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S U M M A R Y  
Due to the increasing prevalence of dementia, caring for people with the condition is a 
global cause for concern. Ethics is an essential part of providing good care. However, 
ethics applied to dementia care needs to take account of the loss of cognition that 
results from the condition. There are particular challenges which arise when caring for 
a human being who has lived a normal life, but in whose current state does not fully 
resemble the person they were. 
This thesis aims to establish which philosophical approach provides the best foundation 
for an ethics of dementia care that can be both inclusive of everyone with dementia and 
meet these everyday challenges. In order to do this, the methodological approach of 
philosophical inquiry has been taken. As such, the concepts and arguments employed in 
the philosophical and empirical work have been critically examined. The results of this 
inquiry have then been utilised to construct a new pluralistic ethical model. 
The central argument of the thesis is that ethical approaches based on the moral status 
of the care recipient are not adequate and therefore should not be the primary focus for 
dementia care ethics. Instead, it is argued that a more promising approach is to embrace 
a virtue of receptivity (as advocated by Slote) in order that people are more responsive 
to the thoughts and feelings of those in their care. The ethical model proposed then 
combines this with principles to guide the care provider; as well as recognising the 
essential element of a supportive sociopolitical environment for the provision of ethical 
care. 
To implement this change, a suggested programme for ethics education is outlined. 
Future research will consider both the success of the model and this education 
programme. 
[290]  
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T H E  T H E S I S  
INTRODUCTION 
Dementia raises many questions about the human condition. It disrupts cognition, 
challenges personal identity and with that puts at risk the existence of elements that 
many of us consider fundamental to life’s value. Dementia care is therefore a 
challenging and special task. It needs to support people through periods of cognitive 
decline, while also nurturing the many positive aspects of human existence that 
arguably remain. To be inclusive, the ethics of dementia care must take account of the 
realities of people’s changing cognitive state. 
I first became interested in the effect that the loss of cognition has on autonomy and 
personhood as a Masters student at the Department of Philosophy, University of York. 
At this point, I had worked as a mental health nurse for six years and it occurred to me 
that the way that health care problems are discussed in Philosophy is very different to 
how they are approached by those from a nursing background. In particular, there is a 
tendency to describe the situation of human beings who are deemed to no longer meet 
the criteria of personhood in a reductionist and non-emotional manner, which I found 
unsettling. I envisaged that doing ethics in this way would probably not be satisfactory 
to other nurses and care providers1. There is a need to be respectful of the experience of 
the people whom our decisions affect, and latterly I have concluded, a need to be more 
emotionally involved too. 
My Masters dissertation (Mitchell 2008) investigated how changes in cognition affect 
personal identity and the subsequent challenges that result for advance directives based 
in precedent autonomy. I argued that if respecting autonomy matters, then a social 
                                                        
1 The term care provider is used throughout this thesis to represent anyone who provides care 
for someone with dementia, whether professionally involved or not. The term caregiver and 
carer have been avoided as these can be synonymous with non-professional carers in the 
literature. The term care receiver has been used for someone who receives care. The decision 
has been taken not to hyphenate these terms. 
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narrative view of personal identity provides the best chance of autonomy linked to this 
personal identity surviving the loss of cognition which results from dementia.  
However, my argument rested on a number of assumptions. Firstly, the survival of 
someone’s personal identity and the autonomous wish to carry on a former way of life 
makes sense for someone who has a temporary loss of full cognition such as with an 
acute psychotic episode. Here people can be assumed to have an interest in picking up a 
life with its autonomously held beliefs and preferences. However, for the personal 
identity argument to work for people with dementia, it relies on the assumption that it 
matters in a social sense that the current life lived by the individual is continued in a 
manner consistent with their life narrative as whole. However, it is possible that those 
around the current individual would not value this. More importantly, it is possible that 
the current individual with dementia might show different (non-autonomous) 
preferences. As such, the current individual may end up being held to ransom by 
previous autonomous preferences about how their future self with dementia should 
live. All of these remarks also rely on the assumption that respecting autonomy is of 
prime importance. 
These doubts led me to wish to explore the topic of autonomy and personhood in more 
detail. This formed the proposal for my PhD thesis. I presented this to the International 
Centre for Nursing Ethics at the University of Surrey, which has since become the 
International Care Ethics Observatory (ICE). After initial discussion, it became clear that 
it would be necessary to focus solely on dementia care ethics and to investigate what an 
adequate ethics in this area requires more broadly, beyond the autonomy and 
personhood question. 
In order to do this, a range of philosophical approaches have been analysed. During the 
research process, I reflected on the uncomfortable feeling I experienced in the seminar 
room during my Masters degree. Early in the research process, I was sceptical about the 
value of emotional responses, wishing instead to focus on my project as a rationalistic 
endeavour. At this time, I was greatly influenced by the moral philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant and hoped that it would be possible to have a form of Kantian autonomy that 
would be inclusive of people with dementia. However, the arguments ultimately led 
back to a position sympathetic to this emotive starting point. 
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During my research, I have also continued to work as registered nurse, in practice with 
people who have severe dementia. This has been a further source of reflection. As the 
ethical model has taken shape, I have considered how it might apply in the situations 
that I face. Furthermore, being in practice has helped me to keep a grounded 
perspective and it has given me the opportunity to have discussions with many people 
who have been touched by dementia in various ways. 
The aim of the thesis is to determine which philosophical approach provides the best 
foundation for the ethics of dementia care and to utilise the conclusions of this inquiry 
to construct a new ethical model. 
The ethical model produced aims to be broadly applicable to anyone who is involved in 
dementia care. As such, it is of potential interest to professionals, people with dementia 
and their families. It seeks to offer a new way of thinking about the ethics of dementia 
care that will improve the lives of both people with dementia and those who support 
them. Dementia touches a large number of people in society so there is potentially a 
broader benefit in developing thinking about how society as a whole should relate to 
people with the condition. Furthermore, it is hoped the ethical model might signal the 
development of health care ethics in a direction that makes it more inclusive overall. 
Chapter 1 will outline the significance of dementia as a global challenge. It will consider 
the physical changes that take place in the brain and the philosophical implications of 
dementia being a condition which is both progressive and permanent. The discussion 
will then consider the main challenges that an ethics of dementia care needs to respond 
to. The prominent ethical issues are outlined before going on to discuss the 
methodological and epistemological approach that the thesis is going to take. 
Chapter 2 marks the beginning of an examination of philosophical approaches that 
might ground a new ethical model. Standard ethical thinking may not always be 
applicable due to the effect which the various conditions that cause dementia have on 
people’s cognition. Chapter 2 will consider if the concept of autonomy can be 
understood in a way that is both achievable for people with dementia while being 
rigorous enough to ground personhood as a moral status. The philosophical controversy 
surrounding issues such as personal identity and advance directives will be discussed in 
this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 broadens the discussion of personhood to examine whether it is possible to 
rethink the conceptual basis of personhood for people with dementia in a way that does 
not rely on autonomy. It will consider the ethical responses that might be entailed by 
the psychological properties held by people with dementia. It outlines the effect of 
setting the threshold of cognition needed to support personhood at different levels and 
the possibility that personhood may admit to different degrees. The discussion will then 
move on to the role of embodiment and whether it is possible for personhood to be 
linked to a shared human nature. 
This leads on to the discussion in Chapter 4 which investigates building an ethical model 
around the concept of the dignity of humanity. It will examine the multifarious concept 
of dignity as both a subjective and objective notion along with its relationship to 
autonomy. The latter part of the chapter will evaluate whether humanness might be act 
as a source of intuitive understanding that can guide care. In order to investigate the 
source of this, an existential approach will be drawn on. 
Chapter 5 will consider how the inner life of the care provider is relevant to the caring 
relationship. It will explore the notion of vulnerability in more depth before moving on 
to how this might guide a care provider in terms of cultivating virtues. The importance 
of empathy in caring will be examined, before introducing the key notion of receptivity. 
The role of moral education and exemplars will also be discussed. 
Chapter 6 will examine the ethics of care and compare this philosophy to virtue ethics 
already discussed. This chapter will evaluate the argument for mutuality in caring which 
proposes that society at large values care as a sociopolitical concept. It will also examine 
the broad nature of decision making in the ethics of care and the importance of context 
and negotiation. 
Chapter 7 will examine ethical approaches which balance principles and interests, and 
assess whether these approaches might be compatible with the ethics of care and virtue 
ethics approaches already discussed. The influential four principles framework of 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013) will be explored here, along with the ethical 
framework for dementia from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a). The notion of 
best interests will be examined before moving the discussion on to the role that 
consequentialism and contractualism might play in an ethical model. 
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Chapter 8 will draw together the philosophical arguments used to devise the ethical 
model. The model itself will be explained. Further worked examples of how the model 
might be applied will be outlined before moving onto how the model might be 
communicated as part of an ethics education programme. 
The final chapter will outline recommendations that flow from the philosophical 
arguments before an overall conclusion is drawn. 
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1 THE MAIN CHALLENGES FOR DEMENTIA CARE ETHICS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by outlining the significant nature of dementia and its prevalence, 
both in the UK and worldwide. There follows a description of the physical changes that 
various types of dementia cause in the brain and the decline in cognition that results. 
Dementia, unlike some other conditions which disrupt cognition, is progressive and 
permanent. The philosophical implications of this will be explored. 
In order to construct an ethical model that is both relevant and workable in practice, it 
is necessary to consider the main challenges that the ethics of dementia care needs to 
respond to. This required a literature search of empirical and argument-based literature 
to be carried out and the results of this will be summarised. 
One significant result of this initial search was the decision to focus on the everyday 
ethical issues that care providers face. The decision was also taken at this point to 
create a model that can be used not just by professional groups but by anyone who 
provides care for someone with dementia. This makes the ethical model more broadly 
useful and puts it the line with key legislation and the existing ethical framework 
produced by Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a). 
The final section examines the methodology and epistemology that will be used in order 
to explore the philosophical approaches that might provide the best foundation for the 
ethics of dementia care. 
1.2 THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF DEMENTIA 
Due to its prevalence in society, dementia matters to an increasing number of people. 
Data obtained using a Delphi consensus methodology estimated that 1 in 88 people had 
dementia in the UK population in 2005, rising to over 1 in 9 by age 80-84 and over 1 in 4 
by 90-94 (Knapp & Prince 2007).  Prevalence was expected to rise with 1,735,087 
people expected to have dementia in the UK by 2051, an increase of 154% from 2005 
(Knapp & Prince 2007). Internationally, an increase of 234% was expected from 2001-
2040 leaving 81 million people affected (Ferri et al 2005). 
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More recent studies have suggested that these initial calculations might have been 
inaccurate as the prevalence of dementia was significantly lower in the UK than 
originally predicted (Banerjee 2013; Matthews et al 2013). Newer data suggest that an 
improvement in lifestyle factors, such as smoking cessation, has reduced the amount of 
people who would otherwise have developed the condition.  
Nonetheless, Banerjee (2013: 1835) adds a note of caution by stating: 
‘Even with a small decrease in incidence and prevalence, population ageing will 
still double the numbers with dementia worldwide in the next generation.’ 
In line with this, the latest estimates are that 46.8 million people are living with 
dementia worldwide in 2015 and that this will increase sharply reaching 74.7 million in 
2030 and 131.5 million by 2050. This is mainly due to a large increase in the prevalence 
of the condition in low and middle income countries (Prince et al 2015). 
*** 
Dementia can be defined as a progressive decline in cognition caused by a physical 
deterioration of the brain resulting in reduced social or occupational functioning. Along 
with memory loss, people may also experience language deterioration, poor judgement 
and impairment in visuospatial skills (McFerran & Martin 2014; Stephan & Brayne 
2008).  
The nature of this deterioration depends on the cause of dementia, such as Alzheimer’s 
Disease or Vascular Dementia (Nuffield Council 2009a; Stephan & Brayne 2008). 
Brumback (2004) describes the extent of the changes to the brain caused by 
Alzheimer’s disease, the most common condition that causes dementia. Initially, it 
causes damage to the limbic lobe of the brain, which results in the difficulty with 
memory found in earlier stages. It then progresses onto the temporal lobe producing 
problems with language use and comprehension. Next the condition moves to the 
parietal lobe which affects orientation to space and the ability to manipulate objects. 
Importantly, this can also result in ‘...problems with recognition of self and/or the 
environment.’ (Brumback 2004: 33). 
Alzheimer’s disease then affects the frontal lobe, which involves loss of judgement and 
planning for the future, as well as the ability to interact socially. In the final stages, the 
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sensorimotor cortex and visual cortex are damaged resulting in ‘...the individual 
becoming immobile and relatively unresponsive.’ (Brumback 2004: 35). Brumback 
points out that the extent of deterioration is individual and non-uniform. For some 
people certain talents are reported to be preserved such as being able to play a musical 
instrument even in the end-stages. 
Similar effects are found with other conditions that cause dementia. For example, 
posterior cortical atrophy causes a deterioration of the parietal, occipital, and 
occipitotemporal regions leading to progressive decline in visual and perceptual skills, 
literacy, and coordination (Crutch et al 2012). Vascular dementia is caused by a lack of 
blood getting to specific parts of the brain. As a result, it has a number of different 
subtypes depending on which part of the brain has been affected. Furthermore, a mixed 
picture of vascular dementia and other causes is not uncommon (Román 2005; Stephan 
and Brayne 2008). 
*** 
How to respond to people with dementia is a societal concern and reports suggest there 
are a number of areas where care needs to be improved (House of Lords 2014; Care 
Quality Commission 2014; Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 2011).  
The ethical response is profoundly influenced by the decline in cognition brought about 
by the brain changes described above. Dementia is distinct from a number of other 
situations where cognition is affected. Dementia is progressive and permanent and 
therefore differs from temporary causes of mental disturbance such delirium or 
psychosis. Significantly, the state the person was in before the mental decline will never 
be fully regained, although the cognitive deterioration may not be continuous or regular 
(Stephan & Brayne 2008). 
People with dementia are usually older adults and this means that unlike the situation 
with very young children and people with severe learning difficulties, most people with 
dementia have had, in their past, the cognitive abilities expected of a normal adult. This 
means that people with dementia have made autonomous decisions which they may 
now not be able to understand. As the condition becomes more severe, increasingly 
poor episodic memory severely also affects the ability of individuals with dementia to 
be able to update how they conceptualise their self (Eustache et al 2013). 
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These issues produce a distinctive set of ethical challenges in dementia care. In order to 
better understand what the concrete ethical issues are in practice, a literature search 
has been carried out. 
1.3 LITERATURE SEARCH 
The aim of the literature search is to ascertain what the main ethical challenges are in 
dementia care. Initially, it was decided to locate empirical research studies and reports 
that have sought to highlight the main ethical issues in dementia care. For this the 
databases CINAHL, MEDLINE, AMED, BNI, PsycARTICLES and PsychINFO were used 
employing a protocol driven search strategy utilising the following search terms 
( dementia or Alzheimer* ) and AB ( ethic* and care) and AB (research or study) 
TI ( dementia or Alzheimer* ) and SU ethic* and AB care 
TI ( dementia or Alzheimer* ) and AB ( ethic* and care ) 
Publications were only included if they discussed ethics in dementia care, included 
themes that were potentially relevant to those providing dementia care and did not 
refer merely to research ethics. Following this criteria 159 relevant titles were initially 
found. 
Next, existing philosophical (conceptual) literature on themes relevant to the ethics of 
dementia care was searched.  A different strategy was used due to the different 
academic nature of the material. The main resource used for this search was Google 
Scholar utilising themes such as personhood, autonomy, dignity, vulnerability and 
advance directives. This was enhanced by analysing reference lists and knowledge of 
literature from the author’s previous philosophical research in the area (Mitchell 2008). 
However, as the thesis developed, it became apparent that the latter method was better 
suited to this inquiry for both philosophical and empirical studies. This method is 
referred to as a snowballing approach and is one which employs the judgement of the 
researcher to find relevant references in the process of critically engaging with the 
literature already obtained (Greenhalgh & Peacock 2005). As well as examining 
reference lists of existing papers; citation tracking (available from Google Scholar) can 
also be used in order to see more recent articles that have cited the current article being 
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examined. As with Greenhalgh & Peacock (2005), I found this method yielded a greater 
number of relevant results for both empirical and philosophical studies and, unlike the 
initial protocol driven approach, was able to adapt as different avenues were explored. 
1.4 FINDINGS 
Following engagement with the literature obtained by the snowballing method, the 
following themes emerged as important. 
Figure 1 - Themes from the combined philosophical and empirical literature search 
Abuse by care providers 
Advance directives, including surrogate decision-making 
Autonomy, relational autonomy and precedent autonomy 
Diagnosis disclosure 
Dignity 
Embodiment 
End-of-life care, including feeding 
Ethical frameworks and theories 
Family carers 
Mental capacity and consent 
Medical treatment, including covert administration 
Personal identity 
Personhood 
Quality of life 
Religion / spirituality 
Restraint  
Sexuality 
Staff attitudes or perceptions 
Truth telling 
Wandering and surveillance 
 
These results can be compared to the findings of other researchers who have examined 
the relevant themes for dementia care ethics. These are summarised in the table below.  
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Figure 2 - Relevant themes for the ethics of dementia care from other sources  
Strech et al (2013) The full spectrum 
of ethical issues in dementia care 
determined by a systematic 
qualitative review of the literature 
Coding categories 
from articles 
published on 
dementia and ethics 
(Baldwin et al 2003) 
Consultation for the 
Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics (2009a;b) 
report on ethical issues in 
dementia. 
Diagnosis and medical indication 
Assessing patient decision-making 
competence 
Information and disclosure including: 
a. Respecting autonomy 
b. Information giving 
Decision-making and consent including:  
c. Advance directives  
d. Surrogate / best-interest 
decision-making 
Social and context-dependent aspects 
including: 
e. Caring for relatives 
f. Caring for carers 
g. Resource allocation 
h. Risk to others 
Care process including 
i. Carer attitudes 
j. Patient involvement 
Special situations including: 
k. Benefits vs harms 
l. Covert medication 
m. Driving 
n. End-of-life care 
o. Genetic testing 
p. Use of GPS and other monitoring 
q. Prescription of antibiotics and 
antipsychotics 
r. Restraint 
s. Sexual relationships 
t. Suicidality 
Advance directives 
Behavioural issues 
Decision-making 
Driving 
Drug treatment 
End-of-life issues 
Family 
Feeding issues 
Genetics 
Informed consent 
Legal issues 
Planning issues 
Professional care and 
ethics 
Quality of life 
Research issues 
Resources 
Treatment issues 
Truth-telling 
General/Other 
Advance care planning 
Assisted suicide and 
euthanasia 
Use of assistive technologies 
Freedom of action and risk 
Sexual relationships and 
sexual disinhibition 
Truth telling 
Restraint 
Abuse by family and friends 
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Strech et al (2013) carried out a systematic qualitative review of the literature in order 
to determine the full spectrum of ethical issues in clinical dementia care. The main 
themes are shown above (in figure 2) with some examples of the sub-themes found by 
the authors. Ten years earlier, Baldwin et al (2003) mapped the literature by analysing 
keyword classifications on ethics and dementia articles from 1980-2000. Figure 2 
reproduces their list of the more common and enduring keyword classifications. Finally, 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a; 2009b) explored a number of common ethical 
issues which had been highlighted in the consultation process for their report Dementia: 
Ethical issues. These are also listed above. 
A number of prominent themes can be identified by the frequency they appear in the 
literature. These are the use of advance directives; truth-telling, including diagnosis 
disclosure; balancing freedom with risk, including restraint and the use of assistive 
technology, sexual relationships, end-of-life issues, and administration of medical 
treatment. 
The themes generated by the searches shown in figure 2 are almost exclusively on 
concrete issues in dementia care rather than philosophical themes with the exception of 
autonomy which is mentioned by Strech et al (2013). This is in contrast to the themes 
generated by the combined philosophical and empirical literature search carried out 
here. On the other hand, a recent literature review of studies published on ethical issues 
experienced by healthcare workers in nursing homes did find that the clash of ethical 
principles such as autonomy and beneficence was the most frequently raised issue 
(Preshaw et al 2015). This review was not specific about cause of these clashes and it 
needs to be noted that the focus here was not on dementia care ethics in particular. 
1.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF EVERYDAY ETHICS 
Reflecting on the literature and reviews of the literature brought the realisation that the 
most useful focus for an ethical model for dementia care is everyday ethics as this 
reflects what actually concerns care providers in their day-to-day work (Brodtkorb et al 
2015; Strech et al 2013; Bolmsjö et al 2006; Powers 2001; Hasselkus 1997). This can 
also be referred to as a microethical approach (Örulv & Nikku 2007). This enables the 
model to be useful to a wide range of care providers on a day-to-day basis. 
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Everyday ethics examines the ordinary day-to-day issues which arise in dementia care 
that may not immediately appear to be ethical as they do not involve major treatment 
decisions, large scale concerns such as health care rationing or matters of life and death. 
Raising awareness of the ethical nature of these day-to-day issues aims to encourage 
people to reflect on how to improve the care provided. As Powers (2000: 144) puts it 
‘...discovering the ethical in the ordinary forces reflection on what is taken for granted in 
the details of individual situations.’ Dauwerse et al (2012) also found there is a need for 
appropriate support to help staff identify these more ordinary ethical issues in care and 
consider different responses. 
As such, other areas highlighted by Baldwin et al (2003) such as genetic testing and 
research ethics will not be the primary consideration here. Neither will there be 
particular attention to issues of a good death, palliative care, or euthanasia; though, the 
ethical model aims to be broadly applicable to these situations and these topics will be 
discussed to some extent. The ethical model aims to be sensitive to context and 
therefore resource allocation though not considered in terms of macro decision-making, 
it is considered relevant in terms of the options that are reasonably available for the 
care provider providing everyday care. 
1.6 EXAMPLES OF EVERYDAY ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEMENTIA CARE 
1.6.1 AUTONOMY AND THE USE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
Ethical challenges can arise when deciding whether to respect principles that have been 
long held by the person but now have been forgotten.  
An example is when a life-long vegetarian with dementia asks for a meat at a meal, 
having forgotten his or her previous vegetarianism. To respect the commitment to 
vegetarianism is to respect a choice, made in autonomy, from the person in the past. 
However, the current individual has no memory of this choice and wishes to experience 
the pleasure of meat. 
 As Hope and McMillan (2011) point out a lot depends on the initial reasons for 
vegetarianism. It may have been that, in the past, s/he did not like the taste of meat or 
that he merely made a lifestyle choice. In this case, it seems more reasonable to yield to 
a current stated preference than if s/he was previously a vegetarian through religious 
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conviction or due to a moral objection to the consequences of meat production such as 
animal suffering. If the latter is the case, then there are arguments that suggest that past 
convictions such as these survive and should be respected despite being unknowable to 
the current individual (Dworkin 1993). However, other arguments suggest the current 
preferences still take precedence as the connection with the person in the past (who 
would have abhorred eating meat) is made tenuous by the current individual’s inability 
to remember that choice (Dresser 1986). This will be explored in depth in Chapter 2 
(2.9.2) 
Advance directives have been proposed as a formal way of enabling autonomous future 
decision-making for when such abilities might be lost. Advance directives offer a way 
for people to make a choice about the type and extent of intervention they would accept 
in the future if incapable of making that choice at the time (Capron 2009). They can 
consist of a written or oral statement by the person or involve appointing a proxy to 
make decisions after capacity has been lost. In the UK advance decisions, or proxy 
decision-makers appointed under a lasting power of attorney, usually have the power to 
refuse treatment for someone who lacks capacity (Department of Constitutional Affairs 
2007). There is also a facility for advance statements to be taken into account where a 
person can express their future preferences, although these are not legally binding. 
Although, an existing advance directive may make the past preference clearer, it does 
not resolve the ethical difficulty of whether to favour past or current principles/ 
preferences. A well-known example in the literature is that of “Margo” as outlined by 
Ronald Dworkin (1993). Margo is a thoroughly contented woman with advanced 
dementia. Her existence consists of repeating the same drawing, listening to music and 
appearing to read random pages in a novel. Dworkin considers what would have 
happened if Margo had written an advance directive stating a wish not to receive life 
saving treatment or even to be painlessly killed if in such a state. Does past Margo, have 
the right to make a decision about the current Margo? Should (precedent) autonomy be 
understood as a principle so strong that it outweighs current Margo’s right to exist in an 
apparently contented condition? Would past Margo have made a different decision if 
she had been aware of the contented nature of her future self?  
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The answers to these questions hinge greatly on issues of personal identity, a number of 
which are metaphysical in nature. How this problem might be tackled will be returned 
to in more depth in Chapter 2 (2.9.3) 
1.6.2 TRUTH-TELLING  
Truth-telling is a common issue for both professional and family carers. As pointed out 
rather frankly by James et al (2006a: 801) in reference to professional dementia care 
‘...it is evident that lying is pervasive within care settings’. In their exploratory study of 
staff in various elderly care settings in North East England and Eire, it was found that 
98.2% of respondents stated that either they or a colleague had lied to someone with 
dementia.  
For a number of scholars in the bioethical field, lying to people in care is a prima facie 
wrong (Schermer 2007), which reduces trust (O’Neill 2002a) and fails to the respect the 
person’s humanity (Korsgaard 1996). However, there are times when lying appears to 
present itself as a viable option for relieving distress. A recent consultation among 
stakeholders in dementia care (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009b) produced a range 
of responses from a position of a prohibition of lying on one end to positions of lying to 
promote wellbeing (for either the carers or people with dementia) on the other. 
Seemingly the question produces polarised positions. 
Schermer (2007) provides some concrete examples. The first is where a woman with 
dementia bangs on the door of a locked ward begging to be let out to collect her long 
since grown-up children from school. It is found that telling her the truth makes the 
distress worse; whereas saying her children will not be out of school for an hour eases 
the distress. This is a lie that colludes with a false belief. However, this belief allows the 
woman peace and the ability to talk about her feelings for her children. 
The second example involves a widower who keeps asking how his wife is and is 
inconsolable every time he is told that she has died. Considering the man’s inability to 
remember the information combined with the fact that he becomes highly distressed 
every time he is told, produces a seemingly compelling reason to tell a lie despite the 
prima facie prohibition. However, to tell a ‘white lie’ might be argued by some as being 
disrespectful to his personhood. 
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Hasselkus (1997) in her discussion of everyday ethics makes a helpful distinction that 
these ‘white lies’ fall into two major types. The first are those that fit into the current 
reality of the person with dementia; the second creates a different reality. Schermer 
does not explore this latter option. However, a situation could be imagined where the 
widower discussed above repeatedly remembers his wife is dead (rather than asking 
where she is) but can only be consoled by the same lie that she is out and will return 
soon. There may be a moral difference here as this is contradicting a known truth rather 
than colluding with a false belief.  
These examples and the issue of truth telling will be returned to in more depth in later 
chapters (3.4.2; 5.4.2; 6.3.2) 
1.6.3 UPHOLDING DIGNITY 
Though dignity did not feature in the conclusions of the reviews outlined in figure 2, it 
was identified in the investigation carried out here as a key concept in a number of the 
studies found in both the empirical and conceptual literature. 
For example, an ethical challenge arises when a current preference or a practice of care 
providers is considered undignified in the context of the context of the care receiver’s 
life as a whole. To illustrate this, Chapter 4 (4.6) will consider a professor who has a 
long and distinguished academic career behind her. Now in an advanced state of 
dementia, it appears that providing the professor with a doll to cuddle, which she 
believes is a baby, is effective at reducing her distress. 
A dilemma arises as there is evidence to indicate that doll therapy can be effective in 
this way (James et al 2006b). However, as a therapeutic approach this raises concerns 
about infantilization, which arguably leads to the professor’s dignity being 
compromised. On the other hand, Andrew (2006:419) argues that doll therapy 
preserves dignity more than the alternative methods of managing agitation such as 
using chemical or physical restraint, and it also maintains dignity by providing an 
opportunity to ‘....give care rather than receive it.’ 
In order to decide a dignified way forward, much turns here on how the concept is 
defined. Is dignity something that can be enhanced as well as respected? What is/are 
the source/s of dignity for people with dementia? Does it lie in a broader conception of 
Page | 25  
 
dignity as a human being; or is it more specifically about being a fully functioning 
person, perhaps having a certain status or being of good moral stature (Nordenfelt 
2004)? A certain view of dignity may lead to an alternative action such as providing the 
professor with academic journals to read that she no longer recognises. This may well 
respect the dignity of a meritorious role and fit with a more adult view of behaviour but 
it could also result in distress for the professor in her current state. Nonetheless, it is 
still an example of pretending, and is therefore also ethically questionable. 
Chapter 4 will critically examine the concept of dignity and assess whether it can be 
helpful in such dilemmas. 
1.6.4 MEDICAL TREATMENT 
The everyday act of administering medication can raise a number of ethical issues. First, 
being the appropriateness of using medication as a chemical restraint in order to reduce 
challenging behaviour. This is described as an ongoing ethical struggle for professionals 
as sometimes they feel that the risk to the client, themselves or other clients leaves 
them with no other acceptable option but to ‘take the edge off’ using medication 
(Hasselkus 1997: 646). This dilemma is sharpened by recent research that certain types 
of sedation using anti-psychotic medication can be of particular harm to people with 
dementia and may result in premature death (Banerjee 2009). 
A second issue is covert administration of medication. A review of the literature from 
Haw and Stubbs (2010) found between 43-71% of nursing homes in the UK disguised 
medication in food or drink. Ethical and legal justification relies heavily on the notion of 
best interests (Hughes 2006; Haw and Stubbs 2010; National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence 2015).  The care provider needs to judge whether the covert act, along with 
any harm caused by the medication itself, is outweighed by the benefits of taking the 
medication. Truth-telling and the balancing of goods is an issue here. There is deception 
as the individual does not know they are taking medication but there may also be lying 
if the care provider states explicitly that there is no medication mixed with food in order 
to get the person to take it. The care provider has to make a judgement that the overall 
good (beneficence) outweighs concerns about deception and non-consensual 
intervention. This issue will also be returned to in Chapter 8 (8.5.2) 
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1.6.5 BALANCING FREEDOM WITH RISK 
Reducing the risk of harm is a consideration for those who care for people with 
dementia. However, this has to be considered along with a claim to freedom, such as a 
need for people with dementia to go for walk (known as “wandering”). Robinson et al 
(2007) carried out a systematic literature review followed by a focus group study of 
professionals and carers on this topic. This found that a key issue to balance was 
working out the acceptable level of risk that can be taken in allowing the benefits of free 
movement to people with dementia. For professionals this caused a conflict between a 
promotion of person-centred care and the physical benefits of wandering on the one 
side, with a concern to not only maintain acceptable safety but also to avoid accusations 
of negligence and litigation on the other. As Powers (2000) points out, this is often a 
matter of weighing competing goods, but along with others in the area, Powers falls 
short of offering clear guidance as to how these weights should be ascertained. This 
perhaps illustrates why Robinson et al (2007) found that carers judged professionals to 
be overprotective in their decision-making about risk, whereas professionals 
considered carers to be taking unacceptable risks in favour of freedom. 
One way of managing risk associated with movement is to use surveillance technologies 
such as tagging, tracking devices and cameras. Niemeijer et al (2010) carried out a 
systematic literature of surveillance technologies in residential care and found the 
central themes were institutional aims (efficacy, managing risk and staff burden); care 
relation (duty of care vs. autonomy, substitution of care by technology, person-centred 
care) and resident concerns (freedom and consent, privacy, dignity and sigma). 
However, the reviewers found that the articles reviewed were not able to delineate the 
ethical concepts clearly. For example, dignity can be employed on both sides of the 
argument. It may be believed that wearing a tag for tracking is unacceptable from a 
human dignity perspective, as being human dictates a prohibition on such an intrusion. 
Alternatively, it may be that using technology respects dignity by allowing some 
freedom while preventing people from getting into undignified situations such as being 
outside while inappropriately dressed. The issue of surveillance will be returned in 
Chapter 8. 
Another area where freedom is in tension with risk is the area of sexuality. This is 
becoming a focus of increasing attention in the literature as the benefits of sexual 
Page | 27  
 
intimacy for people with dementia is being recognised (Makimoto et al 2015). However, 
people with limited decision-making capacity are at risk of physical exploitation, so the 
freedom to engage in sexual activity needs to be balanced with this risk. Consent is a 
central notion here. However, this may not be easy to assess. Furthermore, current 
preferences may be in tension with past values and beliefs. This issue will also be 
returned to in Chapter 8 (8.5.3). 
1.7 METHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
This thesis is a philosophical inquiry. As such, it is primarily a critical examination of the 
ideas and arguments used in the philosophical and empirical work relating to the area. 
This analysis will then be used to construct an argument for an ethical model which is 
sufficiently rigorous to be defended against similar scrutiny from others. This differs 
from qualitative research as the emphasis in a philosophical enquiry is on the reasoning 
employed in defending the thesis, rather interpretation of the data itself (Pesut and 
Johnson 2008). 
It is also the case that in healthcare ethics, it is necessary for philosophical conclusions 
to grounded in reality and be applicable to real situations (McCullough et al 2004). Such 
a move has resulted in the proposal for an empirical turn in bioethics reacting against 
the traditional top-down approach of applying ethical theories to individual situations 
(Borry et al 2005). It is recognised, even by those who are sceptical of such an empirical 
turn, that empirical research can inform normative reasoning (Hurst 2010). For 
example, such research can be of use for assessing the nature and frequency of certain 
ethical problems in the field, as well as people’s reactions to these problems. 
Nonetheless, data collection alone is not expected to provide answers to ethical 
problems. 
The ethical model must aim to stand up to empirical as well as conceptual scrutiny, in 
the sense that it has to be both viable philosophically and workable in practice for care 
providers. To test empirically the usefulness of the ethical model is beyond the scope of 
this thesis but could be a direction for future research. 
In its conceptual analysis, this thesis will draw on methods such as those outlined by 
McCullough et al (2004) for appraising the argument-based medical ethics literature. 
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They have observed that argument-based literature is often based on a number of 
appeals to ethical principles, general ethical theory, casuistry, reflective equilibrium, 
tradition and current practice standards and professional virtues. Appeals that are 
generally not considered acceptable in philosophical discourse include arguments 
merely based on expert or majority opinion, law, or facts. Such appeals will be evaluated 
when they appear. This involves an assessment of how terms have been defined, 
whether the concepts are clear and whether the argument put forward is consistent and 
coherent.  
Nonetheless, a note of caution is required. The analysis has to be flexible enough to be 
applicable to the large range of different ethical traditions which are being explored in 
this thesis. For example, an assessment of whether an ethical theory can form consistent 
rules that are universally action-guiding is not going to be relevant to a virtue ethics or 
care ethics approach which does not itself accept the need for such an assessment. It is 
not always coherent to criticise a philosophical approach from the perspective of 
another. It has been necessary instead to try and get inside the conceptual mindset of 
the various approaches to assess their merits. It is for such reasons that an overall 
framework from which to assess the philosophical argument-based literature is not 
appropriate here. 
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2 AUTONOMOUS PERSONHOOD 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Personhood has been highlighted as a fundamental notion in dementia care (Kitwood 
1997; Brooker 2004; Edvardsson et al 2008). Personhood also has a long history in 
bioethics more generally, but has been variously understood (Macklin 1983). 
Controversy continues to surround issues such as the relevant criteria for having 
personhood, if it can be a matter of degree and how we ought to respond to those who 
are found to be at its margins (Kittay 2005; Tooley 2012). This leads to uncertainty 
about what it means to recognise and respect personhood when caring for people with 
dementia. 
In everyday speech, personhood can be used as a descriptive term referring to all, and 
only those, beings who are biologically human (DeGrazia 2005; Sapontzis 1981).  
However, for the purpose of this thesis, personhood is functioning as an evaluative term 
meaning that the bearer has a particular moral status (Sapontzis 1981). Personhood is 
initially defined here as the full moral standing that is associated with persons, bringing 
with it particular protections and entitlements (Jaworska 1999; Jaworska and 
Tannenbaum 2013). Respecting personhood is understood here in terms of recognition 
respect as proposed by Darwall (1977). This means recognising an authority based on a 
particular fact about the entity being considered. 
This chapter will begin the exploration of personhood by outlining how it might be 
grounded by autonomy, using the term autonomous personhood to differentiate it from 
other forms (Christman 2015). The chapter will introduce an example from dementia 
care. It will then explore individual autonomy by first differentiating it from freedom 
and highlighting the importance of the capacity for reflection in this context (Dworkin 
1988). The link between this and the law on mental capacity will be examined. This will 
then be contrasted with the view of principled autonomy that focuses on the moral 
content of autonomous choice (O’Neill 2002a). 
As difficulties arise with these views, the latter part of the chapter will consider how 
they might be modified. The first possibility is precedent autonomy (Dworkin 1986), 
which seeks to ground the moral authority of advance directives. The legal position will 
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again be explored before moving on to problematising advance directives as a way of 
maintaining autonomy. The main challenge here is defending the notion of autonomous 
personhood continuing despite radical changes to the person’s psychology and perhaps 
their identity. Responses to this challenge bring further views of autonomy, leading to 
the consideration of a narrative view of personal identity (DeGrazia 2005); exploring 
more social and relational forms of autonomy (Kuczewski 1994; Mackenzie and Stoljar 
2000) and finally the approach of ‘actual autonomy’ (Agich 2003) 
2.2 AUTONOMOUS PERSONHOOD 
Respect for autonomous personhood is based on the proposed fact that the individual 
with dementia has autonomy. Respecting autonomous personhood requires the 
facilitation of autonomous choices. The nature of autonomous personhood is dependent 
on how autonomy itself is understood.  
The link between autonomy and personhood can be found in classical philosophy. The 
Kantian philosophical view directly links the moral status of being a person with the 
possession of autonomy as a property of the will (Kant 1996a/1785). More generally, 
autonomy is understood to be a capacity for self-governance, which provides people 
with the opportunity to live life in a manner of their own choosing (Christman 2015). 
In biomedical ethics, the influential work of Beauchamp and Childress (2013) argues 
that ‘respect for autonomy’ is one of four key principles of decision-making. For 
Beauchamp and Childress, a respect for autonomy requires that it is made possible for 
people to express their preferences for treatment and care and that these are followed 
unless compelling reasons exist not to do so. This includes providing people with a 
sufficient level of truthful information to make such choices along with an entitlement 
to refuse unwanted interventions. 
Yet, autonomy is a broad and contested concept. As such, this description may be either 
an oversimplification or misrepresentation of autonomy. As the concept of autonomy is 
variously understood, this affects the nature of what constitutes an autonomous choice 
and therefore who can make such a choice. Inevitably, this affects how the choices of 
people with dementia are evaluated. 
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The following example is suggested as an everyday ethical challenge that will be 
returned to throughout the chapter. Although fictional, it is based on empirical work by 
Powers (2001: 334) which identifies the need to learn ‘the limits of intervention’ in 
everyday situations. It relates to a commonly expressed concern of care providers about 
how much freedom should be curtailed in the effort to promote the well-being of the 
individual with dementia, as well as balancing the interests of those around them. 
The aim of this everyday example is to illustrate how varying the understanding of 
autonomy in such a situation can alter the treatment of someone with dementia and the 
resulting implications for autonomous personhood. 
Consider a man with dementia (called Bill) who lives in a residential nursing 
home. Bill has always been an active man and when he first moved to the home 
he used to say that he would never want to stay in bed past midday.  
However, recently, Bill’s dementia has progressed and for the last week, he has 
decided to stay in bed all day until the evening meal at 5pm. This is despite 
having had a seemingly adequate amount of sleep, and there being no signs of 
physical illness. The main concerns are that his health may start to deteriorate 
and that he is losing the benefit of interacting with other people in the home. 
Furthermore, Bill is unable to remember that this is the seventh morning that he 
has stayed in bed. Should Bill’s wish to stay in bed until 5pm be respected? 
The care provider has a belief that it is right to respect autonomous personhood. 
Nonetheless, she also believes that Bill is unable to understand why it is in his 
best interests not to stay in bed. Based on this judgement, she decides to carry 
out a seemingly paternalistic action. Bill is persuaded to get out of bed and go 
into the dining room in time for lunch. This is done by telling him that the rules 
of the home state that he needs to vacate his room before lunchtime, even though 
no such rules exist. 
The care provider uses her position of power to move Bill (or get him to move) perhaps 
with an assumption that autonomous personhood is absent, or at least eroded to a point 
where it is not worthy of respect. Yet, it could be argued that the mere fact that Bill has 
stated his preference will be sufficient for it to be seen as an autonomous choice. If 
autonomy is understood and respected in this way, then it follows that it is wrong to 
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coerce and deceive Bill to get him out of bed. His preference should be accepted 
regardless of whether reasons for getting out of bed appear compelling or not. 
An adult person in a usual situation in society could be reasonably expected to have an 
entitlement to make a choice about staying in bed, along with accepting the associated 
consequences. Such a person would therefore be protected from being coerced or 
deceived. If autonomy is used as the foundation of personhood, then the judgement that 
Bill lacks autonomy has led to at least some protections and entitlements associated 
with personhood to fall away. 
The situation is further complicated as the care provider might still seek to justify the 
action to move Bill based on a claim that it is exercising his autonomy in a different way. 
This is because an alternative view of autonomy is available that gives precedence to a 
preference of Bill’s from his past (to get up promptly) even though Bill is no longer 
consciously aware of it. This justification could be stated in simple terms such as: “Bill 
would not have wanted to stay in bed all day.”  
Alternatively, the care provider may see themselves as taking a broader perspective, 
where the requirements of autonomy are part of the broader social context of the home 
as whole. As such it is considered acceptable to override Bill’s choice as it is at odds with 
this social view. 
Finally, the care provider may take the more extreme view that they have a position of 
legitimate authority where protections and entitlements are able to be overridden, such 
as it is generally accepted that state authorities are allowed to use a threat of legally 
sanctioned force to coerce even fully autonomous persons in the best interests of 
society (Anderson 2014). Here the care provider is taking a view that the protections 
and entitlements of autonomous personhood even if they do exist are not applicable in 
this context. 
As this example shows, varying the understanding of autonomy produces different 
results in terms of how autonomous personhood might be respected. This chapter will 
now explore these various understandings. 
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2.3 INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
Depending on how it is understood, achieving autonomy can be more or less 
demanding.  When someone with dementia states a preference, it is possible that this 
wish and the associated action will not be considered autonomous by those around 
them, as illustrated by the example of Bill above. Bill may well have the ability to 
express a preference to stay in bed and carry that out by acting to stay put. However, 
although it is possible that Bill has the freedom to stay in bed it does not necessarily 
follow that Bill is exercising autonomy by doing so. 
Freedom is understood here to mean a lack of constraint on choice, concurring with a 
sense of negative liberty suggested originally by Berlin (1969). In this sense, Bill could 
be allowed to do as he wishes; however, the aim is to find the best philosophical basis 
for an ethics for dementia care. Therefore, it is important this is seen in the context of a 
broader ethical theory or system. Does the mere fact that the choice is freely 
undertaken create an obligation for it to be accepted by others? John Stuart Mill 
(2010/1859) comes closest to suggesting this in the work On Liberty in which he argued 
for a limitation of the interference by the state on the freedom of the individual. Mill 
believed that persons should be free to make their own choices in order to develop 
individuality and character. 
Such views have the advantage of allowing many more choices to be exercises of 
autonomy and therefore by implication choices to be accepted by those who wish to 
respect the autonomous personhood of others. However, Manson and O’Neill (2007: 20) 
worry that leaving things merely to a matter of free choice would lead to a policy where 
choices: 
‘....however bizarre, however self-destructive, however offensive, however 
degrading – will be permissible, and restrictions on them will be unacceptable’ 
Although this quote is not discussing decision-making by people with dementia in 
particular, the concern that accepting all free choices could lead to bizarre, self-
destructive, offensive or degrading behaviour is relevant. Some examples could be 
quoted: a free choice to walk naked into a communal area; a free choice to leave a place 
of safety while being unaware of the danger outside; a free choice not to eat, or to refuse 
life-sustaining medication. Empirical research by Robinson et al (2007), Bolmsjö et al 
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(2006) and Powers (2001) demonstrates that balancing such freedoms with the risk of 
harm is a common concern of those providing care for people with dementia in various 
settings, as well as for people with dementia themselves. This finding is also reflected in 
a recent consultation work from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009b) which 
included people with dementia and their care providers. 
Manson and O’Neill (2007) argue that autonomy, if thought of as merely free choice, 
cannot be seen as fundamental to ethics. However, few would argue that autonomy 
understood in such a minimal way could perform such a function. Beauchamp and 
Childress’s (2013) view of autonomy shows some similarity with more minimal views 
of the concept. However, it does include the requirement that the choice must involve a 
substantial (though not full) understanding, as well as intentionality and voluntariness. 
They also construct an ethical framework where ‘respect for autonomy’ in this sense is 
not central as it can be overridden by other key principles, such as beneficence. So this 
would respond to Manson and O’Neill’s concern as restrictions on choice would be 
acceptable, although it would mean that autonomy understood in this way cannot be 
solely fundamental to an ethical model, which is the aim for this chapter. 
Mill (2010/1859) also calls for some restrictions on conduct of the individual by saying 
that for freedom to be valuable, desires and impulses need to be owned by the person 
concerned, pursuing their own good while allowing others to do so too. Arguably, it is 
these conditions that make the choice autonomous. It does this by giving the choice a 
greater value or moral significance by associating it with an authentic wish from the will 
of the person. As Dworkin (1988:26) puts it: 
’What is valuable about autonomy is that the commitments and promises a 
person makes be ones he views as his, as part of the person he wants to be, so 
that he defines himself via those commitments.’ 
Dworkin (1988) argues for a version of individual autonomy based on Frankfurt’s 
(1971) division of desires. From this, Dworkin distinguishes that preferences can be of 
the first or second order. A first order preference is where a person has a desire and 
prefers this to available alternatives. A second order preference is where the person is 
able to reflect on this first order preference and decide whether the preference is one 
that itself is preferred. For example, a person may have a preference for coffee over 
water. However, for it to be a second-order preference, the person must be able to 
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reflect on the first order preference and decide whether they would prefer to prefer 
water or coffee. 
Furthermore, Dworkin (1988) argues that the person exercising autonomy must engage 
in a process of reflection that is subject to procedural independence. This means that 
the person must be able to reflect in a way that is free from manipulation or coercive 
influences; here, the actual content of the choice is not important.  
The notion of procedural independence has been further developed by Christman 
(2004) who concentrates on determining what the procedure needs to be independent 
from. He points out that the process of reflection must meet the requirement that the 
agent could realistically imagine choosing otherwise if aware of the alternative reasons 
behind their decision. 
To illustrate procedural independence, the example of choosing between coffee and 
water can be returned to. The addictive properties of caffeine, found in the example of 
coffee mentioned above, is something that can affect procedural independence. If this 
factor was not taken into account when reflecting whether to drink it or not this 
addiction could affect the independence of the thinking procedure, and it is possible that 
autonomy will not be exercised when the coffee is consumed. In other words, the agent 
in this case needs to be aware of the influence of caffeine addiction on their choice but 
still prefer to allow the addiction to influence their preference for coffee. 
It is important to highlight that Gerald Dworkin’s is a capacity based view. So a 
particular choice a person makes such as drinking coffee or staying in bed may be 
judged non-autonomous yet the person may still remain capable of making that choice 
autonomously. The important thing for Dworkin is that the capacity to make the 
autonomous choice is present rather than focussing on the choice itself. This focuses 
respect onto persons rather the choice. Indeed, this capacity Dworkin sees as being ‘a 
characteristic of persons’ (1988: 15), which concurs with the current stance of 
autonomy being a necessary foundation for personhood. 
When seeking consent from cognitively intact individuals, healthcare professionals may 
assume that such a reflective process is possible and hope that it has been enacted in 
order to justify the choice in terms of this more robust conception of individual 
autonomy. This reflection would have to consider the pros and cons of such a wish 
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leaving open the possibility of rejecting this first order preference based on a wider 
assessment of the preferred direction of one’s life as a whole. 
Returning to our example, Bill may be able to say: “I am not someone who usually stays 
in bed all day but today I am particularly tired.” This suggests a link between a 
qualitative personal identity and autonomy (DeGrazia 2005). Bill could draw on his 
identity as someone who does not stay in bed all day as a possible reason for rejecting 
his first order preference, yet still decide in this case that the first order preference to 
stay in bed stands due to being particularly tired. 
However, for some people with dementia, concerns may be raised about such a 
reflective process being possible, as dementia, by definition, involves a deterioration of 
such cognitive abilities (Stephan & Brayne 2008).  In the case of Bill, the justification for 
overriding his choice to stay in bed could be grounded in such a concern. To have the 
capability to exercise autonomous choice, as currently being considered, he would have 
to be able to reflect on the wish to stay in bed. If unable to do so then arguably the 
choice could be overridden without disregarding autonomy as a concept or principle. 
2.4 THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MENTAL CAPACITY 
The legal notion of competence may be linked to the ethical view of autonomy. This is 
because there is a level of mental capacity required before a person can be considered 
legally competent to make a treatment or care decision in the similar way that mental 
capacity has so far been argued to be required for an exercise of autonomy. 
 If someone is considered competent to make the decision then it arguably follows from 
a respect for autonomous personhood that the decision is accepted as their own, along 
with an understanding that the person also takes responsibility for the consequences. 
However, whether the requirements of autonomy are also met will vary depending on 
how it is understood. 
As with the example of Bill outlined above, the harder cases are where someone is 
making a decision that is considered contrary to his/her best interests. Yet this does not 
give care providers an immediate licence to overrule such decisions. In the law of 
England and Wales the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Section 1 (1) states firstly that:  
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‘A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that they lack 
capacity.’ 
And Section 1(4) 
’A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he 
makes an unwise decision.’  
In environments where the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is applicable, there is therefore a 
legal expectation that people’s capacity to make treatment and care decisions should be 
assessed if the person has an ‘...impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, 
their mind or brain...’ such as a form of dementia (Department for Constitutional Affairs 
2007: 44). The Code of Practice in describing who should assess capacity points out:  
‘For most day-to-day decisions, this will be the person caring for them at the time 
the decision needs to be made’ (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007: 53) 
[my emphasis].  
So, any care provider can be expected to make an informal assessment of capacity on a 
day-to-day basis. 
The assessment criteria for Mental Capacity Act 2005 Section 3 (1) state that someone 
is unable to make a particular decision if they are unable: 
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision,  
(b) to retain that information,  
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision,  
or  
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any 
other means). 
If the individual assessed cannot do any one of the above, then this provides evidence 
for the care provider to declare that (on the balance of probabilities) the individual 
lacks capacity to make a particular decision. This then permits, in the legal sense, the 
care provider to make the decision on behalf of the individual in their care as long as it 
can been shown to be in their best interests. 
Yet, it is important to note here that in the law of England and Wales, a best interests 
decision has to be take account the person’s past and present wishes feelings and 
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beliefs. Section 4(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires the decision-maker to 
consider 
‘...so far as is reasonably ascertainable— 
(a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any 
relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity),  
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had 
capacity, and  
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so. ‘ 
This suggests a weighting towards autonomy rather than beneficence. It may well be 
that the person has had a long-standing belief about what they prefer that is not 
considered to be objectively in their best-interests by those around them. However, the 
Act suggests that it may still be in the person’s best interests to follow such a course of 
action, even if others do not believe it will maximise benefit for them. This weighting 
towards autonomy is somewhat in tension with more utilitarian definitions of best 
interests that state it is about ‘...acting so as to promote maximally the good of the 
individual’ (Buchanan and Brock 1990 : 88). 
However, the amount it is weighted towards autonomy depends on how autonomy is 
defined. Much is made in the legal framework of decision-making capacity being both 
decision-specific and time-specific (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2007). It is 
reasonable to state that at a certain time someone may be able to make a decision about 
one aspect of their lives but not another. However, the argument made in this chapter so 
far suggests that the important factor for autonomous personhood is the capacity to 
evaluate a particular decision in the context of broader interests or commitments in one’s 
life, rather than merely the ability to make each decision itself. The person needs to be 
able to decide if and how the decision is relevant to this. If this capacity is lacking, then 
they are lacking autonomy (as currently understood) in the more general sense.  This is 
a more stringent test than the law requires.  
Individual autonomy in its less demanding forms may remain possible for longer and 
may also be less susceptible to such fluctuations. However, the ability to choose in a way 
that is meaningful based on a commitment to live life in a particular manner seems 
likely to be lost as dementia progresses, due to the complexity of the reasoning 
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involved. With this, the justification for paternalistic intervention against the expressed 
wishes of someone with dementia arguably is strengthened as autonomous personhood 
(as currently conceived) is either absent or eroded to a point where it is considered not 
worthy of respect. 
2.5 PATERNALISM 
Paternalistic acts seek to promote the welfare of persons regardless of their current 
wishes (Dworkin 1988). The capacity to exercise autonomy negates the justification for 
paternalistic acts (Dworkin 1988; Holroyd 2009). However, much turns here on how 
paternalism is defined. A key distinction is argued to be the difference between hard 
and soft paternalism (Feinberg 1986). 
Soft paternalism is the view that acting against someone’s wishes is justified only when 
the individual concerned is unable to act in a voluntary way.  Consider the example 
where a stranger is about to cross a damaged bridge. There is not time to communicate 
the danger and the person concerned appears unaware of it. Soft paternalism justifies 
stopping the stranger (Dworkin 2010). Hard paternalism, on the other hand, allows 
interference even with voluntary acts, if it is felt to that this is necessary to promote 
someone’s welfare (Dworkin 2010; Beauchamp and Childress 2013). So even if the 
person was aware that the bridge was damaged and choosing to cross it, a hard 
paternalist action would stop the person, whereas a soft paternalist would let them 
cross. 
Soft paternalism understood in this way may be compatible with autonomy if the 
welfare being promoted by a paternalistic act seeks to promote an autonomous 
preference against someone’s involuntary action. However, this leads Feinberg (1986), 
to raise the question of whether soft paternalism understood in this sense is actually 
paternalism at all, as it merely becomes a way of facilitating autonomy.  
Interestingly, hard paternalism, if understood as interfering with fully voluntary choices 
in someone’s best interest may also be compatible with autonomy, if the voluntary 
choices are considered not autonomous (Scoccia 2008). On the other hand, if hard 
paternalism is understood as promoting someone’s welfare in a manner that violates 
autonomy, such as with Beauchamp and Childress (2013), then it clearly lies outside of 
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an ethical model grounded solely on autonomous personhood. Nonetheless, even hard 
paternalistic acts that offend against a full account of autonomy can still find ethical 
justification in beneficence (Beauchamp and Childress 2013; Scoccia 2008). Therefore, 
these acts cannot be excluded as an ethical course of action when caring for people with 
dementia without further argument. 
Lastly, there is an assumption that underlies the paternalistic approach, namely that 
someone can know what is best for someone else. In order to break this assumption 
down and justify a paternalistic act, it is necessary to draw on other ethical concepts 
outside of autonomy such as consequentialism or a virtue ethics approach. The way that 
autonomy is understood is also relevant. Relational forms of the concept are more 
allowing of others influencing how autonomous decisions are made (Mackenzie and 
Stoljar 2000). This will be considered later in the chapter (2.10). 
2.6 PRINCIPLED AUTONOMY AND THE CAPACITY TO VALUE 
Drawing on the philosophical heritage of the concept, O’Neill (2002a) makes a basic 
distinction between individual autonomy and principled autonomy. The former being 
derived originally from John Stuart Mill’s (2010/1859) view of liberty as outlined 
above; the latter from Immanuel Kant’s (1996b/1797; 1996a/1785) view of autonomy 
of the will, which requires thinking and acting on principles that all others could also 
think and act. 
Principled autonomy incorporates a moral element into exercising autonomy. As 
described by O’Neill (2002a), autonomy in thinking or action is the attempt to think or 
act on principles on which all other rational beings could also think or act. Autonomy, in 
this strict Kantian sense, requires that people legislate rather than merely decide. As 
such, an individual’s choices and behaviour must aim to conform to principles that both 
derive from the individual him/herself but could also be followed by all (Johnson 2008). 
In short, autonomy requires reasoning that strives towards universally applicable 
principles. 
On the face of it, this appears more cognitively challenging than individual autonomy 
and therefore less likely to be possible for people with severe dementia. This creates a 
problem, as on the related Kantian view of persons, people with dementia could be seen 
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as outside the moral community due to lacking this ability and therefore not entitled to 
full moral consideration. However, such an interpretation of Kant is disputed by 
Korsgaard (1996; 2004) who states that even people without the ability to reason well 
can still be considered rational beings under a Kantian conception and are therefore 
seen as persons with the protection and entitlements associated that status. 
According to Korsgaard (1996) rational beings are merely those beings that can value 
ends in life, aside from instinct. Korsgaard (2004: 85) describes a Kantian 
understanding of rationality as being a form of self-consciousness which involves being 
‘...conscious of the principles on which we are inclined to act.’ This is opposed to non-
rational beings that just experience the inclination without a conscious awareness of it. 
So, although the choice may not fully meet the requirement of Kantian moral agency, the 
important element is the striving towards principled autonomy, which involves the 
ability to value aside from instinct. 
Along these lines, Jaworska (1999) argues that autonomy is based on such a capacity to 
value and involves the formulation of principles to govern one’s actions. Jaworska 
claims that people with dementia have a basic capacity to value. She backs this up with 
an empirical claim that in reference to Alzheimer’s disease the area of the brain 
responsible for valuing is less severely affected than the parts responsible for memory. 
Jaworska infers from this that although people with this form of dementia may be 
unable to remember their life as a coherent whole, they may still be able to value by 
laying down principles for their conduct. Jaworska states that this ability means the 
person is capable of autonomy. 
 However, Jaworska (1999: 130) does concede that 
 ‘...possessing the capacity to value does not guarantee that the person can 
exercise autonomy to a full degree. Full-blown autonomy involves not only acting 
on one’s own principles and convictions but also the ability to scrutinize these 
principles and revise them in light of critical evaluation, so that they are well 
articulated and robust’  
So the problem of reflection returns. Though it leaves the question of whether a basic 
autonomy which falls short of ‘full-blown’ autonomy is sufficient to do the work needed 
of it here to ground autonomous personhood. This is possible. However, it seems 
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reasonable to suggest that an unscrutinised principle is less convincing and more likely 
to be overturned by paternalistic motives. 
Returning to the main example, Bill may (currently) hold a principle that a man should 
be left to his devices as long as he is not harming anyone else. However, further scrutiny 
of this principle might reveal other concerns such as a need to be sensitive to the 
current culture of residents socialising as a community, Bill’s previous preference to get 
out of bed early, the impact on Bill’s health etc. A seeming inability by Bill to engage 
critically with the principle could lead to a belief that Bill’s unscrutinised principle is 
best overridden on this occasion. Furthermore, Jaworska (1999: 134) goes on to 
exclude people with ‘late stages’ of Alzheimer’s disease from the capacity to value and 
therefore from her understanding of autonomy altogether. 
So, a basic and reduced form of principled autonomy may be possible but it appears 
vulnerable in similar ways to individual autonomy when the capacity for reflection is 
reduced.  One thing that has become clear is that the opinions and actions of care 
providers are often pivotal. It is they who make judgements about capacity and they 
who are often in the position to promote or restrict actions. 
2.7 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTONOMOUS DECISIONS AND ACTION 
Dworkin conceives exercising autonomy as not merely the ability to reflect and alter 
preferences but also ‘...to make them effective in one’s actions’ (Dworkin 1988: 17). In 
other words, the person must be able to execute the preferred act in order to exercise 
autonomy. This distinction is picked up by Holroyd (2009) who points out that there is 
a significant difference between autonomous choice, agency and action. 
So far the discussion has focussed more on autonomy as a capacity the individual has 
(or had at some point in time) to make autonomous choices. Autonomous choice is a 
mental act. Autonomous action, on the other hand, is the execution of that choice in the 
particular situation. It can be assumed that to be worthwhile, the choice needs to be 
executed by an associated action.  
However, Dworkin’s view on action can be challenged. If Dworkin is understood to 
mean that the person has to be capable physically of carrying out the autonomous 
actions themselves in order for them to be capable of autonomy, then this seems 
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unnecessary stringent. After all, many of our choices require the cooperation of others 
in order to be realised in the material world. It seems fair to say that the value of 
autonomy lies in the associated action being carried out according to the direction of an 
autonomous ideal without the necessary condition that the human with autonomy is the 
sole performer in the present moment of a physical action. Nonetheless, requiring such 
cooperation adds additional factors into the exercise of autonomy. 
Figure 3 describes the factors that need to be considered if autonomy is to be exercised 
with the assistance of a care provider. If the individual with dementia is unable to carry 
out an autonomous action, then this puts the care provider into a pivotal role as they are 
now required in order for autonomy to be exercised. This is also a powerful and 
responsible role and one for which an ethical model for dementia care can make a 
potentially crucial intervention in assisting with decision-making. 
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Figure 3 – Factors to consider when exercising autonomy with the assistance of a care 
provider 
 
Figure 3 outlines that if it is not possible for someone with dementia to exercise 
autonomy themselves, then the first requirement is that a care provider is both present 
and personally adheres to the principle that it is right to respect autonomous 
personhood. Next the care provider needs to be reasonably certain how autonomy 
might be exercised in this particular situation.  This highlights again the key point of this 
chapter that different answers are generated depending on how autonomy is conceived. 
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If the care provider is reasonably certain of the autonomous choice, then further steps 
on the flow chart can now be considered. Firstly, is it possible to facilitate the exercise of 
autonomy with the resources available? If so, the care provider may still believe that 
despite an exercise of autonomy being possible and autonomous personhood being 
worthy of respect there are more compelling reasons why autonomy ought not to be 
exercised in the current situation. As this involves acting against what has now been 
deemed a voluntary and autonomous choice, justification would have to be found 
outside of respect for autonomous personhood. However, if compelling reasons cannot 
be found then the care provider can choose to assist the care receiver in exercising their 
autonomous choice. 
A key point is that this process highlights the powerful position in which the care 
provider finds themselves. It also demonstrates importance of the sociopolitical context 
both in terms of the potential position of power that the care provider finds themselves 
in but also in terms of resources available to support the decisions being made. These 
factors will be examined in Chapters 6 and 8. 
Overall if autonomy cannot be exercised then an alternative ethical strategy has to be 
found. The aim of the remainder of the thesis is to explore the possibilities for this 
alternative strategy and ultimately to construct an ethical model based on the result of 
the analysis. 
2.8 SUMMING UP STANDARD VIEWS OF AUTONOMY 
The possibility of people exercising autonomy based on standard views of the concept 
has been explored. 
It appears that individual autonomy in its robust and meaningful senses involves the 
capacity for reflection that is procedurally independent. This means that decisions are 
made according to deeper second-order preferences that matter in the context of one’s 
life overall. This capacity is quite demanding and is likely to be beyond the reach of at 
least some people with dementia. It can therefore be stated that autonomous 
personhood based in individual autonomy cannot solely meet the aim of grounding an 
ethical model for the care of everyone with dementia. 
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The discussion moved on to explore principled autonomy. However, this found that 
exercising principled autonomy also requires the individual to be capable of a reflective 
thinking procedure about the choices made, which becomes impossible if the individual 
with dementia’s mental capacity is sufficiently reduced. However, these views need not 
be fully dismissed for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the possibility of a model that adapts for varying mental capacity isn’t being 
ruled out. In other words, autonomous personhood would be respected if present but 
an alternative basis would also be needed for those who are unable to think or act with 
autonomy. A related possibility is that autonomy will feature as a principle or value but 
not a fundamental one in grounding personhood. 
Secondly, there are further views of autonomy that draw on these standard conceptions 
but are adapted to take into account those who might be excluded due to current 
cognitive decline. Collectively these are referred to here as modified views of autonomy 
and will be explored now. 
2.9 PRECEDENT AUTONOMY AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
In the first section, it was suggested that even if someone with dementia was unable to 
make an autonomous decision due to cognitive decline, it might still be possible for 
autonomy to be exercised. A promising candidate to allow for this is the concept of 
precedent autonomy. The term was initially coined by Ronald Dworkin (1986) and 
refers to an autonomous choice of an individual from the past that remains applicable at 
the present time when the individual is no longer considered capable of choosing with 
autonomy.  
There is also the closely related concept of prospective autonomy where autonomous 
choices are made in the present with the intention that they will remain applicable in 
the future, despite a loss of mental capacity. Which term is used depends on whether the 
perspective is taken from the time of the autonomous choice being made or at the time 
when the past is being examined for such a choice (Quante 1999). For dementia care, it 
is suggested that the former is more relevant as the discussion is about how to respond 
to people in the present with a reduced capacity for choice. Therefore, the perspective of 
precedent autonomy will be taken up for the discussion. 
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The first question facing a care provider wishing to facilitate the precedent autonomy of 
someone else is how can their autonomous wishes be known? One vehicle for this is to 
use an existing advance directive. From the point of view of the care provider, these 
directives have been made by people in the past in order to choose the type and extent 
of intervention the individual in care would accept now they are deemed incapable of 
making that choice for themselves (Capron 2009; Atkinson 2007). They can take a 
number of forms, such as a past declaration by the individual concerned (also known as 
a living will or instruction directive); the appointment of a lasting power of attorney 
(also known as a proxy directive) or a combination of both (Olick 2001). 
2.9.1 THE LEGAL POSITION OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN ENGLAND 
English Law allows decisions to have been made in advance of a loss of mental capacity 
in either written or oral form using the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The 
term advance directive, although in common use internationally, is not one used in the 
Act. Instead advance directives are divided into advance decisions to refuse treatment 
and advance statements (Department of Health 2015; Department for Constitutional 
Affairs 2007). Both of these forms of advance directing are relevant for advance 
decisions in dementia care. 
In English law, existing advance decisions to refuse treatment that are valid and 
applicable have the same status as contemporary autonomous refusals of treatment 
from a legally competent adult (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007; Johnston & 
Liddle 2007). In order for the advance directive to be applied the decision must be 
considered to be valid and applicable by those who are responsible for making the 
decision. It is also possible to have a lasting power of attorney where the individual 
concerned has appointed someone else to make decisions about their care and 
treatment. An exception to this is if the directive involves a refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment then the decision has to be in written form, signed and witnessed 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007). It also worth noting that as with 
contemporary treatment decisions made by the person in care, these can still be 
overruled by the Mental Health Act 1983, under which people with dementia may be 
detained (Department of Health 2015). 
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In contrast, advance statements outline preferences for future care and treatment, 
rather than refusing specific treatments.  These statements are more likely to relate to 
everyday care issues than advance decisions to refuse treatment.  However, unlike 
advance decisions, they are not legally binding (Department for Constitutional Affairs 
2007; Jankovic et al 2010).  In terms of an ethical response, advance statements are just 
as relevant as the legally binding advance decisions. There is also a requirement in the 
Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice to use any existing advance statements when 
acting in someone’s best interests. Nonetheless, although such statements should be 
taken into account as part of an overall decision; there is no legal obligation to adhere to 
the choice or act on a request for a particular treatment (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs 2007). 
This effectively means that power and moral responsibility remains firmly in the hands 
of the care provider/s in the case of implementing advance statements, as they are not 
binding in the same way as advance decisions. However, even with advance decisions, 
the judgement on validity and applicability lies with the care providers. On closer 
examination the criteria for validity and applicability are quite stringent, and as a result 
there is leeway for the relevant care providers (in this case usually healthcare 
professionals) to declare an advance decision inapplicable or invalid. Examples of 
factors that can make the decision inapplicable or invalid are: 
‘the circumstances are different from those that may have been set out in the 
advance decision’ 
‘there are reasonable grounds for believing that there have been changes in 
circumstance, which would have affected the decision if the person had known 
about them at the time they made the advance decision.’ 
‘....there have been changes in the patient’s personal life… that might affect the 
validity of the advance decision.’ (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007: 
171) 
Jones (2014:102) adds that a clinician would have to enquire about  
‘any doubts that might exist about the patient’s mental capacity at the time when 
the purported advance decision was made 
the information that the patient received about the consequences of the decision 
the circumstances surrounding the making of the purported advance decision 
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the possible effect of undue influence on the patient’s decision; and 
whether the purported advance decision is applicable to the proposed treat and 
was in tented to apply in the circumstances that have arisen.’ 
So if the person in charge of treatment believes for any one of the many reasons 
outlined above that the decision is not valid and applicable, a legal avenue is open to not 
follow the directive. Instead a route, based on the individual’s best interests should be 
taken, which must still consider the advance decision but does not require it is followed. 
Advance refusals can be described as stronger advance directives than advance 
statements (Atkinson 2007), however, as can be seen, they can both be trumped by a 
best interest judgement under specified circumstances. Nonetheless, both advance 
refusals and advance statements can provide evidence of the autonomous wishes of the 
person before they lost the ability to choose autonomously. This at least opens up the 
possibility of respecting autonomous personhood in the present by using these 
expressions of autonomy from the past despite these legal hurdles. 
2.9.2 PROBLEMATISING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN PRACTICE 
Returning to an example from Chapter 1 (1.6.1), I will consider an advance statement 
that outlines a previously stated wish of someone with dementia to only be allowed to 
eat a vegetarian diet. This situation has been highlighted as one of concern to people in 
practice by Hope and McMillan (2011). 
Consider Doris, a woman with advanced dementia. For the last 50 years Doris 
has been a vegetarian. This is due to a strongly held moral conviction against 
using animals for food. After learning of her diagnosis of dementia, Doris had 
written an advance statement stating that under no circumstances should she be 
allowed to eat meat. The care providers in the residential care home where she 
lives are aware of this statement and have believed it to be the right course of 
action to follow Doris’s original wishes, even though none of them share her 
moral convictions. Recently though, Doris has started to ask for lamb chops at 
the main meal. Doris has no recollection of her previous stance; she does not 
know what a vegetarian is and does not appear distressed by the idea of eating 
animals. In fact, Doris is angry when denied food that everyone else can eat. As 
denying Doris the lamb chops causes her distress, many of the people involved in 
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Doris’s care have now started to question whether they should continue to 
follow her original wishes. 
The care providers are faced with a dilemma. Should the advance statement or Doris’s 
current wish to eat meat be followed? If it is believed that Doris can make a current 
autonomous choice, then the advance statement is not valid and the decision is 
seemingly straightforward. Doris has merely changed her mind and (leaving aside 
arguments for vegetarianism) there is no compelling reason why she should not eat 
meat. However, Doris’s inability to recollect her previous conviction or understand its 
significance offers strong evidence against this being an autonomous change of mind. 
So, there is an apparent conflict between Doris’s current wish to eat meat and her 
advance statement that states an autonomous wish to live a life free of meat eating. 
If the care providers wish to respect the autonomous personhood of Doris, then there is 
a duty not to disregard a valid autonomous choice. After all, if Doris were able to 
autonomously refuse to eat meat in the present situation, it would be disrespectful to 
her autonomous personhood to coerce Doris to eat meat or be deceptive about its 
presence in her food for reasons outlined in the discussion on standard views of 
autonomy. Similarly, when Doris was competent in the past she may have had the same 
preference to taste the lamb but still remained vegetarian. This is because, as discussed, 
the value of autonomy lies in being able to override a first order preference in order to 
concur with the preferences or values a person has for their life as a whole. 
So the key concern is whether it is reasonable to say that a past statement is an 
autonomous choice with the same authority as would be the case if Doris could make a 
contemporary autonomous choice. There is a case for this and, as discussed, the 
principle is supported by English law through advance refusals of medical treatment, 
which are legally binding. 
Seemingly, less controversial examples of advance decision–making can be imagined. 
Someone signing a consent form before an operation would reasonably expect a 
surgeon to honour their autonomous wishes while unconscious. Someone who plans 
their funeral in detail could reasonably expect their autonomous wishes for the service 
to survive their bodily death, seeing the funeral as part of their life as a whole. In a 
similar way, people may express an autonomous wish for organ donation (Mitchell 
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2008; Quante 1999). Even so, it is important to note that a view such as that of 
Buchanan and Brock (1990) that these preferences are interests that survive 
incompetence, unconsciousness or death is not sufficient here. Recall that the aim of this 
chapter is to establish how autonomous personhood might form an ethical model for 
dementia care. Interests do not necessarily imply autonomy, autonomous interests or 
autonomous personhood. So, further work will need to be done to establish how 
autonomous personhood can ‘survive’ in dementia. 
So, what are the relevant concerns when respecting Doris as an autonomous person? 
Firstly, the care providers have to be sure that Doris’s current preference for meat is not 
an exercise of autonomy after all. Recall that Jaworska (1999) argued that even when 
the capacity to decide is absent, the capacity to value may remain. So in Doris’s case, it 
may be that she has genuinely developed different values about meat eating which can 
erode the moral authority of the existing advance directive. However, recall that 
Jaworska (1999: 130) also argued that ‘full blown’ autonomy involves the ability to 
scrutinize such values. Doris’s inability to scrutinise her new values weakens its appeal 
as a direct opponent to her previously held moral convictions. The validity of using such 
a minimal expression of autonomy to overrule a previously robust stance is 
questionable. 
Secondly, in line with the legal discussion above, there is the objection that advance 
statements or advance decisions to refuse treatment can be inaccurate and/or 
unreliable. For example, the content may not be articulated in a way that accurately 
reflects the wish of the person concerned; wishes may be misunderstood by the reader 
or misinterpreted by a proxy decision-maker; they may not be explicit about the 
treatment refused or the preferred care requirements; updates to wishes may not have 
been made, have got lost or been forgotten about (Dimond 2008; Holland 2003; Olick 
2001). These practical concerns have to be attended to for any advance directive to be 
taken seriously. Dresser (1994) fears that these concerns create a serious, perhaps 
insurmountable, educational challenge for policymakers who wish to implement 
advance directives. However, Olick (2001) argues that many of the practical differences 
can be overcome by taking a common-sense view about the content of the directive 
rather than becoming overly preoccupied with its specificity. 
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Even if most of the practical difficulties can be resolved, some deeper problems remain. 
Again in line with the legal discussion, unreliability results when circumstances change 
that are not allowed for in the directive. An interesting proposal is raised by Nelson 
(2009) who considers what might happen if the foundation of one’s convictions change 
after the directive is written. Let’s suppose that Doris’s moral objection to meat eating is 
based on the teaching of a particular religious organisation. Let’s also say that the 
religious organisation on which Doris’s bases her conviction has recently changed its 
position, deciding that eating a moderate amount of meat is acceptable after all. This 
would cast serious doubt on whether Doris’s original conviction is still valid. Nelson 
suggests that the autonomous interests expressed in the advance statement would also 
shift with the change of doctrine from the organisation. However, there is considerable 
uncertainty here as it may be that a change in the perspective of the religious 
organisation would be enough to have occasioned Doris to leave or join a faction that 
still supports vegetarianism. 
A related difficulty is that the author of an advance statement or decision to refuse 
treatment may be making a decision about a situation in the far future, about which 
they have insufficient knowledge. It is difficult to know what an experience of having 
dementia is going to be like. 
This problem is brought into sharper relief by returning to the example of “Margo”, 
outlined in Chapter 1 (1.6.1). This example found in the work of Ronald Dworkin (1993) 
was in response to a personal experience of a medical student, Andrew Firlik (1991).  
Recall that Margo was a woman with advanced dementia whose day-to-day 
existence consisted of repeating the same drawing, listening to music and 
appearing to read random pages in a novel. Despite this, Margo appeared very 
contented with her existence. Dworkin considers what might have happened in 
this situation if Margo had written an advance decision stating a wish not to 
receive life-saving treatment or even to be painlessly killed if in such a state. 
Should such a directive be followed, respecting Margo’s autonomous wish to 
prefer death to continued dementia, despite it appearing that Margo is living an 
enjoyable existence with dementia? 
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There are a number of ways that pressure can be put on a decision to follow the 
advance decision to refuse treatment. Firstly, it is impossible for a younger Margo to 
know for certain how the older Margo would feel in this state. However, it would be 
possible for the younger Margo to make a clear directive that states that even if she 
appears contented, she still wishes to be allowed to die, based on perhaps a perceived 
indignity of having dementia. It is worth noting again that such decision to refuse life-
sustaining treatment in the event of dementia would be legally binding in English law as 
long as the specified conditions are met (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2007). 
This would be legally equivalent to a currently competent Margo refusing treatment. 
Yet, if the motivation of Margo in writing the advance decision is to shorten her life with 
dementia by refusing life sustaining treatment, then a Kantian view of principled 
autonomy may question whether such an advance decision is actually an exercise of 
autonomy at all. Recall that such a view of autonomy considers that a choice can only be 
autonomous if it based on principles that all others can think and act (O’Neill 2002a). 
The question therefore needs to be asked whether a principle of shortening life due to a 
wish not to exist in a state of cognitive decline is one that can be rationally willed by all. 
If Margo’s directive is seen as equivalent to suicide, then such a principle would be 
disallowed by many Kantians as it cannot be willed as a moral act (without 
contradiction) that human persons destroy a human body that brings morality itself 
into the world (Kant 1996b/1797). 
However, Velleman (2008) argues that hastening death is morally acceptable in Kantian 
terms when there is a deterioration of someone’s state to the point where their 
autonomy and its associated dignity become compromised. Yet, if it is decided that 
autonomous personhood has to be compromised to allow such an action, then it is no 
longer forming a basis on which to make decisions. This leads back to the same difficulty 
that the advance directive was initially trying to overcome.  
It does remain possible that Margo without autonomous personhood has a claim to be 
kept alive by medical treatment. For example, it could be argued that the happiness 
produced by Margo remaining alive outweighs other considerations. However, this is 
not a subject for this section, the aim of which is to find a way that autonomous 
personhood can ground an ethical model. 
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2.9.3 THE PERSONAL IDENTITY CHALLENGE TO ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
Even if the practical and moral objections of the advance decision are able to be 
overcome, there remains a serious worry about the moral authority of such a directive 
from the past applying to Margo in her current state. The challenge is now based on the 
notion that the advance directive lacks authority, as the individual is not sufficiently 
psychologically connected to the person who wrote the directive to be considered the 
same individual (Dresser 1986). 
This challenge is based on metaphysical ideas about what is required for personal 
identity and in particular what is needed for us to be the same person. In common 
parlance it may be said that Margo is not the person she used to be. However, the claim 
here is Margo may actually not be the same individual. The reason that Margo is still 
called by the same name and is legally the same person is due the fact that Margo is a 
continuation of the same biological organism. 
Yet, the radical change in Margo’s psychology leads to a concern that Margo is not the 
same person as she was before. Support for this idea can be found in the work of Derek 
Parfit (1984). He argues that what matters to us is not that we can identify with the 
same human body through time but that have psychological continuity that he describes 
as being formed from ‘overlapping chains’ of strong psychological connectedness (Parfit 
1984: 206). These connections consist of memories as well as other psychological 
factors such as commitments, character or beliefs. These connections vary in their 
strength. This means that psychological continuity, although in its logic is all or nothing, 
is actually in its nature a matter of degree (Parfit 1973). 
The key point here is that in the case of Margo, Doris, or anyone with similarly severe 
dementia, there is a reduction in psychological continuity to the point where the 
individual with dementia is no longer a continuation of the autonomous person who 
made the advance decision or statement in any sense that matters in terms of carrying 
out its content. So it follows that the interests that may have mattered to Margo if had 
she completed an advance decision to refuse treatment are no longer applicable to 
Margo with dementia as there is not sufficient continuity of psychology. 
 If a view of personal identity is taken that is based on such psychological continuity, 
then Margo with dementia would not be the same person who wrote the directive 
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(DeGrazia 1999). If the psychological view of identity is then combined with a view of 
autonomy that is based on psychological or mental capabilities, then this results in a no-
win situation for autonomous personhood. In order for an advance directive to apply, 
there is a perceived reduction of mental capabilities, resulting in an inability to make 
autonomous choices in the current situation. The aim of turning to advance directives 
was to respect autonomous personhood by allowing autonomous decisions from the 
past to now be applied. However, it now appears that this same reduction in mental 
capability that brings the advance directive into force can result in a disruption to 
psychological continuity meaning that the autonomous decisions from the past and the 
personhood to which it is associated are no longer applicable after all. Therefore, either 
way autonomous personhood is absent. 
Yet, Ronald Dworkin (1993) in his description of the problem argued that if an advance 
decision had been made by Margo then it should have been applicable to Margo in a 
state of dementia. Dworkin (1993) argues this by making a distinction between 
experiential and critical interests. Our critical interests represent critical judgements 
relating to our life as a whole and are somehow more deeply held, whereas experiential 
interests are more transient interests that we have in enjoying experiences. We have 
critical interests in our life proceeding in a certain way that fits with what we believe is 
important for us. If we wish for our life to be coherent as a whole, we may choose to 
forgo a certain pleasurable experience as this is not part of our long-term plan. 
As described above, choosing with individual autonomy also involves making decisions 
that are based on a wider assessment of the preferred direction of one’s life as whole. 
Critical interests can therefore be aligned with the exercise of more demanding forms of 
individual autonomy and therefore aligned with autonomous personhood. Dworkin 
(1986) calls this an integrity view of autonomy. This view focuses on people having a 
coherent plan rather than having reliable evidence of one’s best interests. It therefore 
neatly dismisses the concern that making an autonomous decision would require 
evidence of what having dementia might be like. 
Nevertheless, with cognitive deterioration, the ability to choose with autonomy is lost 
and critical interests formulated in the past can no longer be known by the individual 
who possesses them. Crucially though, Dworkin argues these critical interests do 
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remain. So, the potential conflict of interest is not between the different psychological 
selves: Margo with dementia and the past competent Margo. For Dworkin, the conflict is 
within Margo with dementia, though she is unaware of it. If Margo had directed that the 
last chapter of her life should go in a certain way, and we wish to respect Margo’s 
autonomous personhood, then her critical interests, even in her demented state, should 
prevail. The advance directive should be respected. 
2.9.4 NARRATIVE VIEW OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
This move can be achieved by relying on a narrative view of personal identity, rather 
than a psychological view. The narrative view looks at personal identity in a different 
way. It sees the question of who we are as being most important aspect of personal 
identity (DeGrazia 2005). People can decide what is important to them and from this 
create their identity (at least to a certain extent). Narrative identity is the qualitative 
part of personal identity. This is in contrast to numerical identity which looks at 
essential properties that keep objects the same and forms the basis of the personal 
identity challenge from the psychological view (Holland 2003). Yet, DeGrazia argues 
that narrative personal identity still needs a form of numerical identity in order that the 
narrative can be identified to a particular human being. Importantly, though, DeGrazia 
argues that the numerical identity required here is biological not psychological. In other 
words, narrative identity presupposes the continuing existence of the human body 
(called Margo) rather any psychological criteria. 
So this result suggests that Margo before dementia owned her body and this gives a 
right to decide on its care and treatment which continues even though it is now 
inhabited by Margo with a radically different psychology (Furberg 2012). If the advance 
directive is honoured, this leaves Margo with dementia in the seemingly unfortunate 
(yet for her unknowable) position of inheriting a body over which nobody is able to 
have a current say about its continued existence, as its last chapter has already been 
written. 
The same arguments now can be applied to Doris and the vegetarian dilemma. If 
Dworkin’s arguments are accepted, then Doris is also in a position where she no longer 
has full control over her body. Following the advance statement means that Doris is 
refused the freedom to eat meat due to her past moral convictions that she can no 
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longer understand. Doris’s last chapter is one in which she remains vegetarian and due 
to her inability to author a viable alternative, this is how it will have to stay. 
However, Dresser (1995) raises an objection to the notion of narrative coherence 
behind Dworkin’s integrity view of autonomy. In particular, she questions the empirical 
assumption that people actually have or want to have a coherent life plan as proposed 
by Dworkin, suggesting instead that ‘...many people take life one day at a time’ (Dresser 
1995: 36). Moreover, she puts forward that people may want a ‘surprise’ ending to their 
lives.  
This criticism drills deeply into the value of autonomy in general. If Dresser’s criticism is 
accepted, then it challenges the idea proposed earlier that autonomous choice requires 
reflection based on the second-order preferences that matter in the context of one’s life 
overall. Taking each day at a time would make it hard to commit to such preferences and 
perhaps would suggest that autonomy would have to be understood in a more minimal 
sense. However, paradoxically taking one day at a time could be seen as a higher order 
preference in itself. To have such a view could produce an advance statement stating a 
wish to have one’s contemporaneous wishes taken more seriously than one’s 
autonomous past preferences. This line of reasoning would suggest that Dresser’s 
objection is not fatal after all. 
A deeper worry is whether it is reasonable to identify (numerically) with the continuing 
human body rather than its psychology, when it is the psychology of the person that 
matters in the sense that the content of the directive is an expression of an autonomous 
will. In other words, as it is psychology that matters how can the continuing body be 
relevant? 
A plausible response to this is that the person’s narrative and their autonomous wishes, 
survive in the psychology of others who identify them with the continuing human body. 
So the conflict is not within the current individual as was suggested with Margo earlier; 
it is between the past autonomous wishes expressed in the advance directive that now 
live through others and the individual’s current non-autonomous preferences. Does the 
survival of an individual’s autonomous wishes in the psychology of others mean that 
autonomous personhood is viable in a form that it can ground an ethical model? The 
next section will investigate this claim. 
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2.10 RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND THE SOCIAL SELF 
It is suggested by Kuczewski (1994) that autonomous interests, as expressed in an 
advance directive, can survive in the memory of others. Referring to how he would see 
himself in a future state of incompetence, Kuczewski (1994:42) states: 
‘The body that belongs to the incompetent patient at t2 [a future time] is in some 
sense “mine” because other persons call it by my name and make the story of 
what happens to it a chapter of the story they tell about “me”. As such I attempt 
to make that chapter embody the values which are presently mine.’ 
This is an extension of the notion of an ownership right to the body discussed above. 
Here the ownership is justified by the fact that the community still sees the continuing 
human body as part of the narrative of the person who declared their autonomous 
preferences. Furthermore, Kuczewski (1994:42) has a conception of himself as part of a 
larger group that also contains ‘part’ of him, adding that his story is ‘…to some degree, 
only complete when told from this vantage point from outside of my stream of 
consciousness.’ This implies that our narrative identity as persons is formed at least 
partially by the people around us. As Christman (2004) points out, communitarian 
views such as this, along with feminist views of relational autonomy, put pressure on 
the standard (liberal) view of autonomy that focuses on an individualistic 
understanding of the self. 
Importantly here, this opens up the possibility of autonomous personhood also being a 
social notion. Though, it needs to be made clear what is meant by this. Recall, that 
autonomous personhood is understood here as the moral status of persons. As a result, 
the notion being considered is this:  
Can an ethical model be constructed based on the moral authority of a social 
form of autonomous personhood for individuals, which endures even when 
those individuals are no longer capable of autonomous choice themselves? 
 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a: 117), in its report on ethical issues in 
dementia, leaves the reader in no doubt of the importance of a social and relational 
element in autonomous decision-making: 
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‘We also argue that autonomy should be seen in ‘relational’ terms: that is, that a 
person’s sense of self and self-expression should be seen as being firmly 
grounded in their social and family networks.’ [my emphasis] 
Relational autonomy shares with communitarianism a conception of autonomy that 
emphases the importance of social conditions, as a reaction to the traditional view of 
individual autonomy which is perceived to idealise ‘rugged’ individualism (Mackenzie & 
Stoljar 2000:5). 
Some theorists such as Donchin (2000) take a strong view of relational autonomy, 
which states that autonomy by its very nature is a social concept. This would lead to the 
further conclusion here that autonomous personhood (as a moral status) is only 
possible through social means. 
This emphasis on interdependence appears a promising route to support and include 
people with dementia. However, there is some ambiguity. Does society merely maintain 
an individual’s autonomous personhood when competence is lost, or is autonomous 
personhood something which is actually generated by social interaction allowing this 
process to carry on as long as a human being exists to take part in the tale? Kuczewski’s 
(1994) view appears to imply the latter. The view from the Nuffield Council (2009a), on 
the other hand, could mean either. If it is the case that society merely maintains an 
individual’s autonomous personhood, then it begs an explanation as to how an 
individual’s personhood can be maintained without other people generating that 
personhood from their own consciousness.  Unless a satisfactory explanation for this 
can be found, it will have to be assumed that autonomous personhood is generated in 
some way by society (including family) around the person. 
To help clarify the concept, Donchin (2000: 240) suggests that when conceptualising 
relational autonomy it is necessary ‘...to steer a path between two risks’. 
The first risk that Donchin refers to is one that reflects the feminist lineage of relational 
autonomy. This is where the individual’s expression of autonomy does not take into 
account the social conditions enough and by doing this actually allows power 
imbalances in society to be ignored and therefore persist in the ‘guise’ of autonomous 
choice (Donchin 2000: 238). This highlights the overall concern of relational theorists 
that standard models of autonomy do not sufficiently account for the fact that people 
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can be vulnerable to such influences, and therefore people make decisions without 
being aware of the context that has led them to make that choice. 
This view suggests that whether autonomy is exercised or not is highly dependent on an 
awareness of prevailing social conditions. It appears to imply that those who are 
oppressed by society are constrained from thinking autonomously. This gives the 
seemingly unwanted result that people who are in such a position of being oppressed 
would no longer have protection from paternalism, as it would be allowable for their 
arguably non-autonomous thinking to be dismissed (Holroyd 2009). 
In weaker forms of the concept, this awareness of social conditions means simply 
appreciating one’s social context and reflecting on which of these values one should 
take as their own (Donchin 2000). However, this weak form cannot do the work needed 
as the aim here is for autonomous personhood to continue beyond a time when such 
reflective decision-making is possible. Therefore, it is necessary to understand 
relational autonomy in a stronger form. 
Yet, stronger forms lead to a second risk, which is that a person’s individual self is 
overwhelmed by social considerations. Society may constitute autonomy to the point 
where the notion of self-government is effectively lost as the self and its narrative is 
subsumed.  The ‘autonomy’ that remains here is not the authentically persevered wish 
of a past individual self; instead it is a reflection of the beliefs and interests of the social 
group to which the individual belongs. This appears to be a potential risk in the 
approach suggested by the Nuffield Council above.  
It was not made fully clear above what is meant by Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009) 
when they say that a person’s sense of self should be firmly grounded in social and 
family networks. 
To elaborate, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a: 117) supposes that: 
‘...most people [with dementia] would wish that their carer’s interests should be 
given considerable weight: their interests include their carers interests. When 
autonomy is understood in these terms, then in order to support a person’s 
autonomous wishes and values it will be necessary to support the whole family 
and social structure.’  
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Yet, this is open to challenge. The wording suggests an empirical claim that most people 
would see themselves sharing their autonomous interests in this way when in a state of 
dementia. Evidence needs to be offered before such a claim can be taken seriously, but 
even then the problem remains as to how to conceive autonomy for the minority who 
don’t have this wish. Moreover, it needs to be understood how the relational view fits 
with the Nuffield Council’s overall framework of autonomy and well-being interests. 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics argue that ‘autonomy interests’ are promoted by 
offering choice for people with dementia.  Yet, they argue that weight is also given to 
autonomy interests by emotional responses. Arguably these autonomy interests 
conflate with well-being interests as well-being interests involve ‘a satisfaction of their 
[a person with dementia’s] desires and preferences’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
2009: 28).  
From the discussion above, it further appears that autonomy interests also take account 
of the interests of carers and family members. It is therefore becoming hard to establish 
any interests at all that are not a kind of “autonomy interests” when this term is more 
broadly understood. This lack of demarcation makes it problematic to make a decision 
which respects autonomous personhood where autonomy is understood in a way that 
allows it to support interests that are so broad and potentially conflicting. 
*** 
In summary, it appears that if autonomous personhood is to continue despite incapacity 
using the social accounts such as from Kuczewski or the Nuffield Council then there are 
two plausible possibilities. The first is a more metaphysical claim (Christman 2004) that 
autonomous personhood results from a self constituted by the society (including family) 
around the person. The second is the claim that the society around the individual with 
dementia will choose to regenerate and respect their personhood by being faithful to 
the person’s narrative as best they can. 
Yet, both of these are unreliable. The first because society may constitute autonomy to 
the point where the notion of self-government is effectively lost as the self and its 
narrative is subsumed by the beliefs and interests of the social group to which the 
individual belongs. 
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The second because it makes an assumption that society will want to continue the 
narrative of the person concerned, and further argument is needed as to why there is a 
moral reason in terms of respecting autonomous personhood for continuing this 
narrative. In other words, why ought people around the individual (without autonomy) 
be applying the autonomous wishes expressed from the past to the individual in the 
present? One possibility is to return to the argument from the previous section that it is 
the continuing ownership right over the body that provides moral authority (Furberg 
2012). However, this fails to attend to the worry that motivated this current section; 
this being that the continuing human body is not what matters most, as it is 
psychologies (not bodies) that generate autonomous personhood. In short, many 
families and care providers may choose to maintain the narrative of the person but the 
grounding of this as respecting autonomous personhood of the current individual 
remains open to challenge. 
Recall that in the example of Doris the care providers around her do not share her moral 
conviction against meat-eating. If these care providers are the only social network that 
remains then it seems possible that Doris’s narrative could end up being rewritten to 
reflect the new values of the situation in which Doris now expresses a contemporaneous 
preference for meat-eating. On the other hand, it also seems possible that the care 
providers may choose to go against the prevailing social conditions and declare that 
they are (as a social group) keeping Doris’s original values alive so that her last chapter 
is one where she is vegetarian. On the above views, it could be argued that either way 
this is respecting autonomous personhood in a social sense. 
Yet, perhaps this more flexible view of autonomy is exactly what is required for 
autonomous personhood to survive as a notion that includes people with advanced 
dementia. This leads to the final view of autonomy to be considered, the 
phenomenologically derived account of “actual” autonomy. 
2.11 ACTUAL AUTONOMY AND PARENTALISM 
In opposition to idealistic (liberal) forms of autonomy, Agich (2003) proposes the 
concept of actual autonomy that appeals to a practical understanding of the concept 
that is relevant to everyday experience. From this, Agich (2003: 1) aims to develop an 
ethical framework that is able to include the long-term care of older people who have a 
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reduced ability to ‘function independently’ or ‘choose rationally’. As described by Agich 
(2003: 11) 
’The framework involves a developmentally orientated and phenomenologically 
derived account of the ordinary or everyday sense of autonomy in terms of 
concrete human action in the shared world of social life.’ [my emphasis] 
A number of themes are raised here that are worth exploring in more detail. Firstly, 
Agich believes that it is necessary to take a developmental perspective to understand 
how autonomy is actualised in practical situations in everyday life. Importantly for 
Agich, this involves taking a phenomenological view, which he contrasts with 
communitarianism.  Although, he agrees with communitarians that a social view is 
necessary to counteract overly individualistic forms of autonomy, he criticises the 
concept for stating that the social aims of community can overwhelm personal 
autonomy, in a similar way to feminist social views discussed above.  In meeting this 
criticism, Agich (2003: 126) proposes the alternative phenomenological claim that 
‘....sociality is an essential feature of being a person’, meaning that to be a person 
requires the tendency to develop social ties. So rather than society somehow subsuming 
individual autonomy, as is arguably the case with communitarianism, Agich describes 
how being an autonomous person necessarily involves social ties. He hopes that this 
claim about the everyday nature of the social world from our concrete experience 
provides a framework that gives meaning to personal autonomy.  
The more flexible view of autonomy that appears to be required for people with 
dementia can therefore find its grounding in the diverse reality of everyday existence 
rather than in an ideal theoretical justification. This emphasis on sociality means that 
human beings can only exercise autonomy on this view through supportive human 
relationships; in short, it links dependency with autonomy. This results in a view that 
keeps the communitarian view of people as social interdependent beings, whilst hoping 
to also maintain the agency of the individual.  
As part of this view, Agich (2003:48) endorses the concept of parentalism, which is a 
form of ‘...autonomy-respecting paternalism’. The suggestion is that far from the forms 
of paternalism that are juxtaposed to autonomy, parentalism does not seek to cause 
dependence in the individual being cared for, nor does it intend to impose a best 
interests view over a ‘competent’ choice. A similar view is expressed by Donchin 
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(2001:381) who is sympathetic to an ‘optimal parenting relationship’ as part of a 
relational understanding of autonomy in health care. 
Yet, this raises the objection that an attitude of parentalism, though acceptable towards 
children, is not acceptable for adults. Can parentalism manage to side-step the 
objections made against paternalism? Agich himself states that it shares with soft 
paternalism the justifying of ‘... actions undertaken against unreasonable or 
incompetent decision-making.’ (Agich 2003: 49). If this argument is accepted, it appears 
that a care provider can override a choice of someone that they consider unreasonable, 
yet still be respecting their autonomous personhood in actual terms. Agich goes on to 
question whether paternalism is as compelling a practical concern in everyday life as it 
is in theory. Nonetheless, a conception of autonomy broad enough to sanction others to 
carry out seemingly paternalistic acts (deemed more reasonable or competent than the 
individual’s preference) is highly sensitive to the prevailing social conditions. 
A second difficulty is the understanding of personhood (in the general sense) that 
emerges. Agich’s view suggests that personhood consists of being an interdependent 
agent (Hughes 2005). Yet, what this means for the moral status of autonomous 
personhood being examined here is harder to decipher. This may be because the 
question of what moral status results from being autonomous is not one that a 
phenomenological theory of autonomy seeks to answer. Instead, it seeks to understand 
autonomy in a descriptive way rather than seeking a theory of autonomy that can make 
normative judgements. 
As a result, applying “actual” autonomy to the example of Doris does not appear to move 
the discussion any further forward. The care providers may wish to take a parental or 
autonomy-respecting paternalistic approach; however, it seems that this could involve 
either responding to Doris’s contemporaneous preference for meat-eating in a meat-
eating environment, or keeping Doris’s original values alive. Nor does Agich’s theory 
offer any guidance for the well-rehearsed example of Margo from the contemporary 
literature, discussed above. Agich, although sympathetic to a narrative approach to 
understanding personal identity does not engage with the dilemma that this appears to 
create.  
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Similarly, if we return to the original example of Bill, the phenomenological view that 
sees him as an interdependent agent in his everyday world may well be accurate as a 
description. However, this on its own does not offer clear guidance as to whether it is 
therefore allowable to use the social conditions of a care home, Bill’s health and his 
previously stated position that he is “not someone who usually stays in bed all day” as 
sound reasons to persuade him out of bed. There is a good chance that such a broad and 
flexible view of autonomy can lead to equivocal judgements casting significant doubt 
over its ability as a concept to constitute autonomous personhood as a foundation of an 
ethical model. 
Actual autonomy promotes the notion of personhood being broadly conceived in a 
similar manner to the influential figure of Tom Kitwood; although, puzzlingly, Agich 
himself does not discuss this comparable work (Hughes 2005). Overall, actual 
autonomy is far enough from autonomy’s usual theoretical and normative pedigree for 
further discussion of its guiding phenomenological themes to be returned to in later 
chapters. 
2.12 EVALUATING AUTONOMY AS A SOURCE OF PERSONHOOD FOR PEOPLE 
WITH DEMENTIA 
The aim of this chapter was to establish if autonomy can be formulated in a way which 
allows it to be possible for people with dementia yet robust enough to ground a 
reasonable claim to personhood. As dementia involves a reduction of cognition, a 
primary consideration was to deduce which views of autonomy might remain viable for 
people with more severe dementia. 
Firstly, standard views of autonomy were examined. These were broadly divided into 
forms that require a moral element in autonomous choice (principled autonomy) and 
those that see autonomy as a capability without reference to the content of the choice 
(individual autonomy). Ultimately, this division was not crucial. It was found that both 
individual and principled autonomy can be understood in ways which make them more 
or less inclusive. 
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In order to include the largest possible number of people with dementia, less stringent 
versions of autonomy as an expression of free choice or a basic capacity to value can be 
advanced. However, decisions made in this way are open to challenge from others. 
Instead, it was argued that for all standard views, autonomous thinking needs to include 
the ability to reflect on immediate preferences in terms of broader values as this 
approach provides a strong claim for the moral status of autonomous personhood. This 
ensures that the resulting choices are judged on an equal ground with those of other 
persons and there is a prima facie prohibition against the will of others being routinely 
imposed in the form of paternalism. Yet, this approach means excluding from 
autonomous personhood those people who are incapable of this reflective thinking 
procedure, leaving people with more severe dementia without the status of autonomous 
personhood. 
This conclusion moved the discussion on to consider whether it is possible to modify 
these standard views of autonomy in order to make them more inclusive of people with 
severe dementia. A promising avenue for modifying a standard approach to autonomy is 
the concept of precedent autonomy. This underpins advance directives and is 
commonly used in health care systems. This is where someone’s autonomous choice 
from the past remains applicable at the present time when the individual is deemed to 
no longer be able to make the autonomous choice. In their English legal form, advance 
directives are only binding when they take the form of an advance decision to refuse 
treatment and only then when considered valid, applicable and not overruled by other 
legal means such as by the Mental Health Act 1983. Though, in terms of an ethical model, 
all advance statements outlining preferences are ethically relevant as expressions of 
autonomous will, even if they vary in their legal force. 
On exploration, the concept of advance directives as a vehicle for autonomous 
personhood proved problematic. Firstly, practical problems can make directives an 
unreliable way of understanding someone’s autonomous will. Also, there are potential 
difficulties with some choices being seen as not meeting the moral requirements of 
principled autonomy. However, the greater challenge comes from the notion that 
advance directives lack authority as the individual is not sufficiently psychologically 
connected to the person who wrote the directive. 
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In order to maintain the identity of the person despite psychological disruption, a 
narrative view of personal identity has been suggested. For the purpose of this chapter 
this required autonomous personhood to also be engendered by such a narrative. On 
further investigation such a narrative view relied heavily on a biological view of 
personal identity stating that a person’s autonomous narrative maintains authority 
essentially because it is associated with the same human body. This is problematic as 
the ground of the original challenge was that it is the psychology of the person that 
matters, in the sense that is crucial for the content of the directive. 
A plausible response to this was to investigate whether the person’s autonomous 
narrative somehow survives in the psychology of others who identify it with the 
continuing human body. This view finds its reflection in communitarianism and 
relational autonomy. More specifically it suggests two possibilities. Firstly, autonomous 
personhood results from a metaphysical constitution of a social rather than individual 
self. Secondly, the alternative idea is that people will choose to regenerate and respect 
someone’s personhood by being faithful to their narrative (or being true to their 
memory). 
Both of these proved unreliable. The first because society may constitute autonomy to 
the point where the self and its narrative is overwhelmed, meaning that any notion of 
self-government is effectively lost. The second because it makes an empirical 
assumption that society will want to continue the narrative of the person concerned, 
and further argument is needed as to why there might be a moral reason for this. 
This suggests that despite over 25 years of discussion in the literature, the problem of 
the moral authority of advance directives remains unresolved.  
Finally, the approach of actual autonomy was examined. Here advance directives are no 
longer relevant as the aim is to find a way of describing autonomy that is relevant to 
people in the current situation of physical and/or psychological dependence. In many 
ways this approach is the interdependent, social view of autonomy writ large. However, 
the framework is descriptive rather than theoretical and does not seek to make 
normative judgements. The only concrete guidance offered is to adopt an approach of 
parentalism, which effectively allows a degree of soft paternalism. Arguably this is 
stretching autonomy to a point where it is losing its basic character of protecting people 
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from such paternalistic acts. Furthermore, “actual” autonomy does not offer enough to 
ground autonomous personhood in the harder cases. Its phenomenological form does 
not lend itself to such a project and, moreover, if attempts are made to apply it in such 
examples, it suffers the same objections as other social approaches of producing 
equivocal results. 
This chapter began by highlighting that controversy surrounds how to treat those at the 
margins of personhood. It was hoped that the concept of autonomy could form an 
approach to personhood that could attend to this problem. However, this has not been 
fully successful. The possibility remains that an ethical model might adapt for varying 
mental capacity. People with sufficient mental capabilities would be able to draw on the 
protections and entitlements of autonomous personhood, with an alternative ethical 
route for those with lesser cognition. Alternatively, autonomy could feature as a 
principle or value that is not fundamental to personhood but still relevant to the ethical 
model as a whole. 
Overall, it has been argued that autonomous personhood does not meet the aim here of 
being a fully inclusive concept on which to ground an ethical model. Nonetheless, 
personhood is broad concept that does not necessarily rely on autonomy. 
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3 PERSONHOOD NOT GROUNDED BY AUTONOMY  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Personhood has been defined as the full moral status or standing which is associated 
with persons (Jaworska 1999), bringing with it particular protections and entitlements.  
However, this leaves the question open as to what constitutes a person. 
The previous chapter investigated how personhood might find its grounding in 
autonomy, variously understood. Though not dismissed altogether, it was argued that 
autonomy was not sufficiently robust to ground personhood for everyone with 
dementia. The current chapter will broaden the investigation further to consider how 
personhood might otherwise be realised. 
This broadening brings about a somewhat different approach. Rather than having an 
ethical notion (autonomy) as a starting point, a number of factors relevant to 
personhood that are either held by, or associated with people with dementia will be 
investigated.  However, these factors or attributes must enable the necessary 
philosophical work to be done by showing how the moral status of personhood has 
been engendered by it. Furthermore, it will then be necessary to show how personhood, 
once engendered, might provide a foundation for an ethical model for dementia care. 
A set of factors commonly thought to meet these requirements to ground personhood 
are psychological capacities. In classical philosophy, John Locke (1979/1700: 335) 
states that a person is: 
‘…is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider 
itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places…’ 
In contemporary times this Lockean understanding has been developed by David Parfit 
(1984), who advanced the notion that persons consist (merely) of chains of 
psychological connectedness containing memories, beliefs and desires and it is the 
continuing existence of this psychology that matters to us. 
The first section of this chapter will consider the ethical responses that might be 
entailed by various psychological properties. Then the investigation will consider which 
of these psychological properties are held by people with dementia and how they might 
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be relevant to personhood. Setting the threshold of cognition to support personhood 
low enough to be inclusive of all people with dementia brings implications and these 
will be explored. The possibility of having degrees of personhood will also be 
considered. 
The discussion will then explore the relevance of embodiment in the debate. It will ask if 
the body can provide at least a partial basis for personhood in this evaluative sense. An 
influential contribution here is the Situated Embodied Agent (SEA) view of Hughes 
(2011a; 2008; 2001a) that draws on the philosophical heritage of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. Here the idea is that personhood is derived from an intimate 
combination of the physical body, its contextual situation and its psychology. The 
argument states that the continuation of the living human body situated in context is a 
necessary part of personhood. From this it is possible to ascertain a level of agency, 
even with severe cognitive deficit, as people understand other human beings 
instinctively due to ‘our shared nature’ (Hughes 2008: 129). This view will be evaluated 
before moving to a conclusion. 
3.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS OF PERSONHOOD 
Psychological properties offer a strongly intuitive candidate for the foundation of 
personhood.  To demonstrate the importance of psychological properties, Tooley 
(2012) draws on previous philosophical work in the area. He asks the reader to imagine 
having their psychology entirely erased, whilst their body survives supported by lower 
brain function. Plausibly, he proposes that the intuition people experience in this 
situation is that they would have lost something supremely valuable even though their 
body survives.  
The prohibition on murder reflects how society sees the destruction of the living body 
along with its psychology. However, this intuition suggests that personhood is the status 
held by the psychology rather than by the body, making the destruction of someone’s 
psychology on its own similarly wrong. 
To further illustrate, Tooley (2012) then asks the reader to consider how having one’s 
psychology replaced with pseudo-memories, beliefs, desires etc. might affect the 
intuition. The remaining individual has the same living human body and is 
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psychologically normal. From an objective perspective, there is still a human person in 
the world. Yet, from a subjective point of view this may appear to be the same as death. 
This is because from the point of view of the subject, it will no longer be him/her in the 
body. He/she will be unable to recall the past or expresses the same hopes for the 
future. As a result, it is likely that this action, if possible, would also be seen as murder. 
There are parallels here to the view of Derek Parfit (1984) mentioned above; though, 
Parfit takes the reductionist psychological view one step further by dismissing the 
separateness of persons and the importance of personal identity altogether (Glover 
1988). In other words, for Parfit, it is the maintaining of psychological connections not 
any identity associated with it that matters. Nonetheless, these views all agree that 
people have an interest in the survival of cherished psychological connections, whether 
associated with an identity or not. 
Although not responding to Tooley’s case directly, DeGrazia (2005) challenges the 
intuition that underpins the psychological view. He states that someone in the position 
of being about to experience serious physical pain (by torture) is consoled neither by 
the prospect of having his/her entire psychology erased nor by having it replaced. 
DeGrazia (2005: 26) suggests this reaction: 
‘“Great,” you think sarcastically, “massive amnesia followed by torture.” When 
you hear that, in addition to losing your memories, you will acquire what seem to 
be memories of someone else’s life, this seems even worse: “Madness followed by 
torture.”’ 
Yet, this opposing intuition seems to rest on a mistake. It appears to assume that there 
will be some of the original psychology remaining after the erasing or reprogramming. 
Otherwise there would be none of the original psychology to produce the thought after 
the erasing event “I now have amnesia and I am still going to be tortured” or “I now 
have someone else’s past.” If there was no original psychology, then this experience 
would not be possible. On the other hand, if there is some of the original psychology left 
that is able to understand that the past is forgotten or replaced with someone else’s 
then the psychology is still connected in a way to the original in order to be able to make 
that assessment of loss. This might only be a minimal flow of experience to link the 
present and past moment (Dainton 2014) but this would still suggest a form of 
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psychological continuity. Although in a much reduced psychological state, this suggests 
a continuing self-consciousness. 
If the amnesia proposal means that someone’s episodic memory (the memory of their 
autobiographical events) is completely erased, then it arguable that the total lack of a 
past would actually make it impossible to have a stream of consciousness at all in the 
present (Gennaro 1996). 
Looking at the situation impersonally, the pain will still be felt and this is a bad outcome. 
However, if erasing or reprogramming occurs to the extent proposed by Tooley’s cases 
some relief might be felt that it will not be you who will feel the pain. Nonetheless, this 
consolation is somewhat empty as it would result in your current consciousness being 
annihilated. 
At this stage, DeGrazia’s response appears unconvincing. The discussion will consider 
further arguments for the role of embodiment later. At this stage, however, it will be 
assumed that the psychological view holds and as such it is our continuing psychological 
life that we value. In the case of most human beings these psychological properties are 
seen to be of sufficient value to provide the moral status of personhood. 
3.3 PRIMA FACIE DUTIES RESULTING FROM PERSONHOOD 
The status of personhood associated with these psychological connections provides 
protections and entitlements too; though, these vary depending on the ethical theory 
being employed. A classical deontological view is that persons have absolute worth and 
therefore can never be treated merely as a means to achieve someone else’s end (Kant 
1996a/1785). In Kant’s terminology this is derived from the absolute worth of 
Humanity in persons, by which Kant means a special capability to set ends and 
rationally pursue them. (Johnson 2008). This provides a prohibition on destruction of 
the person through murder or suicide but also generates other duties such as a 
prohibition on lying. 
On the other hand, for a utilitarian perspective the focus is on consequences. It sees 
persons as having special capabilities, such as being able to reflect on their situation and 
have hopes for the future. So if persons are thwarted in some way, or they have 
knowledge of soon being so, then they are going to suffer more than other beings 
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making this action more harmful and therefore “more” wrong (Singer 2011). This view 
based on an equal consideration of interests will be returned to in Chapter 7 (7.3). 
The current section of this thesis examines the former view that personhood provides 
certain deontic constraints on what behaviour is acceptable towards someone who is a 
person. Yet taking such a strategy can lead to some seemingly absurd consequences 
related to absolute positions. A common example being Kant’s argument that we must 
be truthful in all statements and this duty cannot be overridden, even if this results in 
another person’s death (Kant 1996c/1797). A further example is where an innocent 
person is prohibited from being tortured, even if this torture is the only way to prevent 
a large number of other innocent people’s deaths. This second example is more 
controversial yet still many people would be inclined to override the prohibition of 
torture in such a circumstance. 
 As a result, it appears that in more extreme circumstances there is a move away from 
absolute prohibitions in favour of consequentialist concerns. Although once the move 
away from absolutism has been made, new problems arise. For example, it is far from 
clear what the right answer is to the question of how many innocent deaths would have 
to result before a prohibition on torture ought to be lifted (Alexander and Moore 2012). 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that to be applicable an ethical model 
would have to avoid seemingly absurd conclusions. So it is apt to proceed with the 
notion that the status of personhood is of very great but not absolute value. This means 
that the rights that come with personhood and any correlated duties are prima facie.  
Based on the work of WD Ross (Ross 1930), to have a prima facie duty means that there 
is a feature of the act that gives us a moral reason to carry it out. For example, we may 
have a prima facie duty to respect a person by not deceiving them. Yet, there could be 
other features that provide conflicting prima facie duties. In Kant’s example a conflicting 
prima facie duty would be not to act in a way that puts someone else in mortal danger. 
As Ross (1930: 28) puts it: 
‘Any act that we do contains various elements in virtue of which it falls under 
various categories. In virtue of being the breaking of a promise, for instance, it 
tends to be wrong; in virtue of being an instance of relieving distress it tends to 
be right’ 
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What we ought to do – our duty proper – is unambiguous yet hard to determine. Ross 
indicates that whatever it is, it involves the ‘whole nature’ of the act (Ross 1930: 28). 
It is worth noting that WD Ross’s work has been credited by Beauchamp and Childress 
(2013) as being influential in their “four principles” approach. This will also be returned 
to when principlism is discussed in Chapter 7 (7.2.1). For our purposes here, Ross’s 
conclusions will initially be accepted in the context of the duties arising to those with 
personhood. This means that duties to persons are not absolute as the whole situation 
provokes a number of other competing reasons in the search for a right action. 
Nonetheless, the key question remains: can personhood, so understood, be established 
for people with dementia? 
3.4 BASING PERSONHOOD ON PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPERTIES FOR PEOPLE 
WITH DEMENTIA 
Establishing personhood based on psychological properties for people with dementia 
requires a search for the key psychological properties concerned. Returning to Tooley 
(2009: 33), it is suggested that the following factors may each be considered sufficient 
for personhood: 
- Moral agency 
- Capacity for rational thought 
-Having a mental life that involves an adequate amount of psychological 
continuity and connectedness 
- Self-consciousness 
- Being a subject of non-momentary interests 
- Simple consciousness 
It needs to be determined which of these suggestions are plausible both in terms of 
their ability to ground personhood and whether these factors are possible for people 
with dementia. 
3.4.1 MORAL AGENCY, RATIONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY 
In the previous chapter, the notion of moral agency as a ground for personhood for 
people with dementia was considered in depth. Some people with milder dementia will 
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retain the ability to have moral agency. However, serious doubt has been cast on the 
capability of people with more advanced dementia to have such a capacity. For people 
in this situation, further options will need to be considered, if psychological capacities 
are going to ground personhood for those who have the condition. 
Capacity for rational thought is worthy of consideration. If rationality is associated 
with the capability for reflective deliberation, meaning an ability to evaluate our own 
ideas and actions, then this capacity is similar to moral agency. However, simpler forms 
of rational thought can be advanced. Recall from Chapter 2 that Korsgaard (1996) 
claims that rational beings are merely those beings who can value ends in life, aside 
from instinct. The ends valued may be simple ones such as going out for walk in the 
garden for pleasure. This capability to value one’s own ends requires self-consciousness 
but does not necessarily imply a large amount of reflection by the rational being. 
Parfit (1984) argues that having an adequate amount of psychological continuity and 
connectedness is an also an essential element of what matters to us. If there are fewer 
strong psychological connections between the current and past psychological life of the 
associated body (and the psychological view of personhood is accepted) then the level 
of connectedness may be too low for personhood in any meaningful sense to remain 
intact. 
Arguably, a view that combines continuing psychological existence with the ability to 
value that existence is a promising approach to grounding personhood. Along these 
lines, Harris (1985: 14) proposes that a person is a ‘...being capable of valuing its own 
existence.’ This leads him to describe this rudimentary form of self-consciousness as the 
key property that defines the value of persons. In other words, if one is capable of 
valuing one’s own existence then others must too. Even if the person chooses not to 
value their existence, the fact they have the (self-conscious) psychological capability to 
do so means that others are compelled to see their value as persons. 
3.4.2 BASING PERSONHOOD ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  
Agreement on the centrality of self-consciousness can be found in Glover (1988: 61) 
who states: 
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‘I want to suggest that a prime feature of personhood is self-consciousness. A 
person is someone who can have thoughts, whose natural expression uses the 
word ‘I’’ 
The suggestion can be made that this form of self-consciousness as valuing is possible 
for all except those with the severest dementia. Some support for this idea can be found 
by returning again to the work of Jaworska (1999). Jaworska claims that people with 
Alzheimer’s disease have a basic capacity to value that is maintained longer than other 
capacities. It is worth recalling that Jaworska is primarily concerned about autonomy 
and goes on to state that this can only be achieved in a full sense if reflective capacities 
also remain.  
Harris (1985) though, is setting a less robust standard for personhood as the level of 
cognition required here is only that which is necessary to value one’s own existence. 
There is seemingly no requirement for the level of reflective thinking to be as high as for 
autonomous personhood, which involves the ability to scrutinise one’s values in the 
context of being part of a community of other persons. 
How might someone’s personhood be respected if it is understood in terms of them 
merely having a continuing existence that they are aware of and are capable of valuing? 
It suggests a prohibition on killing. In the context of dementia care, this prohibition may 
be considered obvious; though, as will be discussed below it cannot be taken for 
granted. 
What else might be suggested by respecting someone’s personhood in this way? Glover 
(1988) states that self-consciousness produces an interest in past, present or future 
events that are going to affect me. Self-conscious beings make sense of themselves from 
information gained through perception of the world around them. Language is an 
important source of information (Harris 1985), which implies that respecting self-
conscious beings means providing them with truthful information.  So it is possible that 
truth-telling is not just necessary to respect autonomy in terms of facilitating decision-
making, as discussed in Chapter 2, but also has a role to play in respecting someone’s 
personhood more broadly understood. 
To illustrate, let us reconsider the example raised in Chapter 1 from Schermer (2007).  
A woman with dementia, let’s called her “Jane”, bangs on the door of a locked ward 
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begging to be let out to collect her long since grown-up children from school. It is found 
by people caring for Jane that telling her the truth makes her distress worse; whereas 
saying her children will not be out of school for an hour eases the distress. This example 
indicates that Jane is self-conscious in the sense that she can envisage an immediate 
future with her children. However, she is unable to accept truthful information that this 
future is not possible, perhaps due to an inaccurate belief about her age. 
When considering a response, it appears that attempting to provide Jane with truthful 
information is the most respectful thing to do. Tuckett (2012) argues that truth-telling 
should be considered as the first option. Yet, in this case this seems like a futile and 
potentially harmful act. The best approach appears to be to respect the current self of 
which Jane is conscious, even though it is based on factual error and could therefore be 
considered a lie. Tuckett (2012: 17) agrees that a ‘therapeutic lie’ in such circumstances 
can be a compassionate response when other strategies, such as attempting to distract 
the individual, have failed. This also produces beneficent consequences, as it is stated 
that sharing her current version of reality allows Jane to talk about her children and this 
calms her distress. 
For the purposes of this chapter, these consequentialist concerns, or a response based 
in compassion, should not be what determines the course of action; the aim here is to 
respect personhood. So, if Jane’s self-conscious personhood is to be respected then it 
must be done by acknowledging a broader sense of truth than is objectively understood. 
Personhood may be respected in such cases by validation of emotion and validation of 
Jane‘s subjective reality. Arguably, though, doubt could still be cast on whether Jane is 
able to value her future in the meaningful way that the view of self-consciousness 
requires. 
In order to try and get a definitive answer, the effect of dementia on self-consciousness 
has been investigated empirically. Psychological testing by Gil et al (2001) using a 
questionnaire method brought the following conclusion: 
“AD [Alzheimer’s disease] clearly induces an alteration of self-consciousness, but 
not a total abolition, so that it cannot be said that patients are unaware of 
existing or more generally that reflexive consciousness no longer exists.” 
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Support for this is found in a systematic review of both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches for investigating self and identity in dementia more widely (Caddell & Clare 
2010: 125), which concluded that “...the vast majority of evidence points to the 
persistence of self, at least to some degree, throughout the course of dementia”. In 
particular, a number of the studies reviewed found that people in the moderate to 
severe stages of the disease still commonly used both ‘I’ and other personal pronouns 
which indicates a level of self-awareness from self-consciousness. 
This is supported by Eustache et al (2013) who found evidence that a sense of identity 
is maintained even when the disease is at its most severe. However, Eustache et al make 
a distinction between an awareness of sameness and selfhood. The former which is 
about preserving a basic sense of identity is preserved but the latter requiring the 
update one’s sense of self based on an assessment of the current situation is lost when 
dementia is severe. 
Also, the findings from the studies reviewed by Caddell & Clare (2010) were equivocal. 
They state 
“.....the majority of these studies focus only on people with dementia who have 
intact verbal abilities, which is likely to rule out many people in the severe stages 
of the illness and therefore again limits the generalizability of results. It is also 
worth noting that these studies tend to search for evidence which supports the 
persistence of self, rather than a deterioration in self, which could reflect pre-
existing beliefs of the researchers regarding the effect of dementia on the self.”  
(Caddell & Clare 2010: 124) 
This suggests some unreliability in findings, perhaps biased by people wishing to 
establish self-consciousness using such empirical measures. As such, it could be an 
overestimation of the level of self-consciousness is produced due to a wish to avoid the 
implications of loss of personhood for those with a psychological view. 
Finally, there is some debate about the reality of a clear division between self-
consciousness and simple consciousness. From a phenomenological point of view, self-
consciousness, when understood as a non-reflective notion, is merely part of being 
conscious (Gallagher & Zahavi 2010). In other words, it is impossible to be conscious 
without having self-consciousness in this minimal form of being a conscious self-
perceiving individual in the world (Kriegel 2004; Gennaro 1996). 
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3.4.3 IMPLICATIONS OF BASING PERSONHOOD ON MINIMAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CAPABILITIES 
Efforts have been made here to understand self-consciousness as the notion of the 
individual being able to perceive themselves as a separate subject by using ‘I’ and being 
able to value that continuing existence. There is evidence that many people with 
dementia meet these criteria. This makes self-consciousness a more inclusive notion 
than autonomous personhood discussed in the previous chapter. The proposal that 
personhood is granted to those who are able to value their existence is reasonable in the 
sense that would provide basic protections and entitlements such as a right to life and 
not to be harmed. However, other aspects of personhood such as freedom of movement 
and the right to be told the truth might be harder to maintain as prima-facie duties.  
Also, there are people who have a more severe form of dementia who may not be able to 
fulfil Harris’s criteria of being able to value their own existence. People in this situation 
will have sensory and perceptual awareness (Clare 2010) and may have a form of 
existential continuity as proposed by Dainton (2014: 77) which consists of ‘felt flow of 
experience from moment to moment’. However, it raises the question of whether it is 
plausible to extend the full range of protections and entitlements associated with 
personhood to human beings in this situation. 
As Perring (1997) points out, in order to be consistent, such a commitment would mean 
personhood also being granted to other higher animals. This would mean that these 
animals could not be killed merely to feed human appetites nor harmed in order to 
promote human convenience or pleasure. It would be forbidden prima facie to use these 
beings merely as means to our own ends. This outcome would require a vegan diet but 
would also seriously restrict other human behaviours where animals could be harmed. 
One possibility for making more plausible such a view of personhood based on sentient 
consciousness is to advance that that it is only sufficient for personhood if the animal is 
both sentient and human. Although this may fit with common beliefs, it can be 
challenged as being prejudiced against other species (Singer 2011; 2009). The challenge 
is that appealing to the attribute of being a separate species is an arbitrary way to 
discriminate; in the same way that is considered arbitrary to discriminate based on skin 
colour or gender. Put simply: being human may not be enough. However, if compelling 
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reasons could be found why such biological differences are important, then these would 
nonetheless lie outside a purely psychological view. 
Another strategy is to propose that the sort of consciousness non-human animals have 
is open to debate and therefore it may still be valid to discriminate based on the fact 
that non-human animal consciousness is somehow different to human animal 
consciousness (Harrison 1991; Nagel 1974). However, it is unclear how this might differ 
and the debate allows for either result, in the sense that non-human animals may or 
may not be persons. 
So, although inclusive of people with severe dementia, there is seemingly a problem on 
the psychological view with including people with this level of psychological ability as 
persons in the psychological sense. It needs to be shown how minimal attributes are 
able to generate personhood. Also setting the threshold this low means including non-
human animals or finding some valid distinctions in order to exclude non-human 
animals. 
In summary, if personhood is viewed as all-or-nothing notion based on sufficient 
conditions then this creates the risk of unjust exclusion or inappropriate inclusion. 
There is also the difficulty that having an all-or-nothing version of personhood invokes a 
response that is not differentiated for different psychological abilities. Should the 
response to personhood generated merely by consciousness be the same as the 
response generated by full moral agency? It seems implausible that a being who is 
unable to reflect or communicate can have all the same protections, entitlements and 
responsibilities as someone will full moral agency. This implies the possibility of greater 
and lesser personhood. It is to this notion that the final section will turn. 
3.4.4 PERSONHOOD AS A CLUSTER CONCEPT AND A MATTER OF DEGREE 
Due to the unsatisfactory nature of determining a single threshold for personhood, a 
number of writers have proposed that personhood may be better understood as a 
matter of degree. Above, Glover (1988) stated that self-consciousness was the prime 
feature of personhood. He develops this view to argue for self-consciousness and 
personhood as being matters of degree. This account leaves open the possibility of 
degrees of self-consciousness, due to there being different kinds and degrees of I-
thoughts with the result that being a person may sometimes be a matter of degree. 
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In a similar move Perring (1998: 193) argues: 
‘Decisions based on degrees of personhood may be painful and even dangerous. 
However, there may be occasions where these judgments are justified.’  
Others like Tooley (2012) also accept the possibility, while DeGrazia (2008) argues 
against dogmatic assertions, either that moral status admits to degrees or that it is all-
or-nothing. Nonetheless, DeGrazia (2008: 193) does see personhood as a cluster 
concept serving as a ‘summary placeholder’ for ‘morally relevant properties’ such as 
autonomy and self-awareness, each of which he claims come in degrees. 
In a sense the argument has come full circle. As pointed out by Perring (1997), the work 
of Parfit (1984), on which the contemporary psychological view strongly relies, suggests 
that persons are merely degrees of psychological connectedness. In this sense the more 
connected we are, the more we are persons and the more valuable it is for these 
psychological connections to survive. 
For this investigation, the pertinent question is the implications of such a view for 
people with dementia. Glover (1988; 1977) hopes that moving to an understanding of 
personhood as being a matter of degree will reduce the arbitrariness of placing a sharp 
boundary between person and non-person. However, the remaining uncertainty 
relating to which properties count, and how much for, does not seem to resolve the 
issue of how to ground personhood (in a meaningful sense) for people with severe 
dementia. 
A practical implication is that even if it is accepted that personhood has degrees, the 
resulting decisions may still be all-or-nothing. There are countless examples where a 
response, such as opening a locked door, getting someone out of bed, telling the truth, 
appears all or nothing. This suggests that even if a view of personhood is held that it can 
be in degrees, there may well be thresholds where certain entitlements (e.g. to be told 
the truth) take effect. In this view, personhood is understood as a matter of degree but it 
still invokes a range of prima facie duties. The nature of these obligations will vary 
depending on the degree of personhood present. On this view people with severe 
dementia may still be seen as persons, but they will be lesser persons. 
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3.4.5 SUMMING UP PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS OF PERSONHOOD 
There is a strong intuition that associates psychological connections with the moral 
status of personhood. On closer investigation it has been suggested that the most 
plausible psychological attribute sufficient for personhood is a simple form of self-
consciousness where people are able to value their continued existence. This then 
creates prima facie duties on care providers towards the person with this attribute. In 
practical terms, a flexible approach may be required. For example, it may be that a 
prima facie duty to tell the truth yields to merely validating someone’s subjective 
conscious reality rather than truth as objectively understood. 
However, the presence of self-consciousness is more doubtful for people with severe 
dementia, due to reduced psychological capacities and empirical uncertainty about 
what people in this state are actually able to think. If personhood is founded on simpler 
forms of consciousness then this approach produces a demanding moral vision. This is 
because, in order to be consistent with a purely psychological view, it must extend 
prima-facie protections and entitlements to non-human animals with similar 
psychological abilities. 
 A reasonable response is to suppose that personhood is a matter of degree. People (and 
other animals) with different levels of personhood will incur different prima facie duties 
from a care provider. If the duties incurred are all-or-nothing, this then results in each 
one having a separate threshold with a different degree of psychological ability needing 
to be met. This produces a worry about whether it is then possible to work out the 
placing of these thresholds. For example, how much of a person should someone be 
before they are entitled to be told the truth?  This would result in a complex picture 
from which to produce an ethical model. However, things are potentially complicated 
further by the possibility that compromises are possible that reflect the degree of 
personhood present. 
Ultimately, the psychological view of personhood is based on the premise that moral 
status is grounded on psychological capacities. As dementia involves a reduction or loss 
of these capacities, there is always going to be the risk of depersonalisation, although 
people may disagree whether this occurs or when it occurs. 
Page | 83  
 
Someone with a psychological view of personhood might regard this (coldly) as a 
matter of fact and therefore not a problem that can be addressed. However, Post 
(2013:154) describes such a view as having ‘[a] bias against the deeply forgetful’. Before 
going on to discuss the response to the psychological view, the effects of 
depersonalisation of people with dementia by society will be outlined. 
3.5 DEPERSONALISATION BY SOCIETY 
Nearly everyone who has dementia has lived a long adult life as a person. The 
psychological view has suggested that the progression of dementia can result in the 
individual no longer having an equivalent moral status, as their psychological capacities 
reduce. A plausible way of understanding this is that as dementia advances, the range of 
prima facie duties to people with dementia also reduces. 
This leaves people with dementia in a much more vulnerable position than that of full 
persons. An extreme example of the implications of this is provided by Cooley (2007) 
who suggests, from his interpretation of Kant, that persons who are aware that they are 
going to develop dementia have a duty to commit suicide in order not to allow the body 
to live in a state devoid of moral agency. Clearly, Cooley believes that personhood is 
absent once the ability to exercise moral agency is lost, and this results in what he 
himself recognises could be thought of as a ‘too cold and uncaring’ position (Cooley 
2007:43). 
A number of scholars have criticised Cooley, both in terms of the cogency of the 
argument, its consequences and the quality of the Kantian scholarship on which it is 
based (Sharp 2012; Latham 2007; Perry 2007). Nonetheless, it demonstrates what 
might be considered the sharp end of the psychological view for people with dementia, 
and has relevance due to a recent rekindling of the debate regarding the permissiveness 
of non-voluntary euthanasia or so-called mercy-killings of people with dementia 
(Johnstone 2013; Sharp 2012). 
As, Sabat (2006) points out, with the advance of dementia, people with the condition are 
increasingly unable to defend themselves against being negatively positioned in social 
situations. As a result, there is a tendency to interpret the behaviour of the person with 
dementia in increasingly ‘defective terms’ (Sabat 2006: 290). Sabat describes this as 
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malignant positioning which can develop into a malignant social psychology, as outlined 
by Kitwood (1997; 1990), against people with dementia. 
It seems that people with dementia can be disenfranchised in a number of interrelated 
ways. If a psychological view of personhood is held then the number of prima facie 
rights is reduced. With fewer protections, people with dementia may also find 
themselves unable to resist the unwanted interventions that may result due to a 
reduced ability to communicate their wishes in these invalidating environments. 
Furthermore, it is argued by Kitwood (1997; 1990) that malignant social psychology 
actually causes further deterioration of the cognition of people with dementia. This then 
becomes self-reinforcing as the cognitive abilities of the individual with dementia are 
reduced by the environment leading to an increase malignancy in response to this 
further reduction in cognitive ability. 
In concrete terms, Kitwood (1997: 46-7) highlights seventeen behaviours2 resulting 
from personhood being undermined by a malignant social psychology. Some examples 
are illustrated below and examined in terms of the discussion on psychological view of 
personhood above:  
Treachery: Kitwood describes this as ‘using forms of deception in order to distract or 
manipulate a person, or force them into compliance’ (1997: 46). It is notable that 
Kitwood links deception and treachery. The example that Kitwood (1990) originally 
gives illustrates this link. It describes a woman with dementia being tricked to get into a 
car with a lie in order that she can be taken to the local psychiatric hospital. 
In terms of the discussion thus far, Kitwood suggests here that the woman in this case 
has a right to be told the truth about the proposed destination and given a choice about 
whether she gets in the car or not. In everyday life, fully competent persons would 
expect this, otherwise such an action would be considered abduction. Yet, it still seems 
reasonable to suggest that in the event of the woman with dementia being at risk of 
serious harm (of which she cannot be made unaware) it is reasonable for her to be 
                                                        
2 A full list can be found in Appendix A 
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taken to a safe place. Nonetheless, it is arguable that this should be done without 
deception or treachery, if reasonably possible. 
Infantilisation: Kitwood describes (1997; 1990) this as treating someone patronizingly 
as they would a very young child. The psychological view appears to be involved here as 
it is thought someone who is perceived to currently have a mental capacity similar to a 
child should therefore be treated like one. In real terms this treatment involves ignoring 
the adult person’s entitlement to respect in terms of polite language and recognition of 
their abilities, past and present. The use of dolls in therapy is one example where 
concerns about infantilisation have been raised (Mitchell & Templeton 2014; Andrew 
2006). Themes here are also closely related to discussions on human dignity, and will be 
considered in more depth in the next chapter (4.6).  
Invalidation: Kitwood (1997: 47) describes it as ‘failing to acknowledge the subjective 
reality of a person’s experience...’ As discussed above, personhood can be grounded in 
someone being conscious of their own subjective reality, even if it is not shared by 
others. Those that doubt the legitimacy of a subjective self-conscious reality may well be 
inclined to invalidation as Kitwood describes. 
Ignoring: This is where people in close proximity to those with dementia behave as if 
they were not there. Perhaps this is because of a belief that the surrounding people with 
dementia cannot perceive or understand and so it is of no consequence. This exclusion 
implies a view that people with dementia are actually not present in a sense that 
requires a social response, except to service their bodies in an impersonal manner. This 
links to objectification, another element of malignant social psychology, where the 
individual is seen as a ‘...lump of dead matter: to be pushed, lifted, filled pumped or 
drained...’ Kitwood (1997: 47).  
In a related move, it is suggested by Aquilina & Hughes (2006) that people with 
dementia can be treated by society as if they are already dead. This can be termed a 
‘living death’ (Hill 2008) or a ‘death that leaves the body behind’ (George 2010: 586).  
Indeed, Davis (2004) talks about the benefits of relatives beginning a grieving process 
during the phase of cognitive decline. However, others argue that these expressions are 
now increasingly a thing of the past (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009a; Downs 2005). 
It is likely that describing the human being with dementia as dead is merely a 
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metaphorical way of saying that the remaining psychology no longer resembles the 
person once known. After all, people with dementia do not meet the criteria for death, 
which Belshaw (2009:16) defines as ‘... the irreversible breakdown of the organism as a 
whole.’  
The meaning behind such expressions might also be linked to the notion of the social 
death that the person undergoes before biological death (Sweeting & Gilhooly 1997). In 
this sense, the individual is considered not to be alive in any meaningful sense by those 
around them. The perceived loss of personhood results in a social death which removes 
the protections and entitlements that are expected as an equal citizen (Brannelly 2011). 
Underlying much of the above, is the philosophical view of social constructivism that 
sees the human self and its personhood as being constructed by society rather than 
solely existing due to the individual’s mental processes (Hughes 2011a). This offers a 
way out by offering a different way for society to understand and interact with those 
who have dementia, in order to remove the social malignancy and thus to a 
reconstruction their personhood. 
3.6 RESPONSES TO DEPERSONALISATION 
3.6.1 PERSON-CENTRED CARE 
In his landmark book Dementia Reconsidered Kitwood (1997) states how he was 
motivated to a response after observing the phenomenon of malignant social 
psychology.  Along with a colleague, Kathleen Bredin, they decided that a new culture in 
dementia care was needed which would focus on maintenance and enhancement of 
personhood rather than pathologizing people based on cognitive impairment (Kitwood 
1997:136; Kitwood and Bredin 1992).  
This new approach was entitled person-centred care, based on the original Rogerian 
psychotherapeutic term. Though, philosophically, it also draws heavily from the work of 
Martin Buber who saw personhood as being founded in the response to our 
spontaneous relationships to other human beings (Baldwin 2008; Kitwood 1997). 
Person centred care, has since been advocated widely as a model of dementia care both 
in the UK and abroad (Edvardsson et al 2008; Brooker 2007). However, it is arguable 
that a situation has developed where person-centredness has merely become an 
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exercise in political correctness rather than having substance for many that use the 
term in practice (Brooker 2004). 
Kitwood was aware of the need to counter philosophical views that emphasise 
individuals’ psychological capabilities.  Drawing on the work of Post (1995), Kitwood 
proposes that the answer must be inclusive of everyone with dementia. As Kitwood 
(1997: 10) emotively puts it: 
‘[Despite differences in mental capabilities] we are all, so to speak, in the same 
boat; and there can be no empirically determined point at which it is justifiable 
to throw some people into the sea’. 
Rather than psychological capacity, Kitwood suggests that personhood is based on three 
elements: uniqueness of persons, embodiment and relationships with others. This can 
be observed in his oft-quoted definition of personhood: 
‘It is a standing or status that is bestowed upon one human being, by others, in 
the context of relationship and social being. It implies recognition, respect and 
trust.’ (Kitwood 1997: 8) 
It is argued by Brooker (2007) that Kitwood’s original vision has been obscured by 
government policy in the National Service Framework (Department of Health 2001) 
that interprets person-centred care merely as individualised care rather than focusing 
on communication, relationships and the culture of care as Kitwood originally intended. 
This had led some to call for relationship-centred care as a development from person-
centred care (Nolan et al 2004; Nolan et al 2001), seemingly overlooking the central 
position held by relationships in Kitwood’s original psychotherapeutic vision. 
Nonetheless, this original vision of Kitwood is open to criticism. Firstly, there is the 
worry of whether it is consistent to hold the view that personhood can reflect 
uniqueness without also being individualistic. If the individual is the focus, then it seems 
that this undermines the relational nature of Kitwood’s proposal. Yet, Kitwood can be 
defended here as it seems reasonable to posit that individuals can be unique and 
interdependent. In other words, there is a distinction between independence and 
individuality; people can be unique individuals but still depend on their relationships 
with others. 
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Secondly, there has been criticism of the rigour in Kitwood’s methodological approach 
(Dewing 2008). Also, due to his untimely death, Kitwood was unable to fully clarify his 
philosophical position. Nonetheless, its enduring influence in the field of dementia care 
suggests that people have found Kitwood’s analysis persuasive nonetheless, and Dewing 
(2008) adds that a broader reading of his work reveals a cogent approach. 
A final and more serious problem relates to Kitwood’s definition of personhood. This is 
of central interest here. Recall, that his definition states that personhood is bestowed 
upon a human being by others. It is notable that in his seminal work Kitwood (1997) 
does not return to bestowing, and instead focuses on maintaining personhood, which 
contains the tacit assumption it is there.  
Nonetheless whether the focus is on bestowing or maintaining personhood, the end 
result is the same. The key thing is that people with dementia are being somehow 
provided with this status by others. Yet, in order to be inclusive, the question is raised 
what it is that will ensure that care providers bestow or maintain personhood for 
everyone with dementia. 
In order to explain why, Kitwood (1997:61-4) makes the empirical claim that carrying 
out person-centred care (or positive person work) slows cognitive deterioration and 
improves well-being. These positive outcomes provide a reason to bestow or maintain 
personhood but there is no argument here that obligates people to do so. There could be 
one or a number of people who decide, for other reasons, not to bestow or maintain 
personhood for certain individuals with dementia. For example, they may believe that 
the well-being gained by bestowing such a moral status is not as great as the burden of 
the extra work needed to respect this status and therefore they choose not to bestow 
personhood or provide the associated care. 
Kitwood’s work can be aligned with social constructivism. This commonly understands 
personhood as something constructed by others through social interaction (Hughes 
2011a). Yet, the notion of malignant social psychology illustrates how such forces can 
also depersonalise people with dementia (Aquilinia and Hughes 2006). Furthermore, 
the thesis of social constructivism that all psychological phenomena are merely social 
constructs is debatable (Hughes 2011a; 2001a). It appears that leaving it up to others to 
bestow personhood makes it a potentially exclusive notion after all (Dewing 2008). To 
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rephrase Kitwood’s words above: if left up to the crowd they could after all decide to 
throw someone out of the boat. 
Kitwood’s view is undoubtedly an influential force in dementia care. It promotes a 
positive attitude but its grounding for personhood is open to challenge leaving the 
position vulnerable to being eroded by those who believe that some people with 
dementia are not persons.  
Despite this, it is important to stress that Kitwood’s work is not being dismissed. As 
described above, his writing also suggests personhood is maintained through the 
process of forming relationships with people with dementia and recognising their 
uniqueness as human beings. This suggests a more existential argument which begs 
further investigation.  Kitwood’s work also contains some important insights into how 
interacting on an emotional level with people with dementia can develop certain 
qualities or virtues in the care provider. It is possible that development of the care 
provider’s character and empathic receptivity is the key factor. 
Finally, it is possible that there is actually consequentialist ethics smuggled in by the 
claim that bestowing personhood improves wellbeing and possibly also delays the 
progression of the disease. A role for consequentialist ethics will be returned to in 
Chapter 8. 
3.6.2 SITUATED EMBODIED AGENT VIEW AND ‘BODILY AUTONOMY’ 
Hughes responds to the psychological view of Locke and Parfit with the situated 
embodied agent (SEA) view of the person. In doing so, he draws on the work of 
existential phenomenologists Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, along with the work of 
Wittgenstein (Hughes 2013; 2011a; 2001a). Similarities can be seen with the approach 
of Kitwood (1997) in the acknowledgment of a social context, but Hughes distances 
himself from the full-blown social constructivism implied by Kitwood (Hughes 2011a; 
2001a). As the name suggests, Hughes’ view has three components: situated context, 
embodiment and agency. 
In describing his view Hughes (2011a: 42) states 
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‘In its most general form, the SEA view suggests that psychological phenomena 
are properly understood only in a contextually embedded manner: they cannot 
be characterized independently of the situated context.’ 
By this Hughes means that the context in which we live, such as family and culture is an 
essential part of understanding the person and the meaning behind the person’s 
communication. Due to this situatedness, persons cannot be understood merely as a 
series of psychological connections but are also embedded in a broader unified 
narrative (Hughes 2011a; 2001a). Hughes also writes also about the role of spirituality 
in the SEA view. Drawing on Heideggerian terminology, he states that seeing human 
beings situated in a spiritual domain ‘....is a non-negotiable aspect of our being-in-the-
world’ (Hughes 2011b: 204). However, the emphasis in Hughes’ philosophical work is 
on the secular notion of being embedded in social terms (Hughes 2011a; 2001a). 
The SEA view suggests a social narrative view of the personal identity, such as was 
discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of autonomous personhood. Recall in that context, 
the worry was that a social view would subsume the individual’s wishes. Without the 
need for autonomy, there is arguably less of a problem with someone’s narrative 
identity being a more social notion. However, as Hughes recognises, for the narrative 
view of personal identity to work it is necessary to identify with a continuing human 
body. Putting this in the context of advance directives, Hughes (2001a: 89) states 
‘For the reality at the bedside suggests, in keeping with the SEA view, that this 
person today is continuous with and connected to the person who signed the 
directive, by embodiment and by the situatedness that embodiment entails.’ 
To support the centrality of embodiment, Hughes (2013; 2011a) draws on the 
existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (2012/1945), which proposes that our 
understanding of the world is essentially that of an embodied being, and that we can 
only act in terms of this embodiment. This acts as a rebuttal to the Locke/Parfit view of 
personal identity by instead understanding identity as arising from a situated embodied 
context rather than individual’s psychological states (Hughes 2011a).  
This emphasis on being human rather than the psychological life as the main source of 
personhood finds support in the work of Buber, a Jewish theologian, which also 
influenced Kitwood’s philosophy. It is also a common line of argument in Christian 
bioethics to rely on the notion of being human as the key source of moral status, 
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regardless of a particular individual’s faculties (Sutton 2007). Hughes (2008: 129) 
appears to be suggesting something close to this position when he states that 
‘The arguments here suggest that people with dementia, because we all occupy 
the same human worldly groove, remain persons even in the severer stages of 
their disease. The requirement that we should be person-centred, therefore, 
stems from our being human.’ 
As it stands, a tendency to focus on embodiment leaves the position vulnerable to 
accusations of speciesism (Singer 2009) as it is unclear what is about being biologically 
human that grants moral status. However, it is clear that tapping into our shared human 
experience means we have a chance of better understanding those of us who have 
dementia by ‘a potential to feel their meaning’ when language fails (Hughes 2013: 356).  
Nonetheless, despite a providing an eloquent phenomenological description of what it is 
to be human, it remains unclear how sharing the experience and language of being 
human generates a moral status for persons. Recall, that a similar criticism was used in 
the previous chapter against Agich’s (2003) view of actual autonomy that also drew 
heavily on a phenomenological view. However, the importance of feeling in dementia 
will be returned to later when the discussion moves away from the focus on moral 
status. 
A number of possible avenues are open at this point. Discussions on human dignity as, 
the name suggests, focus more on humanness than personhood. There is also recourse 
to arguments drawing on a spiritual or an existential view of human existence. Although 
there are clearly links between these arguments and a discussion of personhood, they 
will be given a full treatment in the next chapter.  
Leaving these elements to one side, it is possible that the answer may be found in 
agency, the final aspect of Hughes’ framework. As recognized by Hughes (2011a), 
agency is primarily associated with autonomy; yet, this immediately creates a problem 
as this is not an ability that is shown by everyone with dementia. In a similar move to 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009), Hughes (2011a) goes on to suggest that 
autonomy should be seen as relational and interdependent. However, in Chapter 2 it was 
argued that this does not solve the problem as its reliance on a social view proved 
unreliable, risking equivocal results. 
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So some further thinking is required on how agency fits into the picture of grounding 
personhood for people with severe dementia. Hughes (2011a; 2001a) stresses that 
people with dementia, along with the rest of us, are not just agents but situated 
embodied agents. This means that certain gestures, even in severe dementia, can be 
understood as agentive with the aid of having this shared embedded context (or human 
worldly groove). Hughes (2013; 2011a) also draws on Wittgenstein’s notion of an 
agreed form of life to make the point that understanding is more than just a cognitive 
act by drawing on our whole experience of being human. 
To help illustrate the point, both Hughes (2013; 2011a) and Dekkers (2004) use the 
example of someone with severe dementia seemingly rejecting the intervention of 
artificial feeding. The thought is that the physical resisting of these interventions is 
significant, rather than merely a reflex against such an intrusion. In this context, 
Dekkers (2010; 2004) argues for the notion of bodily autonomy. Dekkers (2010: 257) 
uses the term autonomy in a particular way to suggest that ‘the human body lives its 
own life’. Along with Hughes, Dekkers (2010; 2004) aligns his work with the 
philosophical heritage of Merleau-Ponty (2012/1945). Dekkers (2010: 258) argues that 
even in severe dementia there is the preservation of  
‘[t]acit bodily knowledge.... based on the sedimentation of life narratives...’ 
finding their expression in behavioural patterns which ‘....may be interpreted as a 
remainder of what once has been ‘real’, that is rational autonomy.’  
Yet this distinction between rational autonomy and bodily autonomy suggests a two tier 
approach to autonomy that is ultimately unhelpful for grounding personhood for people 
with severe dementia. Indeed, Dekkers (2010: 254) makes it clear that his ambitions are 
limited when he states. 
‘My position is that people with severe dementia cannot be entirely denied a 
(rudimentary) form of selfhood or personhood. They definitely are not persons 
in the strict sense of moral agents who are self-conscious and rational and 
demonstrate a minimal moral sense, but at least they can be called persons in a 
weaker sense.’ [my emphasis] 
So although people with severe dementia may be called persons, arguably, they should 
be denied anything more than a rudimentary form of personhood in a moral sense.  
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Earlier in the same chapter Dekkers also states ‘...my own premise is that ‘person’ is 
equivalent to ‘human being’’. (Dekkers 2010: 253) It is hard to deny that people with 
severe dementia are human beings. So to reconcile this, it would appear that Dekkers is 
taking the position that all human beings are persons in a descriptive sense but, in terms 
of their moral status, people with severe dementia are (at best) lesser persons than the 
rest of us. As a result, Dekkers’ work appears to bring us no further forward than the 
psychological view described above for grounding personhood for people with severe 
dementia. 
So where does this leave the SEA view? It was hoped that agency might be able to form a 
more solid grounding than merely relying on situated embodiment human life. 
However, it appears that agency is not something that can ground personhood for 
people with severe dementia. Advance directives can be used, but these are vulnerable 
to previously elaborated criticisms on how narrative identity can survive. At this point, 
it appears that the agency component is unable to the secure the triad as a whole. 
In summary, the SEA view enhances the phenomenological understanding of the person 
with severe dementia. As a result, the insights drawn on are useful for improving care. 
However, it does not seem meet the aim here of grounding personhood as a moral 
status. Nonetheless, shared human experience and dignity may well form a suitable 
basis for an ethical model.  
3.7 EVALUATING THE ROLE OF PERSONHOOD IN AN ETHICAL MODEL FOR 
DEMENTIA CARE 
In the previous chapter it was argued that psychological views of autonomy are unable 
to ground autonomous personhood if mental capacity is not sufficient for reflective 
thinking. Attempts to solve this problem from non-standard views of autonomy, 
precedent, relational and phenomenological, ultimately proved unconvincing. Although 
there may still be a role for autonomy and autonomous personhood in a broader ethical 
model, autonomous personhood has not been able to ground solely a model for 
dementia care in a fully inclusive way. 
It was hoped that unbuckling the requirement of autonomy from personhood might 
broaden its inclusiveness sufficiently to include most, if not all, people with dementia. 
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On this broader psychological view, it was suggested that the most plausible attribute 
sufficient for personhood was self-consciousness. This appeared a promising move as 
both philosophical and empirical work suggested that most people with dementia are 
self-consciousness in the sense of being able to value their continued existence. 
It has been shown that having self-consciousness as the necessary and sufficient 
criterion of personhood provides the status to more people than autonomous 
personhood. This creates prima-facie duties on care providers towards the person with 
dementia. It also allows the valuing of the simplest of ends to be respected even though 
autonomous decisions that require reflective thinking based on an awareness of 
broader factors in one’s life may remain out of reach. 
However, the presence of self-consciousness is more doubtful for people with severe 
dementia, due to a further reduction in psychological capacities. There is some evidence 
that a basic sense of identity based on simpler form of consciousness continues into 
severe dementia (Eustache et al 2013). Yet, if personhood is founded on simpler forms 
of consciousness then in order to be consistent with a psychological view, it must 
extend prima-facie protections and entitlements also to non-human animals with 
similar psychological abilities. It was argued that this creates an overly demanding 
moral vision beyond that which can be expected by such attributes. 
As a result, rather than understanding personhood as an all-or-nothing notion based on 
sufficient conditions, it was suggested that it might be better understood as being a 
matter of degree. Linking this to the notion of prima facie duties, it can then be 
proposed that people with different levels of personhood will incur different prima facie 
duties from a care provider. It is possible that different levels of personhood will allow 
for certain compromises to be allowable that otherwise would not be if a greater level of 
personhood was present. 
However, this approach produces a rather complex configuration with each duty 
effectively having a different threshold of psychological ability that must be reached in 
order for it to be engaged. This did not meet the overarching aim here to produce an 
ethical model that is both practically useful as well as being philosophically rigorous. 
So it was concluded that despite moving away from the need for autonomous 
personhood, the psychological view is not the best way to ground an ethical model for 
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people with dementia. In fact, it was advanced that focusing on psychological properties 
might be harmful, leading to depersonalisation and a malignant social psychology. 
This led the discussion onto two prominent responses to the purely psychological view: 
person-centred care from Kitwood (1997) and the SEA view of Hughes (2011a; 2001a). 
There is much to recommend both of these views; in fact, it is fair to say, that following 
either approach could enrich the provision of dementia care. However, in terms of the 
work needed here to establishing personhood as a moral status, it is argued that both 
views leave too much uncertainty to generate an ethical model. 
Kitwood’s view relies on people recognising the uniqueness of each human being 
through relationship and suggests that this can slow the progression of dementia. Yet, 
Kitwood is open to challenge due to apparently unreliable nature of bestowing a moral 
status in this way. If those caring for people with dementia do not wish to bestow 
personhood on them, there is no argument in Kitwood that obligates them to do so in 
terms of moral status, though it does suggest some other existential and consequentialist 
reasons to do so. 
Hughes’ view hopes to overcome the flaws in this and other social constructivist 
positions of personhood. However, although this generates a persuasive 
phenomenological position on what it is to be human (with or without dementia), it 
remains unclear at this stage how sharing the experience and language of being human 
generates a moral status on which an ethical model can be built. In order to so this the 
central notion of humanness needs to be evaluated. 
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4 DIGNITY AND AN EXISTENTIAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
HUMANNESS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 examined whether the criterion of self-consciousness might be sufficient to 
support a psychological view of personhood for people with dementia. Though this is 
more inclusive than autonomous personhood, it was argued that extending personhood 
to people with the severest dementia produces an overly demanding moral vision. This 
is due to the need to extend prima-facie protections and entitlements to non-human 
animals with similar psychological abilities in order to remain consistent with the 
psychological view. The alternative of imagining personhood as being a matter of 
degree was demanding in the sense that there are practical difficulties with trying to 
assign the appropriate levels of entitlements and protections to those with ‘lesser’ 
forms of personhood. So even if such a system of more-or-less personhood is possible, it 
did not meet the aim here of producing an ethical model that is practically useful. 
In response, alternative views of personhood that seek to be fully inclusive of people 
with dementia were also investigated. A number of these views, such as Kitwood (1997) 
and Hughes (2011a) are prominent in the field and add a great deal to improve the care 
provided for people with dementia.  Yet, these approaches were shown to be vulnerable 
to philosophical challenge. Kitwood’s view of personhood relies on others bestowing the 
status on the individual with dementia. This may be plausible within the context of a 
positive environment where people are willing to bestow personhood in this way. 
However, this may not be case in all situations. If those caring for people with dementia 
do not wish to bestow personhood on them, there is no argument in Kitwood that 
obligates them to do so in terms of moral status. Hughes’ view aims to overcome the 
flaws in this and other social constructivist positions of personhood. However, the 
position generated is not an argument for moral status per se. It is, instead, a 
phenomenological position. 
4.1.1 BROADENING THE USE OF THE TERM ‘PERSON’ 
Despite these results, it seems fair to suggest that few people outside of philosophical 
circles would defend the notion that a living human being is a nonperson. Though, it is 
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possible to be caring towards nonpersons, to describe them as such implies a 
disrespectful and callous attitude to the human being concerned that would be 
particularly unacceptable in a caring context. 
Perhaps for this reason, people with dementia in everyday care situations continue to 
be described as ‘persons’, without necessarily inferring they have the exalted moral 
status that comes with philosophical definition of that term (Sapontzis 1981). So, people 
with dementia, though called persons, may not have the same levels of protection, 
entitlements or responsibilities that come with having full moral status. For example, it 
may be considered acceptable to carry out certain necessary care tasks (such as 
washing), despite the person with dementia objecting. These interventions may still be 
carried out in a sensitive and caring manner, perhaps using coaxing rather than 
coercion. Nonetheless, a person with full mental capacity would have the right to refuse 
such an intervention as well as having the responsibility to accept the consequences of 
such a decision. 
So this leads to question what do people mean when they say that an individual is a 
person? It is suggested here that they may be getting at something else, the notion of 
humanness or shared humanity. From this broad notion, the more specific notions of 
dignity and a variety of existentialist and more spiritual views can be drawn. There is no 
doubt that people with dementia are still human, even in the severest stages of the 
disease. The aim of this chapter is to assess what it is that people understand by the 
experience of caring for another human being and how this might ground an ethical 
model for dementia care.  
The first section will explore how humanness, as ground for an ethical model, may be 
found in dignity. The multifarious concept of dignity will be thoroughly examined along 
with its relationship to autonomy. The second section will then pick up on themes 
raised in Chapter 3 on spirituality and existentialism and evaluate whether these 
concepts can be understood in a way that can ground an ethical model in dementia care. 
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4.2 DIGNITY AS A CONCEPT IN CARING 
Dignity is a notion which is familiar in experience yet contested in definition. It is fair to 
say that most people are able to get a sense of the difference between a dignifying and 
undignifying situation for a human being. Shotton and Seedhouse (1998: 246) suggest 
that anyone who has found themselves in a ‘degrading situation’ knows what dignity is. 
In everyday life, we make efforts to do things such as protect the privacy of our bodies, 
present ourselves in an acceptable way, attempt to appear erudite in company or calm 
under pressure. There is a sense that we already know what dignity is for ourselves and 
this can be generalised to help honour it for others. In this vein, Seedhouse and 
Gallagher (2002: 369) describe an ‘intuitive understanding of dignity’ amongst care 
providers, patients and their relatives.  
The way that people have expressed their understanding of dignity can be found in 
empirical studies, both from health professions and the wider community (Royal 
College of Nursing 2008; Stratton and Tadd 2005; Tranvåg et al 2013). Yet, Shotton and 
Seedhouse (1998) also suggest that without an adequate definition of the concept, there 
is a chance that dignity will not be given the protection it deserves in health care 
practice. This view underlies the overarching aim of this thesis which is to establish a 
philosophical grounding that best meets the challenges of providing an ethical model for 
dementia care. 
The academic literature can be broadly divided into work that attempts to clarify the 
theory behind the concept and those studies that aim to deduce its meaning by 
investigating how people understand the term in practice. Gallagher et al (2008) argue 
that there can be a ‘dialectical relationship’ between theoretical work on the conceptual 
and empirical work, which suggests that the tension that can be found between dignity 
theory and how people experience the concept in everyday life can ultimately be 
productive. This dialectical view is accepted here as a sound strategy for developing an 
understanding of dignity. As a result, both empirical and philosophical literature will be 
considered in an attempt to find a conception of dignity that is conceptually rigorous 
while also matching people’s experience of being a dignified human being. 
Dignity as a philosophical concept has strong historical roots. It was described by 
Aristotle as a virtue of character. Aristotle believed it could be cultivated by pursuing a 
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middle path that avoids excesses of deference to others and arrogance in ourselves, 
while also being neither subservient nor disrespectful to others (Gallagher 2004). 
Dignity is also important in the ethical writings of Kant and plays a prominent role in 
human rights discourse (Gallagher et al 2008). 
Yet, in contemporary times, it has been subjected to criticism. Pinker (2008) states that 
the concept is not adequately defined, describing it as a ‘squishy’ and ‘subjective’ notion. 
He goes on to argue that it is not able to do the work required of it, particularly when it 
is being employed by conservative bioethicists. If Pinker is right, then this lack of 
theoretical grounding is a concern worth addressing. 
The use of the term dignity also invites criticism when applied in a more liberal sense of 
protecting people from unwanted interventions of others. Macklin (2003) argues that 
despite its prominence in such bioethical discussion, it actually means no more than 
respect for persons or their autonomy and is therefore a redundant term. If Macklin is 
right, then dignity will not be able to provide any alternative to the problems of 
establishing autonomy and personhood for people with dementia, which have been 
described in the previous two chapters. 
Responding to such concerns, the conservative commentator Leon Kass (2008: 300) is 
clear to point out that respect for human dignity... 
‘...lies not in the patient’s autonomy or any other of his personal qualities or 
excellences but rather in the patient’s very being and vitality.’  
However, in the same article, Kass appears to endorse the very difficulties he is trying to 
avoid: 
‘In sum, the human being has special dignity because he shares in the godlike 
powers of reason, freedom, judgment, and moral concern, and, as a result, lives a 
life freighted with moral self-consciousness—a life above and beyond what other 
animals are capable of.’ (Kass 2008: 325) 
This definition of a ‘special dignity’ suggests a Kantian view of dignity, where being a 
human person means possessing a special kind of absolute worth that cannot be 
exchanged or balanced with anything else. Yet, problematically the source of this worth 
and its resultant moral status is for Kant (no more and no less) the ability to choose 
with autonomy. For Kant, autonomy means having a rational will that is free and 
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therefore able to choose morally by deducing reasoned laws or principles that could be 
accepted by all (Johnson 2008; O’Neill 2002a; Kant 1996a/1785). Yet, this appears 
equivalent to the properties that Kass outlines for dignity above. So despite Kass’s 
attempts to avoid autonomy, his description of human dignity appears to be describing 
Kantian moral autonomy in all but name. 
As Chapter 2 has found autonomy to be lacking in a meaningful sense for people with 
advanced dementia, following such an argument would suggest these individuals not 
only lack personhood but dignity too. Aligning dignity absolutely with autonomy brings 
the discussion no further forward. However, it may be that autonomy can play a role in 
understanding dignity without dominating the concept. 
4.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY 
The first aim is therefore to clarify the relationship (if any) between dignity and 
autonomy. Kant’s claim that autonomy is the sole source of dignity is contested. Pullman 
(1999) hopes to redefine ethics in long term care with dignity rather than autonomy as 
the primary idea. Yet autonomy still retains a central role:  
‘Autonomy remains a central notion within an ethic of dignity, albeit as a value 
circumscribed by that broader notion.’ (Pullman 1999: 44) 
Though, Pullman adds that the role that autonomy plays in some people’s personal 
dignity is due to the prevailing social climate rather than being an essential part of the 
concept: 
‘Inasmuch as personal dignity is a socially constructed notion, the relative 
importance of individual autonomy to each person's sense of personal dignity 
can never be taken for granted.’ (Pullman 1999: 35) 
So, autonomy is not determining dignity absolutely as with Kant’s view but it remains 
an important part of dignity, at least in societies that value autonomy. There is some 
support in the empirical literature for this view that autonomy forms part of what it is 
to have dignity.  
Tranvåg et al (2013) carried out a meta-ethnography of healthcare professionals’ 
perceptions of dignity and the practice of dignity-preserving dementia care. The results 
suggest that respect for autonomy does indeed play a role. For Tranvåg et al, the other 
Page | 101  
 
important factor was the notion of individual integrity. This is understood to mean the 
protection of one’s personal sphere both physically and psychologically; maintaining 
the privacy of one’s body and surroundings as well as being able to hold certain values 
(Randers & Mattiasson 2004).  
Tranvåg et al (2013: 869) found that in the majority of the studies, professionals saw 
‘...advocating individual autonomy and integrity as a primary foundation for dignity-
preserving dementia care...’ An important part of this is care providers helping the 
person to maintain a ‘...sense of status in her or his own eyes...’ (Tranvåg et al 2013: 
870). On the other hand, some studies formed the view that advocating autonomy could 
erode integrity in a way that is unacceptable for dignifying care, indicating a departure 
from the notion that autonomy is a source of dignity. In these situations, integrity takes 
precedence leading to ‘persuasion and/or mild restraint’ as a way of preserving dignity 
(Tranvåg et al 2013: 872). As the study from Randers and Mattiasson (2004: 70) puts it 
‘Understanding the complexity of the concepts of autonomy and integrity in the 
care of older people may lead to the supporting or substituting of patients’ 
autonomy, in ways that protect their integrity and, consequently, uphold their 
dignity.’ 
A similar theme is found in (Jakobsen and Sørlie 2010: 296) who interviewed nursing 
home care providers. 
‘Intervening against a patient’s will was for these informants motivated by the 
wish to promote dignity.’ 
However, it is important to recall from the arguments in Chapter 2 that autonomy is 
variously understood. The autonomy being ‘substituted’ here may not refer to 
autonomy in the deeper sense of being able to make a reflective choice. It may well refer 
to autonomy understood merely as freedom to choose. This sort of autonomy would not 
necessarily be seen as dignifying in the same way as pursuing autonomy in the deeper 
reflective sense. 
A concrete example of this is using physical force in order to wash someone who is 
refusing to do so (Jakobsen & Sørlie 2010). In such situations, the individual has made a 
decision not to be washed. However, this may not be an autonomous decision in the 
deeper sense. After all, if this was actually an autonomous decision then such an 
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intervention carried out on an adult would be considered assault unless there was an 
appropriate legal authority in place. The alternative is that the refusal is not considered 
autonomous and therefore the care providers feel obliged to override it. 
If it is believed that an autonomous decision is not possible then care providers may 
well look to the perseveration of dignity as an ethical justification for intervening in 
situations such as someone being washed. In their research, Örulv & Nikku (2007) 
found that the key decision for staff in care homes when encountering a dignity-
threatening situation is whether they were justified to ‘interfere’ or not in order to 
preserve dignity. 
Yet, this still begs the question of what the dignity is that is being honoured by such 
interventions. Discussing this and other similar examples, Tranvåg et al (2013) state 
that meeting patient’s personal hygiene needs is part of protecting the physical element 
of personal integrity. However, this seems somewhat at odds with the notion that 
integrity is about privacy and protection of personal space. Could it not be that 
someone’s dignity is violated more by being washed forcibly than by being allowed to 
stay unclean?  
The concern here may relate to the very notion of allowing a human being to remain 
soiled. This suggests a more conservative notion of dignity, where the human body must 
be maintained and seen in a certain way.  This possibility will be returned to later on.  
There are other reasons for intervention, which may also be compelling, such as the 
overall well-being of the individual or those around them. However, this would not be 
responding to dignity as such but rather to consequentialist concerns such as promoting 
comfort for the greatest number. 
This section has shown that the strength of the relationship between autonomy and 
dignity depends on how each of the terms is understood. The following sections will 
evaluate the difference between subjective and objective views of dignity as a way of 
differentiating the concept from autonomy. 
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4.4 DIGNITY AS A SUBJECTIVE NOTION 
Following a comprehensive review of the literature Matiti and Baillie (2011) found that 
dignity is a multifarious concept. Furthermore, they suggest that everyone has a ‘unique 
and dynamic’ (2011: 21) understanding, inferring that not only does each individual’s 
definition of dignity vary but also it is in a state of flux. This is reflected in the definition 
of patient dignity from Matiti’s PhD thesis that states: 
‘Patient dignity is the fulfilment of patients’ expectations in terms of values 
within each patient’s perceptual adjustment level, taking into account the 
hospital environment.’ (Matiti 2002, cited in Matiti and Baillie 2011: 14) 
This definition appears to be based on a view that each person’s dignity has to be 
discovered before it can be responded to. This suggests a subjective view of dignity. The 
difference between this and objective views is an important distinction in discussions on 
dignity as objective views see dignity as something that exists independently of people’s 
subjective experience of the term (Gallagher 2004).  
Yet, there is the possibility that following a subjective path brings the concept back 
again to autonomy. People make autonomous choices and these ought to be respected. 
However, if someone starts to lose the ability to form autonomous choices, it seems to 
follow that they are losing the ability to form their subjective dignity expectations too. 
This is because it appears incoherent to separate the forming of a dignity expectation 
from the forming of an autonomous choice. 
In order to differentiate these, it would have to be possible to have a dignity expectation 
that is not an autonomous choice. However, it seems reasonable to propose that 
someone cannot expect a certain outcome based on their own understanding of dignity 
without this also being part of a reflection on how this fits an autonomous decision to 
live life in a certain way. Conversely, if someone believed that a course of action was 
subjectively undignifying it is unlikely that this course of action could then be chosen 
with autonomy. 
One view of dignity that is relevant here is the dignity of identity proposed by 
Nordenfelt (2004). Though, rather than attempting to differentiate this from autonomy, 
Nordenfelt (2004: 75) outlines autonomy as one of its central components. 
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‘It is the dignity that we attach to ourselves as integrated and autonomous 
persons, persons with a history and persons with a future with all our 
relationships to other human beings.’  
As with a number of studies discussed in Tranvåg et al (2013) above, Nordenfelt states 
that the dignity of identity is grounded by both autonomy and integrity. This definition 
suggests a subjective view of dignity, linked (at least partly) to respecting autonomous 
personhood. To illustrate, Wainwright and Gallagher (2008) refer to Gallagher’s (2004: 
595) example of a woman who said that ‘...dignity to her meant having a saucer with her 
cup’. Such dignity expectations are described in subjective terms by Wainwright and 
Gallagher (2008: 52): 
‘The point is not whether saucers are of objective importance, or whether the 
woman is right to expect a saucer. It is that the woman’s preference, for reasons 
that have to do with her age, social class, her deeply held values and in short her 
identity, is to use a cup and saucer and her preference should, if possible, be 
respected.’ 
If we accept that saucers are not of objective importance, then it seems reasonable to 
infer that notions such as the woman’s preference, her values and identity are linked to 
her individual autonomy. So, this form of dignity is at risk once the ability to exercise 
autonomy in thinking and action declines. Furthermore, it has been argued in Chapter 2 
that precedent autonomy on which advance directives rely is problematic; so following 
past preferences may not respect autonomy and therefore not this form of dignity 
either. 
Wainwright and Gallagher (2008) agree that this apparent dependence on autonomy of 
the dignity of identity undermines the inclusiveness of this particular conception of 
dignity. Nordenfelt (2009) has responded in later work by stating that although this 
conception of the dignity is based on the subject’s integrity and autonomy, it is not 
solely reliant on their self-image. Nordenfelt states someone’s integrity can be perceived 
to have been undermined by society without the person being aware and this can bring 
about a reduction of the dignity of identity. This suggests that people have a dignity 
based in a social identity as well as a personal one. Though, this avoids the problem of 
tying dignity with autonomy, it generates new problems by dignity being socially 
relative. This will be assessed in the next section. 
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A further practical example of the relationship between dignity and autonomy can be 
found in Tadd et al (2011). They describe a situation where a patient on a ward asks to 
go to the lavatory but is told by the nurse to use an incontinence pad as it is unsafe for 
the woman to be assisted to walk there. This is highlighted as an ‘indignity’. However, 
when analysed more closely the example seems to turn more on a discussion of 
autonomy than dignity. The situation is one where an autonomous preference to go to 
the lavatory is deliberately thwarted by the nurse refusing to assist the woman 
concerned. 
An alternative scenario can be proposed. Here the woman may autonomously choose to 
use a pad, accepting that this is the safer option. It seems more open to debate whether 
this would still be considered an indignity. To consider it so would rely on an objective 
notion of dignity linked to how humans ought to behave (in general). This could also 
apply to the saucer example above, if it can be shown that having a saucer with the cup 
represents something of objective importance for people from a particular culture.  
A further possibility is that the woman in Tadd et al’s (2011) example may have 
dementia and be unable to express a preference one way or the other. If it is genuinely 
unsafe for the woman to be assisted to walk to the lavatory and also that some 
discomfort would be felt by using a pad, then a dilemma is created. It may well be 
impossible to know the woman’s autonomous preference in this situation and (as 
argued above) it is not possible to know her subjective dignity expectations either. It is 
therefore necessary to consider objective dignity concerns in investigating whether it is 
more of an indignity to be assisted to go to the lavatory or use a pad. 
Thus far, it appears that autonomy has a strong influence on dignity, particularly when 
it is understood as a subjective notion. If autonomy is not possible, then this puts these 
subjective forms of dignity at risk of diminishing too. For people with dementia, 
exploring dignity as an objective notion appears a more promising avenue. 
4.5 DIGNITY AS AN OBJECTIVE NOTION 
4.5.1 ‘BASIC’ HUMAN DIGNITY 
Objective forms of dignity propose that dignity is something that exists independently 
of people’s subjective experience of the term. The most obvious candidate for this form 
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of dignity is that it is an inherent worth held by all members of the human species. A 
number of writers argue that dignity is held equally by all humans regardless of other 
faculties (Kass 2008; Nordenfelt 2004; Pullman 1999). This is commonly referred to as 
‘basic’ human dignity or Menschenwürde. Describing this type of dignity, Gallagher 
(2004: 590) states: 
‘People have this dignity or worth regardless of their levels of competence, 
consciousness or autonomy, or their ability to reciprocate in human 
relationships. They have this dignity purely because they are human.’ 
This form of dignity is inclusive of all humans and is stable and enduring (Gallagher 
2004). As such, it appears the ideal candidate to establish dignity for people with 
dementia and ground an ethical model. Haugan (2010) believes that it is a relatively 
uncontroversial notion that dignity applies to all human beings. Pullman (1999) argues 
that when autonomy is lost, others can still honour this enduring basic human dignity 
by intervening paternalistically.  
Yet, Pullman (1999) does not outline what constitutes this basic human dignity or how 
it ought to be honoured. Without further explanation, it begs the question of what the 
source of this dignity is. As Cochrane (2010: 236) puts it  
‘If all human beings possess dignity – this extraordinary moral worth – we need 
some explanation of what it is about the species Homo sapiens that makes them 
so deserving.’ 
This problem is not lost on all promoters of the concept. For example, Kass states (2008: 
315-6) 
‘.... asserting that we all have “equal dignity” does not, by itself, make it so. Mere 
assertion will not convince the skeptic nor refute the deniers of human dignity.’ 
Such sceptics may raise the objection of speciesism (Singer 2009) which states that 
valuing human beings just because they are human is an empty and prejudiced notion if 
no further argument is offered. As discussed in Chapter 3 (3.4.3), the challenge is that by 
appealing to the attribute of being a particular species as a source of value discriminates 
arbitrarily against other species without giving further reasons why this biological 
difference is significant. 
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Kass (2008) wishes to point out what it is about human beings in particular that is 
special. He suggests that it is our psychological ability to respond to the limits of our 
embodiment that provides us with our humanity.  
‘It is a [truly human] life that will use our awareness of need, limitation, and 
mortality to craft a way of being that has engagement, depth, beauty, virtue, and 
meaning—not despite our embodiment but because of it.’ (Kass 2008: 326) 
Yet, not every human being is in a situation where they are able to ‘craft a way of being’ 
and arguably people with severe dementia would not be able to do this. As discussed 
above, Kass appears to fall back on the notion that human beings have special ‘god-like’ 
psychological properties of reason, freedom, judgment, and moral concern. (Kass 2008). 
Ultimately, Kass’s view is very close to the views of philosophers who link moral worth 
to autonomy.  
Another approach to ‘basic’ human dignity comes from Nordenfelt. He prefers the term 
Menschenwürde and describes it as ‘...a kind of dignity that we all as humans have, or 
are assumed to have, just because we are humans.’ (Nordenfelt 2004:77). Yet, 
immediately there is some uncertainty here. It is one thing to suggest that human beings 
have such a dignity; it is something else to say that they are assumed to have it. Though 
later, Nordenfelt confirms that ‘Menschenwürde is once and for all fixed and it is the 
same for all people.’ (Nordenfelt 2004: 79) 
Of particular concern here is how Nordenfelt describes the ground for the 
Menschenwürde, which he links to the following capacities: 
‘The first is the human being’s consciousness and ability to think, i.e. his or her 
reason. This includes the power of self-consciousness. Human beings can reflect 
upon themselves. Second, human beings are different from other creatures in the 
world through not being fixed. Human beings are free to decide their own way of 
life..... This is the third element in human dignity, viz. autonomy, most clearly 
explicated by Kant.’ (Nordenfelt 2004: 78) 
As discussed above, the psychological factors of self-consciousness, reflection, reason 
and autonomy (particularly Kantian autonomy) start to fall away as dementia develops. 
Nordenfelt appears to not see a problem with Menschenwürde applying to all human 
beings yet being grounded by a property that is not held by all of them. In fact, he 
repeats the same reasoning in later work (Nordenfelt 2009: 39) 
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One possible explanation relates to how Nordenfelt understands Menschenwürde. In 
describing its ground, he asks the question: 
‘What is it about humans as a species that gives them a high dignity?’ (Nordenfelt 
2004: p78) 
This suggests an important difference between describing the dignity of an individual 
human being and the species as a whole. The argument could be run that although an 
individual no longer has the appropriate psychological capacities for Menschenwürde, 
they are biologically human so can still have the status held by human beings as a 
species as a whole. Such reasoning could also be used to salvage Kass’s account above, 
not to mention the psychological view of personhood discussed in the previous chapter. 
Yet, there are some difficulties with this view. Firstly, it appears to be an equivocation to 
ground dignity in psychological properties but then grant it to a biological category. 
Secondly, biological entities that are part of the human species vary greatly, from an 
embryo to a fully developed adult. Yet, such a view would have to apply an equal dignity 
to all of these beings. Furthermore, as Cochrane (2010) points out, it is not clear what 
the obligations generated by such an account of dignity actually are. Put in concrete 
terms, if the view is held that certain psychological capacities ground dignity then what 
is the correct response if faced with a human being who is judged not to have them? It is 
possible to say that certain psychological capacities ground the status of all human 
beings. Yet, in a caring situation it is problematic (at best) to respond to a particular 
individual in terms of respecting a dignity based in certain psychological attributes of 
the species, if that capability is believed to be absent for individual. 
Similar concerns about concrete application can be expressed about religious views 
based on sacredness and humans being made in God’s image. This line of thinking is 
found in Kass’s work along with others such as Gelernter (2008) and Kraynak (2008).  
Religious views by their nature are hard to refute. People are free to believe that dignity 
is God given. However, others are equally free to believe it is not. Similarly, in these 
situations how members of the human species are to be treated may be reliant on what 
has been instructed by religious texts. A group of people could agree that a certain 
religious code provides adequate guidance for dementia care; yet others may easily 
dispute this assertion if no further argument is given. As a result, such views would not 
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fulfil the overall aim of this thesis which is to establish the best philosophical approach 
to ground an ethical model for dementia care. 
It is worth noting at this point, that a similar argument can apply to personhood. People 
are free to call any entity they wish a person. This could include all humans but also 
pets, rivers, mountains etc. The point, however, is that in order to be meaningful, the 
term must have an adequate grounding and produce a response that is reasonable as a 
result. 
4.5.2 LIVING A DIGNIFIED EXISTENCE AS A HUMAN BEING WITH DEMENTIA 
It has proved difficult to establish a basis for human dignity or Menschenwürde for 
people with dementia without relying on properties that may be absent when the 
condition is severe. Basing individuals’ dignity on inherent worth, grounded by the 
properties of their species as a whole, appears incoherent. However, there may be 
another avenue to follow. As discussed in the introduction, the notion of a dignified 
existence for a human being in general is one that people can relate to. This section will 
consider how we might live a dignified existence as a human being with dementia. 
By using the term ‘dignified existence as a human being’, this proposes that the dignity 
of the species as a whole contains certain objective ideals associated with it towards 
which everyone should either personally strive or be helped to attain. Cochrane (2010) 
refers to a similar concept when dignity is understood as species integrity. 
This concept is also related to the notion of human flourishing which Nussbaum 
connects with such an understanding of dignity (Cochrane 2010). Nussbaum believes 
that people’s dignity is promoted by allowing them to develop their capabilities in order 
to flourish as full human beings. These capabilities include things such as health, 
freedom of movement, security, control over one’s environment, using the senses in a 
‘truly human way’ and ‘[b]eing able to form a conception of the good’ (Nussbaum 2008: 
377-378). Yet, there is the seemingly obvious problem that people’s capabilities are 
reduced when they get dementia. In order to try and include people with cognitive 
impairment Nussbaum states that a single capability (such as practical reasoning) 
should not be used to ascribe human dignity. However, there is a lack of guidance on 
which of the capabilities might be necessary or sufficient.  
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To try and get a clearer view about what a dignified existence might mean, it is worth 
considering some examples. The first is to consider again the example from Gallagher 
(2004) who was told by a woman that dignity for her was having a saucer with her cup. 
What is it about providing someone with a saucer under their cup that might enable 
them to flourish as a dignified human being? It could be that the basic animal process of 
drinking a liquid needs certain elements in order to show that it is part of a dignified 
human existence. This may sound contrived. However, to illustrate, it is worth 
considering the extreme opposite: perhaps where tea has to be drunk by patients from a 
spout in the wall. This fictitious scenario is likely to be judged as undignifying for all 
human beings. After all, this is how gerbils behave; it is not how humans behave. So 
there is a point where the tea is served in a way that is undignifying for humans in 
general suggesting an objective species norm rather than just a subjective preference. 
To extend the example further, the woman concerned may start to lose mental capacity 
resulting in a radical change in her preferences. In this new state, the woman will now 
only agree to eat her food off a plate on the floor. This causes concern for people 
witnessing this as they think that the woman should not be allowed to eat in this 
manner. 
Both of these alternative eating scenarios, from a plate on the floor or through a tube, 
can be viewed as undignified in terms of a previously stated subjective dignity 
preference to have a saucer with her cup. Interest here is focused on what the 
implications are for being a dignified human being in general. Perhaps, being a dignified 
and flourishing human being involves eating and drinking in a certain way and 
therefore this needs to be promoted by people caring for those with dementia. 
Shaub (2008:383) seeks to show the relevance of this for some dignity theorists when 
she says that ‘Feeding can become dining and procreation can become family life.’ 
However, it equally seems that this is about cultural relativism. In some Asian cultures, 
it is considered perfectly normal to eat with your hands while sitting on the floor. The 
sense of repugnance that may be felt watching someone eat in this way may easily be 
related to cultural preferences rather than an objective notion about what people need 
in order to flourish as human beings. It also seems likely that the sight of a tube 
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delivering food is likely to be more readily accepted in some cultural contexts than 
others. 
4.6 THE FUNCTION OF CULTURE IN DIGNITY 
To clarify the function of culture in dignity, a final example is proposed. Recall the 
example, raised in the introduction (1.6.3), of a professor, who has a long and 
distinguished academic career behind her. Now in an advanced state of dementia she 
lives in a nursing home. The professor has little recollection of her previous role and 
shows only a fleeting interest in her area of research. At times she gets frustrated with 
other people in the home. It has been found that providing a doll to comfort her, which 
she believes is a baby, can reduce her distress. While holding the doll, the professor can 
be heard by others in the home interacting with the doll using baby talk. 
Though, there is evidence to suggest that using dolls in this way can be effective for 
managing agitation for people with dementia (Mitchell and O’Donnell 2013), doll 
therapy is considered controversial for two main reasons. Firstly, it can be perceived 
that giving someone a doll treats them in a child-like way and is therefore infantilising 
(Mitchell & Templeton 2014). This follows from arguments made over a number of 
years that it is important for older adults to have age-appropriate experiences (eg. 
Salari 2002) 
Secondly, when using dolls in this way, people with dementia are not corrected when 
they perceive the doll as a baby and are therefore being deceived (Andrew 2006). Yet, 
Andrew (2006) goes on to argue that despite these concerns, doll therapy actually 
maintains dignity more than the alternative methods of managing agitation such as 
using chemical or physical restraint, and it also promotes dignity by providing an 
opportunity to ‘....give care rather than receive it.’ (Andrew 2006: 419). It appears that 
Andrew does not deny that there is something undignifying about giving an adult a doll 
that they believe is a baby. Yet, she believes that there are other elements of the process 
that are dignifying and the alternative of using restraint is worse overall for the dignity 
of the individual. 
Page | 112  
 
When analysing the example above, it is important to separate out what might be 
undignifying for any human being and what might be undignifying for the professor in 
particular. 
 Firstly, the arguments outlined above that this practice is infantilising and deceiving 
suggests that there is risk that dignity can be disrespected or undermined for any adult 
human being in this situation. It would seem that an adult human being cannot flourish 
if behaving in a seemingly child-like way and this is further hindered by leaving 
someone in a state of ignorance about the true nature of the doll. 
Cultural context may also be important here. It may well be acceptable for someone 
with dementia to interact with a doll in such a way in the context of a nursing home; 
whereas it would not be for someone to do so in a public place, or as a professor in their 
workplace. On the other hand, it could be argued that there are certain things that 
should remain as similar to mainstream society as possible even in a nursing home 
context. For example, people may expect adults with dementia to be dressed in the 
similar manner to how adults of that age would dress at home.  
It seems that expectations of the society that surrounds the individual with dementia is a 
key factor for dignity here. This idea is reflected in the followed personal view of 
Kathleen Morgan (2011: 281-282) who has a diagnosis of dementia: 
‘Dignity is being treated like any other woman. I still like the same things I used 
to – fashion, style, babies, the things I can’t do, I still like. Dignity is being dressed 
right. Appearance is everything because that is what we are all judged on. We 
must look the best we can to be accepted (for as long as we can) by society.’ 
Morgan is clear about the link between the judgement of others and having dignity. 
Though it is a personal view, Morgan’s language suggests that ‘being treated like any 
other woman’ and having our appearance judged favourably are essential elements of 
dignity for everyone. Nonetheless, notions such as being ‘dressed right’ are clearly 
linked to the culture in which Morgan or anyone else may find themselves. 
This leaves the difference that might be made by the woman in the example being a 
professor. The inclusion of this is more than a rhetorical flourish. It is argued by 
Nordenfelt that dignity can be obtained by people having certain standing in society. He 
refers to this as dignity of merit and it is often provided by an older person’s past 
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employment (Nordenfelt 2004; 2009). Wainwright and Gallagher (2008) argue that 
dignity of merit actually relies on another of Nordenfelt’s categories: the dignity of 
moral stature. In this example, this would mean that the professor’s dignity does not 
just relate to her having been a professor but also on her having carried out that role in 
a manner judged appropriate. 
Accepting Gallagher and Wainwright’s interpretation still leads to people such as the 
professor having a higher dignity based on their societal status, just as long as they live 
up to the status of their role. Assuming this is the case in the current example, the 
relevant point is that it seems to follow that it is easier to find oneself in an undignifying 
situation having been in a position of high moral standing. This is because the threshold 
of an acceptable level of dignity is higher. Put colloquially, there is the potential for a 
larger fall from grace.  
However, as highlighted by Wainwright and Gallagher (2008), there is also a strong 
argument that status of this kind should not make a difference to sort of care that the 
individual receives. This suggests that the care response should only be based on the 
dignity which is shared by all human beings. In light of this, the fact the woman 
concerned is a professor is merely a red herring in terms of making the doll therapy 
more undignifying. 
Ultimately, whether the woman in the scenario is of especially high standing in society 
or not, the dignity that is associated with her is based on the expectations of that 
society. In the discussion on subjective forms of dignity earlier, individual dignity 
expectations were found to be associated with personal autonomy. This time, 
expectations are based in the culture of the society around the person. These 
expectations may differ depending on both the standing of the individual in that society 
or on what that particular society expects for human beings in general.  
Support for the idea that cultural expectations of society can be a source of dignity has 
been found in a mixed method empirical study by Edlund et al (2013). They suggest that 
dignity has a relative component which is highly changeable depending on culture in a 
society and all the norms and rules that it involves. Though, it is worth noting that 
Edlund et al (2013: 855) also propose that human beings have absolute dignity, which is 
gained by creation and cannot be taken away or even ‘called into question’. This implies 
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a religious view and such positions have already been tackled above, so will not be 
pursued further here. 
A final example to illustrate the importance of cultural acceptance in dignity is when 
people’s physical condition deteriorates towards death. In this situation, it appears that 
certain cultures in society have a need to maintain dignity by maintaining appearance 
not just through actions like dressing appropriately but also through keeping the human 
body contained and clean. Building on the work of Lawton (1998), Komaromy (2005) 
describes how staff in nursing homes feel the need to contain people’s ‘leaking bodies’ 
in order to make them acceptable for those around them. 
So, it appears that a view of what is acceptable for human beings within a particular 
culture brings certain expectations for dignifying care. However, the aim of this section 
was to look for objective forms of dignity. The problem of relying heavily on the view of 
society brings a similar problem to that which was found with Kitwood’s social 
constructivist view of personhood discussed in the previous chapter.  
Recall, social constructivism sees the human self and its personhood as being 
constructed by society rather than solely existing due to the individual’s mental 
processes (Hughes 2011a). This was found to be unreliable as there is nothing in this 
idea that stops societies deconstructing personhood for people with dementia. If dignity 
expectations have similar causation then it seems plausible that people with dementia 
could be treated variably depending on what dignity is seen to be. This could lead to a 
situation where people with dementia are unable to meet the expectations set. 
Returning to Morgan (2011:282), her perspective suggests that this is a consideration 
for her: 
‘In reality there is no dignity in dementia. If we are not careful, we can become so 
sensitive to loss of dignity that we see loss where there is none. We all view 
dignity and what affronts it differently. This must make it tricky to put dignity 
into training; can you train dignity?’ 
So this variability in how people view dignity in society appears to leave open a risk of 
equivocal judgements about how dignity might be honoured for people with dementia 
or deciding whether it has been lost. In conclusion, it can be seen that if dignity is no 
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longer dependant on inherent properties of either the individual or the species, the 
concept then becomes highly susceptible to cultural context. 
4.7 SUMMING UP DIGNITY 
As Morgan (2011) states above, it is challenging to get to the bottom of what dignity is. 
In this vein, it is worth reiterating the definition quoted near the beginning of this 
chapter from Matiti’s research: 
‘Patient dignity is the fulfilment of patients’ expectations in terms of values 
within each patient’s perceptual adjustment level, taking into account the 
hospital environment.’ (Matiti 2002, cited in Matiti and Baillie 20: 14) 
Initially this seemed an overly subjective and fluid definition of the concept. Yet 
attempts to ground it more solidly on an objective footing (in a way that is not reliant on 
autonomy) have proved problematic. The type of dignity referred to as ‘basic’ was found 
either to rely on a seemingly unjustifiable preference for the human species or to rely 
(once again) on attributes based in autonomy that may be absent for people with 
dementia. The notion that there is a dignified human existence towards which we all 
should strive initially seemed promising. However, on closer investigation this 
understanding of dignity is highly dependent on societal norms. This means that people 
with dementia could be treated variably depending on how dignity is seen by the 
culture which surrounds them. 
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, dignity, despite being variously understood, 
is something that matters to people. The empirical literature continues to provide 
information on how people understand dignity in various contexts. The importance of a 
dialectical relationship between this empirical work and the conceptual work has been 
accepted.  
Despite a lack of objective definition, it has been suggested that care providers are still 
able to act with an ‘intuitive understanding’ (Seedhouse and Gallagher 2002: 369) in 
order to honour what they see as dignity for people in their care. The source of such 
intuitions is worthy of further investigation, and this may offer a way for a spiritual 
perspective to be incorporated that is less open to challenge than in the examples 
outlined above. 
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The remainder of the chapter will explore whether philosophical approaches using an 
existential perspective might bring us closer to understanding the source of such 
intuitions. 
4.8 THE RELEVANCE OF AN EXISTENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE 
There are numerous existentialist approaches that might inform an ethical model for 
dementia care. The focus here is on two existentialists Martin Buber and Emmanuel 
Levinas who have been particularly influential in the foundation of relational ethics and 
in doing so have also drawn on spirituality in their work (Buber 1959; Davis 1996). 
Notably the 1923 work entitled I and Thou from Buber (1959) heavily influenced 
Kitwood’s person-centred care (Kitwood 1997). The work of Buber and Levinas taken 
together are understood to be a major influence in the formation of the perspective of 
‘personalism’ as applied in healthcare ethics in general (Schotsmans 1999) and also to 
dementia care in particular (Baldwin 2011). 
Another relevant existentialist thinker is Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In his 1945 work 
Phenomenology of Perception (2012), he argued that the role of our body in 
understanding experience is central. Recall that this philosophy along with the work of 
Heidegger provides a philosophical grounding to the Situated Embodied Agent (SEA) 
view of the person discussed in the last chapter (Hughes 2013; 2011a).  Though 
Merleau-Ponty’s work does not draw on spiritual themes, Hughes sees the broader 
notion of spirituality as being a ‘non-negotiable’ element of understanding the person 
(Hughes 2011b: 204). There is arguably a trend which seeks to bring together 
existentialist and spiritual ideas in discussions of dementia care. 
As well as being an existentialist, Merleau-Ponty is part of what is described by Smith 
(2013) as the historical movement of phenomenology. Levinas, mentioned above, is also 
a relevant figure here. Though broadly part of this movement, Levinas was highly 
critical of its key figures moving it away from what he saw as its solitary tendencies in 
order to develop his concept of the Other (Davis 1996). The relevance here is in 
considering the response the Other generates in the person providing care for someone 
with dementia. 
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This section will revisit the ideas that stem from the writing of Merleau-Ponty, Buber 
and Levinas in a way that marks a break philosophically from what has gone before.  
Rather than theorising about concepts or attempting to find the objective truth from 
empirical methods, existentialism seeks answers from the concrete experience of our 
personal situation (Langer 1989). The overarching aim of this chapter has been to get at 
what it is that people understand by the experience of caring for another human being 
and how this understanding might ground an ethical model for dementia care. This 
section will now investigate whether an existential approach may bring answers where 
the previous investigation has left questions. 
4.8.1 THE BODY AS A SOURCE OF INTUITION 
This chapter has examined being a person more broadly than in the previous ones by 
basing it in the notion of humanness. Part of this is an appreciation that people with 
dementia, along with those who care for them, are embodied human beings (Hughes 
2013; 2011a).  Focussing on how a sense of self is manifested in the body is a central 
part of recent thinking in dementia care (Downs 2013). Being a person in the sense that 
we inhabit a human body is something that we all share. Recall the statement of Hughes 
(2008:129) from that the previous chapter (3.6.2):  
‘....people with dementia, because we all occupy the same human worldly groove, 
remain persons even in the severer stages of their disease. The requirement that 
we should be person-centred, therefore, stems from our being human.’ 
It was argued there that this focus on ‘being human’ resulted in a position vulnerable to 
speciesism. However, a more existentialist interpretation is possible, and based on his 
other work (Hughes 2013; 2011a) this is probably closer to what Hughes intended. An 
existentialist interpretation would focus on the experience of being human in this world, 
on which we all can draw. 
So what does this shared experience produce ethically for dementia care? A criticism 
raised against Hughes in the last chapter was that despite his view providing a sound 
description of what it is to be human, it was unclear how this could be translated into a 
basis for an ethical model when personhood was at its centre. Looking beyond 
personhood as a moral status, this chapter has raised the possibility that responding to 
someone as a person might be a richer and more intuitive notion rather than just 
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recognising that someone has certain morally relevant attributes and then respecting 
them. This notion of the intuitive appears to offer a way in. As Hughes (2013: 356) puts 
it: 
‘...the foundations for good care emphasise the importance of knowing the 
people we care for in as holistic a fashion as possible. We are back to ‘being with’ 
as a priority before ‘doing to’. And we are back to the importance of the intuitive, 
the expert clinical judgement based on feelings akin to an aesthetic sense of what 
is right.’ 
So it appears that for Hughes the right thing to do is based on a mixture of aesthetic and 
reasoned judgement. Rather than responding solely to reason, it is about care providers 
feeling what’s right. 
This vein of thought reflects the philosophical shift outlined above. The aim is no longer 
to argue solely in terms of obligations generated by the features of the human individual 
being cared for. Instead, care providers must also use their ability to feel, making akin to 
aesthetic judgements rather than merely drawing on their ability to reason based on the 
facts presented. It is worth noting that the relegation of reason in ethics and an 
increasing role for feeling (or sentiment) also reflects the classical philosophical work of 
Hume (1751/1998) and this important theme will be returned to in Chapter 6 (6.2.1). 
A full assessment of the works of Hume, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty and others 
mentioned above is beyond the scope of this thesis. A search for an ethical model for 
dementia care can develop, without much digression, into a full assessment of what 
makes a viable theory of ethics overall. The focus here will be kept on how these ideas 
can be used for the purpose here of grounding an ethical model. 
It seems to fair to accept that the human experience of being embodied, which includes 
having feelings and emotion can bring wisdom in the form of an intuitive feel for the 
care needs of another human being. Encouraging care providers to be more aware of 
this as a resource seems a sensible strategy. This may well promote a sense of 
connection and collaboration in how people are cared for. However, is it sufficient when 
used as a way to respond to concrete ethical dilemmas? Hughes certainly thinks so 
when he states:  
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‘In the end, good decisions will be made when those involved have had the 
courage to look with some intensity at the face of the Other; when encounters, 
however brief, are at the level of the soul.’ (Hughes 2011a: 264) 
Yet, if the suggestion is that all people have to do is to look someone in the eye and they 
will intuitively know the right thing to do, then this may be judged overly optimistic by 
some. For Hughes, this encounter produces judgements that are aesthetic and therefore 
not describable in everyday language. Nonetheless, it is possible that from this a less 
rigid, but still viable ethical model, could be constructed and this will be returned to in 
later chapters. 
4.9 RESPONDING TO THE OTHER 
4.9.1 I-THOU RELATIONSHIPS 
As discussed, the influential work on person centred care by Tom Kitwood (1997) has 
its philosophical roots in the work of Martin Buber. The crux of Buber’s work is that the 
life of human beings involves either experiencing other entities as objects, which is 
referred to as I-It; or being in relation with them, which is referred to as I-Thou (Buber 
1959). 
For Kitwood, it is empathy that makes it possible to respond to someone as Thou. 
Furthermore, the promotion of I-Thou relationships with people with dementia is an 
essential part of maintaining personhood, as Kitwood defines it. However, as discussed 
in Chapter 3 (3.6.1), Kitwood’s view relies on personhood being bestowed by one human 
being on another. The worry outlined in Chapter 3 is that such a mechanism is highly 
vulnerable to being influenced by the social constructivist forces that Kitwood had set 
out to counteract. 
The question here is whether in this chapter, following the reorientation of personhood 
away from being understood strictly as moral status, a reassessment of Kitwood’s view 
is possible. Kitwood makes the following plea for people to accept the foundation of 
personhood in Buber’s terms along with the assumptions that lie behind the view:  
‘There is, of course, no way of proving – either through observation or 
experiment – whether Buber’s fundamental assertions are true or false. Any 
attempt to do so would make them trivial, and statements that appeal through 
their poetic power would lose their meaning…. Before any kind of inquiry can get 
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under way in a discipline that draws on evidence, assumptions have to be made… 
These assumptions are metaphysical beyond the possibility of testing.’ (Kitwood 
1997: 12) [my emphasis] 
It is worth noting, firstly, the reference to an appeal from poetic power. This suggests a 
similar view to Hughes that judgements can be made aesthetically and are therefore not 
describable in everyday language. Kitwood is suggesting that any attempt to try and 
analyse Buber’s fundamental assumptions into their core elements would result in a 
loss of meaning. Secondly, Kitwood does not elaborate fully on what he means by 
‘metaphysical assumptions’, though there is reference to these assumptions being 
religious in their nature. 
In short this all implies that there are certain ideas about being human that need to be 
believed for Buber’s view to be convincing. The main one is that relating is the source of 
our link to what is truly valuable or divine. This is plausible. However, basing the idea 
on these metaphysical assumptions leads to a less solid ground for an ethical model. 
There is no answer to the simple challenge that although relationships are part of 
caring, they are not in themselves the source of value on which ethical conduct is based. 
In other words, it is not the relationship itself that carries the moral weight; it is the 
human beings (and their thoughts and feelings) that are ethically important. If the focus 
is solely on relationships, then it also raises the question whether this means that a 
solitary human has less moral weight than one in relation. In response to this, Buber’s 
original line of thinking suggests that even a solitary human still has a relationship with 
God. 
Baldwin (2011) criticises Kitwood for not fully appreciating that Buber’s I-Thou 
formulation is ultimately founded on this relationship between the person and God. So, 
it seems that there is an element of religious faith required for these metaphysical 
assumptions even though they are hidden in Kitwood’s more humanistic interpretation. 
As a matter of faith, there is the choice to believe these or not. If these assumptions are 
not believed, then there is little progress in this regard from the conclusion reached in 
Chapter 3 on Kitwood’s account of personhood. This concluded that Kitwood’s reliance 
on others bestowing personhood is vulnerable to challenge as it is does not provide an 
argument that obligates such a moral status to be bestowed. There seems to be little in 
the way of further argument to be found by drawing on Buber.  
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Though, it is worth noting further arguments to support Kitwood multi-faceted work 
can still be found. As pointed out, Kitwood discusses the importance of the care 
provider developing themselves as human being with an empathic orientation towards 
people with dementia. The importance of development of character and receptivity to 
emotion in the care provider with be discussed in depth in Chapters 5 (5.5) and Chapter 
6 (6.2.3). Finally, there may well be consequentialist reasons for bestowing personhood 
in sense understood by Kitwood. Consequentialism will be explored in Chapter 7 (7.6). 
4.9.2 THE OTHER 
Baldwin (2011) favours the existentialist philosophy of Levinas as a basis for a care 
ethic. This manages to avoid the element of faith that is seemingly required for Buber’s 
vision. The important element in Levinas’s work for Baldwin is the response that is 
generated by the face (le visage) of the Other. Levinas is critical of Buber’s formulation 
as it implies an over-familiarity with the Other (Davis 1996). For Levinas, it is the failure 
to fully understand the Other that makes them radical and generates our ethical 
response. As Davis (1996: 48) puts it:  
‘…the Other makes me realize that I share the world, that it is not my unique 
possession, and I do not like this realization. My power and freedom are put into 
question. Such a situation is ethical because a lot depends on how I respond.’ 
The Other makes an appeal through their very existence. Yet, it needs to be clarified 
how this call should be answered. How should care providers respond to such a call 
generated by their connection with people with dementia?  
It is proposed here that Nagel (1986: 179), though not an existentialist, offers a ‘moral 
phenomenology’ that may be useful. The relevant part of Nagel’s work is that which 
discusses the perspective or ‘point of view’ of the individual who is being acted upon. In 
our case this would be in a caring context, though Nagel is concerned with the ethics of 
doing harm to an individual for a greater good. As such, Nagel argues that the 
perspective of the ‘victim’ brings strong moral constraints on the behaviour of those 
acting on them. When in close contact with someone else they can make a direct appeal 
not to be harmed in a way that is stronger than the reasons that might be given against 
the harm if it was done impersonally. 
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The relevance of Nagel’s perspective in a caring context is the individual we are caring 
for might make a similar appeal. This is not to suggest that recipients of care are victims. 
The grounding of the appeal rather than being an overt “do not harm me” as expressed 
by the potential victim in Nagel’s work may instead be expressed more subtly by the 
vulnerability of the human being in more general terms. As pointed out by Sellman 
(2011; 2005) all human beings are vulnerable due to the self-evident fact that we are 
not immune to everyday risks. Sellman goes on to suggest that vulnerability is a matter 
of degree. If our capacities for protecting ourselves from these risks are sufficiently 
reduced, such as may be the case with dementia, then we can be considered ‘more-than-
ordinarily’ vulnerable. 
Arguably, it is the perceived vulnerability of the Other that demands that we limit our 
power; it is this that generates a caring response to our fellow human beings. The 
decline of cognitive powers is likely to bring with it a particular vulnerability. If 
compassion is generated in this way, then witnessing a fellow human being with such a 
decline actually heightens our compassionate response. The human being, though losing 
cognition, is more able to engender this ethical response from the care provider. 
If this line of thinking is accepted, then this marks another shift in philosophical 
thinking. The existential-phenomenological approach gives a window into the world of 
how we relate to one another. However, in order to realise this as an ethical vision we 
need to respond with wisdom to a vulnerable and dependent other. This calls for a 
broadening of the discussion to explore virtue ethics, ethics of care and the role of 
emotion in the caring encounter. 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
The chapter began with the suggestion that few people outside of philosophical circles 
would defend the notion that a human being is a nonperson. This is particularly the case 
in a caring context, where to do so may cause offence. So a question was posed asking 
what people might mean when they say that an individual is a person, if it cannot be 
established based on psychological capacities. From this it was suggested that people 
were getting at humanness as the key attribute when using the term person. The aim of 
the chapter was then set to explore what people understand by the experience of caring 
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for another human being and whether this might be able to ground an ethical model for 
dementia care. 
The bulk of the chapter was concerned with the notion of human dignity. This began 
with a discussion to clarify if there is a relationship between dignity and autonomy. The 
nature of the relationship depends on how each of the terms is understood. A key 
distinction is between subjective and objective form of dignity. It was argued that 
subjective forms of dignity were closely linked to people’s individual autonomous 
preferences about how they expect to be seen or treated. As it has been established in 
Chapter 2 that some people with dementia lack the ability to form autonomous 
preferences, it was decided that exploring dignity as an objective notion was a more 
promising avenue. 
The exploration of objective forms of dignity began with the assessment of dignity 
understood as an inherent worth held by all members of the human species. This is 
sometimes referred to as ‘basic’ human dignity or Menschenwürde.   However, the 
challenge here was the source of such dignity being based solely on being a member of 
the human species. Attempts to justify why human beings are special and warrant such 
dignity was found again to rely on psychological attributes that are associated with 
autonomy.  This left uncertainty as to how human beings should be responded to when 
they lack the psychological attributes that grant dignity to the human species as a 
whole. 
As a result, the discussion moved away from inherent worth onto one of a dignified 
existence of human beings in general. Though the intention here was to establish an 
objective set of ideals towards which all human strive; in practice it appeared that these 
ideals were reliant upon cultural context and the expectations of society. This resulted 
in dignity understood this way being highly changeable depending on this context, 
leading to the objection that it is socially relative. 
Nonetheless, it was put forward that care providers might act with intuition when 
honouring dignity. Building on this theme, the latter part of the chapter, examined if 
existentialist perspectives might be able to better capture what it is that people 
understand by the experience of caring for another human being and how this 
understanding might ground an ethical model for dementia care. 
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Firstly, Hughes’ situated-embodied-agency view was re-examined. Hughes is keen to see 
the aesthetic nature of making ethical decisions when directly encountering another 
human being as an intuitive response based in the experience of being an embodied 
human. This opens some important avenues in terms of an increasing role for feelings in 
making ethical judgements. 
Next, Kitwood’s engagement with Buber’s work on relational ethics was considered. 
Similarities could be seen with Hughes’ approach as Kitwood also draws on the appeal 
of the poetic power of Buber’s work. However, deeper investigation found that certain 
metaphysical assumptions of a spiritual nature had to be accepted before Buber’s view 
on the value of relationships could be followed. 
Finally, the existential encounter with the Other was examined through the 
phenomenological lens of Levinas and Nagel. It was proposed that in a caring 
interaction the call of the Other is one that is linked to their inexplicability but also their 
vulnerability. It was further proposed that an increase in vulnerability brought about by 
a decline in cognition generates an ethical response in care providers demanding that 
they limit power. It was then suggested that an ethical model might be founded 
primarily on this lived experience. Guidance on how to respond to this experience as a 
care provider is aligned more closely to virtue ethics and the ethics of care. 
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5 VULNERABILITY AND VIRTUE ETHICS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter marked the beginning of a philosophical shift. Rather than establishing 
the moral status of the individual with dementia as the sole basis of an ethical model for 
care; instead, the importance of shared humanity and how the care provider might act 
intuitively in the caring encounter was emphasised. 
As the discussion in the last chapter developed, it was suggested that the 
phenomenological experience of the care provider was of central importance. It was 
then further suggested that the decline in cognitive power experienced by people with 
dementia, which created difficulties for ethical views based on moral status, may 
actually engender a positive ethical reaction from the care provider. The vulnerability 
and dependence of the fellow human being (or Other) instils the idea that care 
providers themselves are also vulnerable and dependent on others to a greater or lesser 
degree in their lifespan. This realisation, though possibly unsettling, may also contain 
the genesis of a positive caring relationship. It was suggested that the source of an 
ethical model may be found primarily in this lived experience of the care provider. 
This chapter will explore the notion of vulnerability in more depth. This leads the 
discussion onto how being sensitivity to vulnerability can lead to cultivating virtues that 
guide the care provider towards good care. Here, the ethical resources drawn on are 
centred in the character of the care provider and, as such, the focus is on how care 
providers should be rather than what they ought to do. The aim of a virtue ethics 
approach in caring is therefore to develop a good character that will be able to respond 
wisely and sensitively to the everyday challenges of dementia care. This chapter will 
examine also the role of moral education and exemplars in this process before 
introducing the key notion of receptivity. 
5.2 RESPONDING TO VULNERABILITY 
5.2.1 THE NATURE OF VULNERABILITY, INTERDEPENDENCE AND TRUST 
The previous chapter introduced the idea that human beings, by their nature, are 
vulnerable to risks in everyday life (Sellman 2011; 2005). We are vulnerable to harm 
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physically by seemingly mundane events such as walking down stairs, travelling in cars, 
catching a cold. We are also vulnerable emotionally to states such as being saddened, 
frightened, ashamed or indignant. Psychologically we are vulnerable to events that can 
make us anxious, develop low self-esteem or feel paranoid. In turn, vulnerabilities in 
one area can lead to heightened vulnerability in other areas such as economic and social 
vulnerability (Carel 2009) 
These vulnerabilities are a matter of degree and may or may not lead to harm. They will 
vary both between individuals and throughout our lifespan. We are all vulnerable when 
newly born but the hope is that we will become increasingly less so as we move to 
adulthood and develop strategies to protect ourselves from risks. 
Though, as we cannot manage all risks, inevitably we also place trust in others. Trust, if 
appropriately placed (O’Neill 2002a; 2002b), reduces vulnerability. However, trust, if 
inappropriately placed, increases it. As O’Neill (2002b: 24) points out, ‘[a]ll trust risks 
disappointment’ and every time we place trust it is not without risk. So, we find 
ourselves in a situation of risky interdependence as we cannot be fully sure that others 
will be able to live up to the trust we have placed in them. 
For people who value the idea of independence accepting oneself as vulnerable and 
interdependent in this way may be unsatisfactory. There is a tendency in health care to 
overemphasise the importance of independence (Nolan et al 2004). In reality, the fact of 
our interdependence as human beings seems hard to deny. Furthermore, as Kittay 
(1999: xii) highlights, interdependence is not merely a matter of mutual cooperation 
between ‘essentially independent persons’; it actually describes the reality that we are 
all dependent at some points in our lifetime and many of us must care for people who 
are dependent. 
For some, the capacities for protecting themselves from risks are significantly reduced 
for reasons that are out of the ordinary, such as illness, reduced mental capacity, or 
unconsciousness. This reduction in the capacity for protection is referred to by Sellman 
(2011; 2005) as being ‘more-than-ordinarily’ vulnerable. This concept of being more-
than-ordinarily vulnerable is clearly relevant here as developing dementia means that 
people depend more than usual on others in order to be protected from physical, 
psychological or emotional harm as well as to have positive events brought into their 
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lives. People in this situation need to either place trust in others or, if unable to 
conceptualise the need for this trust, then it has to be placed on their behalf.  
Kittay (1999) argues that those who are in need of care are vulnerable to the care 
provider. This is because people who depend on others for care are vulnerable to the 
actions or inactions of those providing their care. This situates vulnerability in the 
relationship rather than being a property held by the individual themselves. The care 
provider, as someone who is in the position to respond, is obligated to meet the needs of 
the individual, and as such the care recipient is vulnerable to the care provider not 
meeting these needs. Kittay (1999:55) sees care providers as having ‘vulnerability-
responsive obligations’. Though, she adds that the scope of this obligation is limited, as 
the care provider is also vulnerable and should not be expected to provide care to the 
point where they are being coerced unjustly. 
This additional perspective on vulnerability can be accepted but only in addition to the 
account above. On its own it fails to capture the point that people do not have to be in a 
relationship to be vulnerable. It is quite possible to be vulnerable to a risk without 
someone else being there to respond. However, noting this additional source of 
vulnerability as being vulnerable to the care provider is useful, as it is possible to be 
vulnerable to the actions of someone who in a position to help.  
Nonetheless, the focus on relationships found in Kittay is indicative of the approach of a 
number of care ethicists to focus on relationships and, as such, it marks a distinction 
with a virtue ethics approach that focuses primarily on the character of individuals 
rather than what they might be obligated to do (Banks and Gallagher 2009). As a result, 
the question of the ability to respond to vulnerability as a source of obligation is not a 
major concern in this chapter. Nonetheless the importance of obligation and 
relationships to care will be assessed in the next chapter (6.2.3) when the discussion 
moves to the ethics of care approach, and furthermore it will be considered how this 
might, after all, be aligned to a virtue ethics approach. 
For now, the key point is the effect that vulnerability and dependence has on the 
character of care providers. It will be argued that vulnerability and dependence is not 
merely something to be accepted as a part of the fragile human condition; it is also has 
potential to promote positive individual human responses within the context of caring. 
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5.2.2 COMPASSION AS A RESPONSE TO VULNERABILITY 
One response of particular relevance to vulnerability is compassion. Goetz et al (2010) 
describe compassion as an emotion which acts as an intuition in assisting with moral 
judgements, having evolved in response to perceiving unjustified distress. 
‘It [compassion] closely tracks suffering, responsibility, vulnerability, and other 
harm-related concerns and serves as an intuition that guides attitudes that seek 
to remedy unjustified suffering or need.’ (Goetz et al 2010: 366) 
In their analysis, Goetz et al (2010) describe how perceiving a negative outcome for a 
victim is the starting point that may lead to compassion. However, interestingly, they 
propose that there are a number of other possible emotions that may occur in reaction to 
seeing someone else’s misfortune. They argue that if the victim is believed not to be 
deserving of help then it is not compassion that is felt but anger.  They also put forward 
that if the victim’s suffering satisfies a personal goal for the observer then it is happiness 
or Schadenfreude that is experienced. Finally, they argue that if the victim is felt deserving 
of help, yet resources are not available, then distress or fear are experienced in the 
observer rather than compassion. 
Goetz et al’s (2010) conclusions can be criticised on two levels. Firstly, it suggests that 
emotions such as compassion, anger and fear are all-or-nothing and mutually exclusive. 
However, this may not be the case. For example, when faced with a human being who 
cannot be helped, it seems possible that both compassion and distress could be 
experienced. Similarly, it seems possible that at least some compassion as well as anger 
could be felt towards a victim undeserving of help. 
Secondly, this account links compassion to actually witnessing a negative outcome. 
However, as has been outlined above, someone’s vulnerability can be seen in terms of 
their risk of harm and it seems plausible that this can generate a compassionate 
disposition without actual harm occurring. This point is supported by Dewar (2011), who 
conducted an observation study of a British medical ward based on the method of 
appreciative inquiry.  
‘The findings of my study demonstrate that acts of compassion happen in 
numerous encounters between patients and staff, staff and staff, and staff and 
families. In addition people are driven to respond to others in compassionate 
ways when they recognise vulnerability, not just suffering’ (Dewar 2011: 262) 
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Confirming in later work (Dewar et al 2014: 1740): 
‘If we relate compassionate care only to suffering, then we could miss small but 
significant interactions that are compassionate.’ 
Dewar focuses on compassionate acts in care, seeing compassion as being intertwined 
with the actual care provided (Dewar 2011; Dewar et al 2014). For Dewar, vulnerability 
needs to be noticed, emotion experienced and then a compassionate act carried out. 
Taking this together, it can be proposed that compassion is a human response both in 
emotion and action that is generated by vulnerability, which is not necessarily linked to 
suffering. 
Yet, taking a broader moral view, it can be contested whether compassion is a positive 
response to vulnerability. As pointed out by Nussbaum (1996), Stoic and later Kantian 
thinking opposes compassion, seeing it as equivalent to pity. It is thus seen as a position 
that disrespects the dignity of the individual being pitied and one that merely adds to any 
suffering being experienced. A Kantian conception (as discussed) sees the human being 
as possessing a special kind of absolute worth that cannot be exchanged or balanced with 
anything else (Kant 1996a/1785). In this light, compassion can be seen as a rather 
patronizing notion when it is directed at fellow free beings who are legislators of the 
moral law.  For Nussbaum (1996:44) the absolute defending or opposing of pity forms 
the basis of two distinct ways of seeing human beings in society: 
‘One sees the human being as both aspiring and vulnerable, both worthy and 
insecure; the other focuses on dignity alone, seeing in reason a boundless and 
indestructible worth. One sees a central task of community as the provision of 
support for basic needs; it brings human beings together through the thought of 
their common weakness and risk. The other sees a community as a kingdom of 
free responsible beings, held together by the awe they feel for the worth of 
reason in one another.’ 
The distinction drawn here is relevant for understanding ethics in dementia care. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter (4.3), a Kantian conception of dignity is based on the 
possession of autonomy, which had already been argued in Chapter 2 to be lacking for 
people with advanced dementia. So, the view of the human being as both aspiring and 
worthy but also vulnerable and insecure presents itself as a potentially more inclusive 
vision for human beings as a whole and more in tune with dementia care. 
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Nonetheless, Nussbaum (1996) ultimately argues that ethics based on a compassionate 
response is compatible with moral views, such as Kant’s, which are based on reason. 
Nussbaum denies that compassion and respect for dignity are mutually exclusive, 
suggesting it is possible to have compassion or pity for someone while also having respect 
or awe for how they are responding to the situation. Nussbaum also suggests that 
compassion actually involves reasoning about the well-being of others. Compassion is not 
merely taking action blindly based on emotion; it is needed to fully explain ethical 
conduct. 
“...judgment that does not employ the intelligence of compassion in coming to 
grips with the significance of human suffering is blind and incomplete” 
(Nussbaum 1996: 49) 
So compassion in the care provider can be viewed as a cognitively-based emotional 
response to being faced with a human being who is vulnerable. Part of that response 
would involve an assessment of the capabilities of the individual to respond to their 
situation. If it allows sufficiently for respect of the care receivers’ ability to respond then 
it should avoid being patronising, while also not excluding from moral concern those who 
are unable to reason well for themselves. 
Seemingly compassion has a role to play in a broad range of ethical thought. For this 
chapter, compassion will be put into a virtue ethics perspective.  
5.3 FROM VULNERABILITY TO VIRTUE ETHICS 
The analysis above focused on vulnerability as result of our potential frailty as human 
beings. Yet, it is further suggested here that vulnerability can be seen as a positive 
attribute in its own right; not as something negative that generates a positive response. 
It is tentatively suggested here that everyday experiences such as children having a new 
experience; a person excited about the future; someone appearing puzzled or asleep 
brings an observable extra quality. These human beings are not being harmed, nor are 
they at imminent risk of it, yet there is still something that suggests vulnerability and 
with it an extra positive quality which could also be seen as something beautiful. 
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So the positive side of vulnerability is more than just the positive emotions that we 
might develop as a result; part of living richly as human beings is being vulnerable and 
somehow open. As Carel (2009: 218) puts it: 
‘The lesson of vulnerability is not a pessimistic one. Vulnerability also suggests a 
relationship of openness to the world. Without investing in and caring about 
transient and vulnerable things, like people, the environment and works of art, 
we would not be able to flourish. In order to flourish we must let ourselves be 
vulnerable. To be able to love and care about other people and things outside 
ourselves is to make ourselves vulnerable. But this vulnerability is also the gate 
to creativity and flourishing.’ 
So this gestures to another way of linking vulnerability and virtue. It is not just that we 
might care for vulnerable people but we must allow vulnerability in ourselves in order 
that we can develop our character.  Seemingly care is a particularly valuable 
opportunity to develop virtue as it allows for an engagement with people who are more-
than-ordinarily vulnerable as well as to explore vulnerabilities in ourselves (Sellman 
2011; Carel 2009). 
The following quote from MacIntyre (1999: 5) further illustrates the point: 
‘...the virtues that we need, if we are to develop from our initial animal condition 
into that of independent rational agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are 
to confront and respond to vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in 
others, belong to one and the same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of 
dependent, rational animals, whose dependence, rationality and animality have 
to be understood in relationship to each other.’ 
However, virtues and virtue ethics are distinct. It is necessary to now explore virtue 
ethics as an ethical theory in more depth. 
5.4 VIRTUE ETHICS 
5.4.1 SCOPE AND FOCUS 
A virtue ethics approach requires the care provider not merely to ask what ought I to do 
in a particular situation but to consider primarily the question of how can I be a virtuous 
individual (Banks and Gallagher 2009; Tuckett 1998; Slote 1997). 
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These two questions are compatible as virtue ethics can provide guidance for action as 
part of the overall aim of character development (Armstrong 2006). As Hursthouse 
(2003) argues, virtue ethics is concerned with the actions that a virtuous character 
would perform; the same as deontology is concerned with actions obligated or 
prohibited by broader principles, or consequentialism is concerned with actions that 
promotes the best consequences. Nonetheless, a virtue ethics approach does not see 
ethical dilemmas in a detached manner as problems that require solutions, but focuses 
primarily on character development through direct involvement. 
The key element of the proposal here is that a good character is central in providing 
ethical care. It is possible for two people to perform the same action. One could do so 
out of a sense of duty, without being motivated to do so. The other is motivated to 
perform the action from a sense of virtue, even though they do not believe there is a 
duty to perform the action. Even though the outcome may appear the same, only the 
latter is considered worthy of a good character from a virtue ethics perspective 
(Hursthouse 2013). 
This distinction is recognised by Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 32) who state that 
someone is ‘morally incoherent’ if they perform right actions without having the 
corresponding virtuous motivation. As authors of a prominent principlist framework in 
health care ethics, it is interesting that they also make the following assertion. 
‘Although principles and virtues are different and taught differently, virtues are 
no less important in the moral life.’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 30) 
So there are some sound reasons to see virtues as a prominent aspect of ethical decision 
making in providing care. For the purpose of this thesis, a virtue ethics approach to an 
ethical model for dementia care seemingly has the advantage of making a break from 
the idea that the presence of certain capabilities of the individual receiving care are of 
primary importance when making ethical decisions. 
The idea that good character is central has a strong history in nursing in particular and 
has recently experienced a revival of interest (Lamb and Storch 2013; Sellman 2011). 
Though, the idea that virtue ethics can provide a useful grounding for nursing ethics has 
been disputed. Holland (2010:153) argues that although virtue ethics may provide a 
suitable approach for the personal moral life, it should not be extended to the 
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professional sphere as it makes no sense to declare an aim to develop in terms of a 
‘nursing nature’. As Holland (2010:153) states: 
‘In sum, virtue ethics is an approach to personal morality grounded in a 
teleological conception of human nature; its applicability to a professional 
context, such as nursing is, therefore, obviously questionable.’ 
However, it may not be as questionable as Holland asserts as there is an important 
rebuttal to his main point. Virtue ethics, by its very nature, does not separate the human 
being from their role. As pointed out by Putnam (2012: 143) in response to Holland: 
‘Virtue ethicists assume that a human life is a whole and that the virtuous 
individual manifests his or her character traits to different situations, personal as 
well as ‘professional’.’ 
In response to this, Holland (2012) remains concerned that this strategy will remove an 
important distinction between professional and personal ethics. Though, seemingly, 
Putnam is not worried about retaining this distinction at all. Instead he goes to some 
lengths to point out that why this distinction is inappropriate by arguing that we should 
not have differing ethical standards for our personal and professional life. 
This point is important here, both as a defence of virtue ethics in dementia care but also 
as a defence to overall the strategy of this thesis, which aims to construct an ethical 
model for anyone providing care to someone with dementia. The underlying idea is that 
the professional / personal division is not one that requires differing ethical 
approaches. After all, the division between personal and professional is not absolute. 
Professionals are expected to behave with good character in both their professional and 
personal lives (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2008; General Medical Council 2013).  
It is accepted here that there may be additional demands on professionals relating to 
their specific role over that of a non-professional carer. However, there may be 
additional moral demands also for non-professional carers, such as the responsibilities 
that come with being a family member. It is also accepted that someone from a 
professional background is likely to have started to cultivate the necessary character 
traits as part of their education and working life. Nonetheless, it is possible for a model 
to be of use for anyone involved in ethically challenging dementia care situations as long 
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as it is flexible enough to account for the differing moral requirements that individual 
care providers and care receivers might have. 
5.4.2 VIRTUES FOR CARE PROVIDERS 
It has been suggested above that trustworthiness and compassion are virtues that might 
arise in response to vulnerability. A number of other virtues have been suggested by 
scholars investigating which might be most appropriate for people in caring roles 
(Banks and Gallagher 2009). These have tended to be aimed at professional groups. 
For health and social care professionals, Banks and Gallagher (2009) select courage, 
professional wisdom, respectfulness, care, justice and integrity, along with 
trustworthiness.  With a focus on helping relationships, Armstrong (2006:120) selects 
‘...compassion (including benevolence or kindness), courage, respectfulness, patience, 
tolerance, justice, trustworthiness, and honesty.’ In discussing psychiatric nursing, 
McKie and Swinton (2000:38-41) have produced a similar list stating that care, 
friendship, trust, honesty, faithfulness, commitment, patience, justice, respect, insight 
and empathy are all virtues to be ‘learned’ as part of a hybrid framework that also 
draws on deontology. Finally, Sellman identifies the historical value of Nightingale’s 
virtues of obedience, punctuality and observation (Sellman 1997); but in a more recent 
account highlights core virtues necessary for nursing as justice, honesty and courage, 
with trustworthiness and open-mindedness also being of central importance (Sellman 
2011). 
It is worth noting that members of this list of virtues fall on both sides of the traditional 
distinction of self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. By this distinction, courage 
would be described as a self-regarding virtue – a virtue that largely benefits the holder 
of the virtue, whereas compassion would be other-regarding. However, closer 
examination helps to dissolve such a distinction. A virtue such as courage on closer 
scrutiny can be seen as a mixed virtue (Slote 2001). There are benefits for the holder 
but clearly some courageous acts regard others too. It can be concluded, as it has 
elsewhere (Hursthouse 2013), that this distinction is not required. 
In a caring context, courage of the care provider is beneficial for others as it enables 
ethical care to be provided in challenging circumstances (Banks and Gallagher 2009). 
These circumstances may be unavoidable such as the courage that is needed to deliver 
Page | 135  
 
bad news to a loved one. However, Hamric et al (2015) point out that that courage is 
sometimes required in order to respond to sociopolitical and institutional barriers. In 
this situation they argue that rather than expecting courage, instead the focus should be 
on alleviating the conditions that are causing the challenge. In other words, an 
expectation of courage should not be used as a way of maintaining oppressive 
sociopolitical conditions. This theme will be returned to in the next chapter when 
sociopolitical basis of ethical care is examined. 
Overall, it can be asserted with some confidence that a range of virtues such as courage, 
patience, compassion, commitment, trustworthiness, and so on, are good dispositions to 
have when caring for someone with dementia. Yet, as Holland (2010) points out, merely 
making a list of positive character traits is not sufficient to demonstrate that virtue 
ethics is being employed. For example, merely saying that care providers should be 
compassionate appears to be of little help in helping people through the challenging 
scenarios that are met with some regularly in everyday care. 
To illustrate, let us return again to the example from Schermer (2007).  Recall, that this 
involved a woman (we have called Jane) with dementia banging on the door of a locked 
ward begging to be let out to collect her long since grown-up children from school. It 
was found by people caring for Jane that telling her the truth makes her distress worse; 
whereas saying her children will not be out of school for an hour eased her distress. 
What does the virtuous care provider do when faced with such a truth-telling dilemma? 
Tuckett (1998; 2012) states that the deficit of conduct-based theories, such as 
deontology and consequentialism, is that they present potentially conflicting solutions 
in such dilemmas without offering any guidance on how to apply them. Tuckett then 
argues that virtue ethics can complete the picture by the care provider being guided by 
the virtues in the application of seemingly abstract principles. Tuckett suggests that 
someone acting from a compassionate motivation will be able to do the right thing. 
Drawing on the vulnerability discussion above, being faced with a human being who is 
more-than-ordinarily vulnerable to being harmed from the truth, a virtuous care 
provider would feel compassion and be moved by this feeling to act in a way that is 
sensitive to this. 
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The decision is still finely balanced as a compassionate care provider might decide to 
tell the truth in a compassionate way. Honesty is a virtue that many would see as an 
essential character trait for a care provider. Now, if a white lie is told, someone may 
challenge the care provider by saying that they could not possibility have been 
motivated by a virtue of honesty in their response to the woman. 
Furthermore, honesty is closely linked to trustworthiness, arguably another key virtue 
when responding to vulnerability (Sellman 2011; McKie and Swinton 2000). It seems 
open to question if a care provider who tells lies is someone in whom people would 
wish to place their trust, and as such, whether they could be considered to be virtuous. 
There is room for some argument here. There may be times when some forms of 
deception should be tolerated. This may be such an example where that is necessary to 
lie in order to avoid repeated distress in a situation where the truth cannot be accepted. 
5.4.3 PRACTICAL WISDOM AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN 
One way to try and make such decisions is to employ Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, 
which states that a particular disposition should be neither overly employed nor 
underdeveloped in one’s character (Aristotle 2009 [1106a14-1109b26]; Banks and 
Gallagher 2009). Absolute honesty in all situations can lead to the vice of tactlessness, 
which is to be avoided in a similar way to absolute dishonesty (Kraut 2012). Other 
examples include politeness, which leads to the vice of obsequiousness when in excess 
or rudeness when in dearth; alternatively, courage, which leads to rashness in excess or 
cowardice when deficient. 
It is important to highlight that for Aristotle, to aim for the mean does not imply that 
there is a correct amount of a particular disposition to aim for per se; it is relative to the 
individual and the circumstances in which they find themselves (Hughes 2001b; 
Aristotle 2009 [1107a1-7]). Aristotle also argues that not every disposition admits to a 
mean, giving the examples of spite, envy and shamelessness as emotional responses that 
are bad by definition (Hughes 2001b; Aristotle 2009 [1107a8-27]). Aristotle (2009:31 
[1107a10]) adds to these, examples of particular actions that ‘imply badness’ such as 
adultery, theft and murder. Conversely, it seems possible that full trustworthiness (as 
opposed to being considered trustworthy by particular individuals) may simply be good 
by definition and not admit to a mean after all. 
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The doctrine of the mean, despite being an intuitively appealing concept, is not immune 
from criticism. Kant (1996d/1798: 532) sees as contradictory the idea that virtue can 
occur from the result of a mean between two vices. 
‘The distinction between virtue and vice can never be sought in the degree to 
which one follows certain maxims; it must rather be sought only in the specific 
quality of the maxims (their relation to the [moral] law).’ [original emphasis]  
In contemporary times, Kraut (2012) agrees that the application of a quantitative 
measure to the nuanced area of ethical decision is insufficient to express the 
complexities involved; suggesting that the idea of aiming at the mean in practice merely 
becomes another way of saying “making the right decision”. However, it seems fair to 
say that the idea does broadly reflects a truth and seemingly points to something greater 
that underlies it. As Ross (1995:203-4) states:  
‘The Greeks were right in holding that to produce anything good of its kind – a 
healthy body, a beautiful work of art, a virtuous action – certain quantitative 
relations are required; quality rests on quantity. As applied to virtue the doctrine 
is not, perhaps, very illuminating, but there is an element in it which is true.’ 
Linked to this is the notion of practical wisdom (or phronesis) on which Aristotle argued 
that virtuous decisions depend. The doctrine of the mean is not the source of good 
character or a decision procedure; it is merely a way of describing the virtues that 
would be endorsed by someone with practical wisdom (Kraut 2012; Hughes 2001b). 
Practical wisdom, when developed as an intellectual virtue, arguably enables good 
decisions to be made and good actions to be taken. In simple terms, practical wisdom is 
a life skill that has to be developed; yet practical wisdom still requires a virtuous end or 
goal to aim at. As Aristotle states:  
‘Virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things leading to it’ 
 (Aristotle 2009 [1144a7-8]) 
This quote suggests that the goal needs to be set before wisdom can be employed to 
determine the means to get to it. Such an interpretation, then begs the question of how 
the goal is set in the first place. In response it turns out that practical wisdom and what 
Aristotle refers to as ‘moral’ virtue actually work together in his vision (Hughes 2001b; 
Ross 1995). If moral virtue is absent, and therefore the goal is not good, then the skills 
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needed to carry this out are not from practical wisdom but merely cleverness. On the 
other hand, moral virtues without practical wisdom remain undeveloped, useless or 
even harmful. 
Returning to the concern that motivated discussion of the doctrine of the mean; it was 
that moral virtues such as compassion and trustworthiness may conflict. From an 
Aristotelian position of the unity of the virtues, it can be presumed that the virtuous care 
provider would have a disposition towards both compassion and trustworthiness. It is a 
matter of knowing when to be trustworthy and perhaps more frank or when to be 
compassionate which might incline someone to be more tactful. As Hughes (2001b:109) 
points out 
‘The moral virtues, being states of appropriate emotional balance, respond to 
features of the situations in which we find ourselves. In so doing, they alert us to 
the existence of those features and so offer us starting points for choices. Our 
choices are motivated by our virtuous inclinations, indeed; but what is of central 
importance is that they express our refined understanding of what to do and 
why.’  
Practical wisdom works with virtuous inclinations and shows how they can bring about 
good action. However, the expectation that care providers should aim to recognise the 
virtues of compassion, courage, trustworthiness, patience, commitment, and so on in 
themselves and others; further cultivate them and then use these judiciously may be 
overly ambitious. Also, it could suggest that only those people who develop these 
attributes sufficiently in their character are suited to making and carrying out ethical 
decisions for dementia care. It seems to imply an elitist view and taken to an extreme 
this would suggest that an ethical model based on this idea is a redundant instrument in 
the hands of someone without the necessary attributes. 
So the intention is to argue against this elitist interpretation. There is a reasonable case 
to suppose that a wide range of people can develop their virtues through moral 
education. 
5.4.4 MORAL EDUCATION 
Sellman (2009) suggests that the way that moral education takes place in a virtue ethics 
context is dissimilar from the model of teaching and learning in higher education 
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institutions. This is primarily because for virtue ethics the aim is to improve the moral 
character of the students, and the best way to do this is by the emulation of others who 
are understood to have high levels of virtue. This arguably differs from the teaching 
method for subjects such as mathematics or history that are assumed to be taught not 
by emulation of practice but by providing the students with theoretical knowledge. 
Some support for the idea of the primacy of practical learning as an important part of 
moral education can be found in the concept of praxis (McKie and Swinton 2000). 
Praxis, understood as knowledge-in-action acts as a way that the moral community as a 
whole can gain knowledge by reflecting on their practice in moral terms. This 
knowledge is then passed on through mentorship. However, McKie & Swinton do state 
that praxis is not a substitute for theoria or theoretical knowledge but complimentary to 
it, suggesting there may be more of a role for theoretical learning than in Sellman 
(2009). Nonetheless, there is a significant line of reasoning that sites the moral 
education of care providers in the realm of practice. As such, the presence of practice 
mentors gains importance as these are the people on whom modelling should take place. 
It may not be as clear-cut as this, however. Firstly, pressure can be put on the idea that a 
moral education is somehow different to education in other subjects. In the 
constructivist model of education, the important thing is what the student does to 
construct knowledge; knowledge is not understood to ever be transmitted by 
instruction (Biggs 2003). In other words, learning is always an active process and it is 
going to be a process involving knowledge-in-action whatever the subject. This can be 
extended to the idea of emulation. When learning a seemingly theoretical topic such as 
mathematics, it is still possible to emulate a mathematics teacher by observing how he 
or she approaches new problems in a similar way that a virtuous care provider dealing 
with problems in practice can be emulated. 
So, moral education may not be a distinct case. It could be possible to learn from 
exemplars in a number of disciplines. Nonetheless, there is a fair consensus for the idea 
that moral education in the caring professions should focus on practical examples in 
order for it to be relevant to people (Woods 2005; Holland 1999). It seems reasonable 
that a mentor or teacher could be emulated either by the way that they respond to the 
dilemma in the classroom or in real time. Responding in a real practice situation is likely 
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to be messier due to the reality of practice, though as an example it also benefits from 
that reality by showing what can actually be done by the exemplar themselves.  
However, due to its messiness, the response may be a less than perfect example for 
emulation from the exemplar’s point view. So having time to reflect on the response and 
return to it outside of practice would also be an advantage. 
Another source of wisdom for people wishing to develop their caring practice is to 
engage with literature on the topic. Banks and Gallagher (2009) propose that this can 
enable the development of care provider’s moral imagination in response to the needs 
of those in their care. A related point here is that sources of wisdom for care providers 
can be drawn from their broader experience. Care providers vary in the life experience 
they have to draw on. This broad life experience is relevant to the sorts of ethical 
decisions that are made (Toiviainen 2005). After all, the experiences and people from 
which we learn and develop our character are varied and reflect our life as whole. As 
Sellman (2011: 191) rather aptly puts it: 
‘...our teachers are all around us and we learn from them in subtle, unplanned, 
and unexpected ways....’ 
When making this comment, Sellman is referring to fact that nurses can be educated in 
informal as well as formal ways. It is not just during a professional education 
programme that character development can occur. This is in tune with the notion, 
argued for above, that the boundary between personal and professional is porous. The 
nurse’s character outside of work is a relevant notion. For other groups of care 
providers, such as family carers, the boundary between personal and professional is 
minimal or non-existent in their caring practice. 
So the idea that we have teachers all around us is a particularly relevant one here when 
put together with the idea that care providers form a diverse group that includes 
professionals and non-professionals. It is worth reiterating that there is nothing here 
that challenges the idea that professionals are care providers who have a number of 
assured character attributes and academic attainment required in order to be admitted 
to a profession. It is merely stating that moral education is something that is open to 
everyone. 
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As character development is something that is open to professional and non-
professional care providers alike, it is hoped that through the development of character, 
ethical care can be provided. Exemplars provide an important part of this moral 
education, and these can be found in everyday life as well as through literature or more 
formal learning. Furthermore, having a broad base of learners and exemplars helps 
dissolve the criticism of virtue ethics as being based around an elite who aim to 
indoctrinate those who they see as worthy of receiving such education. 
5.4.5 PROBLEMS WITH THE FLOURISHING ACCOUNT IN THE CONTEXT OF DEMENTIA CARE 
At this point it is worth casting a more critical eye over the extract from MacIntyre 
(1999: 5) quoted earlier in the chapter: 
‘...the virtues that we need, if we are to develop from our initial animal condition 
into that of independent rational agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are 
to confront and respond to vulnerability and disability both in ourselves and in 
others, belong to one and the same set of virtues, the distinctive virtues of 
dependent, rational animals, whose dependence, rationality and animality have 
to be understood in relationship to each other.” 
Sellman (2011) suggests that there is a problem with MacIntyre’s account here as it 
links human flourishing with the ability for independent practical reasoning. It 
therefore suggests that people without sufficient mental capacity to reason practically 
cannot fully flourish as human beings. This further quote from MacIntyre (1999: 97) 
illustrates this point: 
‘We have so far then identified two crucial respects in which the virtues are 
indispensable to human flourishing: without developing some range of 
intellectual and moral virtues we cannot first achieve and then continue in the 
exercise of practical reasoning; and without having developed some range of 
those same virtues we cannot adequately care for and educate others so that 
they first achieve and are then sustained in the exercise of practical reasoning.’ 
This problem arises for Sellman as he argues that the work of care providers 
(specifically nurses) is to promote human flourishing of those in their care. MacIntyre’s 
account appears to suggest that such flourishing is not possible for patients with 
reduced mental capacity, so nurses are left unable to achieve this for them.  
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Sellman does recognise that, as human beings, nurses do flourish too through the 
pursuit of nursing: 
‘Thus, in pursuit of nursing as a practice not only is the flourishing of patients but 
also the flourishing of nurses qua humans is enabled.’ 
 (Sellman 2011: 104) [original emphasis] 
Yet, this opens up a question. In terms of an ethical model, is the important thing to 
develop virtues that aim for human flourishing by care providers, care recipients or 
both? It seems open to debate how much the virtues of the nurse or other care 
providers can be dependent on their ability to promote flourishing of the people in their 
care. Such a line of argument appears to suggest that those who care for people who are 
unable to fully flourish are themselves going to struggle to fully flourish as care 
providers. Yet, this appears to go against the otherwise appealing idea that virtues such 
as courage, patience, trustworthiness, open-mindedness and so on are arguably more 
necessary when caring for those who are most challenged in terms of their flourishing. 
It seems to follow that caring for people with such challenges provides a greater 
opportunity to cultivate these virtues in the care provider. 
Secondly, what virtues might be best developed in people receiving care in order for 
them to flourish? Banks and Gallagher (2009: 44-5) state that there are moral, social, 
intellectual, emotional and physical virtues to be developed by health and social welfare 
in order for flourishing to be promoted in each of these domains. Some of these fit 
better than others as virtues to be developed by people with dementia who are 
receiving care. 
Sellman (2011) aims to keep the human flourishing account for care recipients by 
arguing that nurses should help people in their care to flourish to whatever extent the 
capacities of those people allow. This appears to solve the problem with MacIntyre’s 
approach by denying the need to categorise recipients of care into those that have 
different degrees of practical reasoning skills.  
However, there is a case for solving the problem in a different way by not directly 
linking the flourishing of the care provider with the flourishing of the individual care 
recipient in ways that are unattainable. After all, as mentioned above, part of the 
attractiveness of the virtue ethics approach is that it is not dependent on the capacities 
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of the care recipient. It is suggested here that the care recipient having reduced 
capabilities can actually help cultivate virtues in the care provider and it is on this that 
good care depends. With this proposed approach, there is no need to reject the general 
idea that part of having a good character can involve aiming at the flourishing of others 
in certain ways. It is merely to clarify that it is virtuous intentions and their associated 
actions originating in the character of the care provider that should be the primary basis 
for virtue ethics, rather than the actual flourishing of the care recipient based on human 
excellences that may no longer be possible. 
This position in more in line with the virtue ethics associated with Slote (2001). It is 
proposed here that Slote’s agent-based virtue ethics is preferable for the endeavour of 
ethical dementia care as it is based fundamentally on character of the care provider and 
not on the notion of human excellences. 
5.5 ADVANCING THE VIRTUE OF RECEPTIVITY 
In his early work, Slote (2001:7) states that an action is only good if it is done by 
someone of virtuous character as the ethical status of actions is entirely derived from 
claims ‘...about the motives, dispositions, or inner life of moral individuals.’ Therefore, 
following a course of action because it is recognised as being virtuous by its outcome, is 
too much of a departure from the agent as the sole source of the virtuous action. 
Slote’s view of agent-based ethics puts pressure on the notion of practical wisdom 
(Russell 2008). This is because Slote (2001) suggests that the virtuous individual, if in 
possession of all of the relevant facts, will have no need to deliberate about the course of 
action; he/she will be able to act virtuously in caring merely due to having the necessary 
moral virtue. 
‘...she [an ideal caring person] can act from concern for others without 
considering whether she is acting rightly or wrongly or, for that matter, caringly 
or uncaringly…’ (Slote 2001: 193) 
Slote’s earlier view which holds a virtue of benevolent caring as sufficient to be an ideal 
moral individual has since been developed. In later work, Slote (2013) does not state 
that it is possible to act perfectly as an agent on this basis. As discussed above, many 
virtues, though appearing to be compelling, can conflict with other similarly compelling 
Page | 144  
 
virtues in some situations. For example, to act virtuously in one regard such as with tact 
leaves one open to criticism to not acting virtuously in another regard such as 
frankness.  
It was this very conflict that suggested the need for the intellectual virtue of practical 
wisdom (phronesis) in order to deliberate about the wise choice when in a difficult 
situation. Yet, Slote (2013) rejects this Aristotelian idea that wisdom will be able to 
generate the right choice in such situations, Instead, he states that such conflict 
demonstrates the impossibility of moral perfection. This is in tune with an Eastern 
philosophical approach such as the Zen aesthetic attitude of Wabi Sabi which values 
imperfection (Cooper 2013, Saito et al 1998). 
It is from the acceptance of imperfection that Slote instead proposes receptivity as the 
central (but not absolute) virtue. Receptivity involves being empathic to the thoughts 
and feelings of other human beings. Furthermore, this empathy should not merely be 
projective, which involves ‘getting in the heads of others’ (Slote 2015: 5). Instead 
receptive empathy involves: 
‘actually identifying with the other person, actually seeing things, however 
briefly, from their point of view.’  (Slote 2015:5) 
Slote argues that if we value receptivity then we will be able to accept our limitations as 
human beings rather than seeking perfection. For Slote there is a shared tendency in 
both Aristotelian virtue ethics and modern Western Philosophy to seek perfection 
through its emphasis on pursuing a rational life plan. Slote makes the insightful point 
that the things we appear to value most in life, such as friendship are in reality unlikely 
to result from the use of critical analysis or rational life planning, rather they require 
receptivity (Slote 2015). 
As such, receptivity can be also understood as part of Slote’s overall project of 
rethinking Enlightenment values. Slote argues that receptivity moves us beyond a 
reliance on rationality to value also the non-rationality in human life: 
‘....receptivity to other people’s opinions and points of view grounds epistemic 
open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, and rationality in a way that Enlightenment-
type thinking has never recognized. But we have also seen [in previous 
argument] that receptivity of an epistemically nonrational and at least partly 
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irrational kind is essential to valuable relationships and feelings toward others. 
We can and should be epistemically rational in most of our thinking about and 
dealings with the world and the people we come in contact with, but unless we 
are also receptive toward other people and their attitudes and opinions, we are 
going to miss out on much of what is most valuable in life.  
(Slote 2013: 214) [original emphasis] 
So, a combination of rationality and empathy are necessary for us to have a full 
appreciation of the good life. 
There are a number of possible advantages for dementia care of focussing on receptivity 
as the central virtue. Firstly, there is a move away from the idea of human excellence 
being primarily grounded in the intellectual function of phronesis, an ideal that 
seemingly excludes people with advancing dementia. 
Secondly, there seems to be some protection from the criticism (raised above) of moral 
education being merely indoctrination, as the process of being indoctrinated suggests 
more of an intellectual than an emotional or empathic process. 
Finally, the agent-based approach ensures that the character of the individual who is 
providing the care is the key factor. This means that the starting point for ethical care, 
including ethical dementia care, is developing a good character in the care provider, 
rather than establishing the moral status of the care recipient. However, this does not 
result in the individual with dementia becoming irrelevant. Indeed, having receptivity 
as the central virtue means having a full and genuine empathic concern for others by 
being open to their feelings and preferences. 
Despite taking this non-Aristotelian turn, Slote’s proposal need not conflict with the 
discussion of moral education above. There is a similar need for exemplars of 
receptivity as there is for the more intellectualised notion of practical wisdom. Again, 
receptivity can be learned from people both formally or informally, from a range of 
teachers in planned or unplanned ways. 
As such, exemplars of receptivity will not be aiming for perfection, even in receptivity 
itself, as they know that is an unobtainable aim. However, they have a key role to play as 
they will be particularly receptive and hence their approval or disapproval towards 
actions or attitudes of others will act as a sound guide. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
The virtue ethics approach described in this chapter aims primarily to develop the 
personal excellences of providers of dementia care. It has been suggested that an 
advantage of focussing on the character of care providers is that it avoids difficulties 
that haunt other ethical views linking the presence of certain psychological attributes in 
the care recipient to their moral status. Here an argument has been constructed that 
proposes that the vulnerability of the care recipient, which may be due in part to a lack 
of these attributes, is an opportunity to develop good moral character in care providers. 
Though this idea is clearly applicable to the practice of nursing, it has been argued here 
that it is equally applicable to the broader notion of caring when understood as a 
practice in the same manner. The question of “which virtues?” for dementia care has 
suggested that prominent candidates are trustworthiness, compassion, receptivity, 
along with the courage to carry them out. However, it was found that these and other 
prominent virtues can conflict, leading to uncertainty about the correct course of action. 
The doctrine of the mean, though a useful illustration of virtue, was found to be 
ultimately unsatisfactory in attempting to resolve such disputes.  
Instead, an initial solution was sought in the development of practical wisdom 
(phronesis) in care providers. This seemingly lofty aim was seemingly made more 
achievable by basing it in the real life practical experience of dementia care providers. 
Learning takes place through action, and the role of practice mentors or other 
exemplars is also crucial. People acting alone in the provision of care for people with 
dementia may not have access to practice mentors in the same way as in a professional 
nursing environment; however, a broad range of influences both past, present and 
literary can be drawn on. Exemplars are all around us. 
Yet problems remained. Firstly, how do we select the correct exemplars in life or 
literature to emulate? One possibility is that the exemplars should be seen to aim at the 
flourishing of human individuals. If their actions do not help people to flourish, then 
their character is not worth emulating. Yet, on analysis it was found that this solution 
meets some difficulties if the flourishing of people with advancing dementia is seen as 
the measure of the virtue of a care provider. This is because people with advancing 
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dementia are increasingly limited in how they flourish in terms of the usual human 
excellences. 
The agent-based view of virtue ethics associated with Michael Slote seems to offer a 
solution. Here it is solely the care provider’s motives and character that are of concern 
not human flourishing. In later work Slote has advanced the idea that moral perfection 
is an impossibility. As such he argues against Aristotlian virtue ethics which hopes to 
achieve this through the route of practical wisdom. 
Instead, Slote proposes receptivity as a virtue of central but not absolute importance. 
This virtue aims to developing empathy in order to identify with the experience of 
others rather than the more intellectual notion of practical wisdom. It has been argued 
here that care providers can cultivate receptivity in the same way as suggested for 
developing practical wisdom above. There is a similar need for exemplars. It is proposed 
these can be found in all walks of life; providing learning formally and informally.  
It is suggested that this interpretation of virtue ethics is the most useful as it seems to 
be more in tune with dementia care than Aristotelian forms that focus on flourishing 
and the intellectual prowess of human beings. The notion of receptivity and the 
sentimentalist approach to ethics found in Slote’s work is by his own description 
aligned to the ethics of care (2013; 2007). 
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6 THE ETHICS OF CARE, EMOTION AND THE ROLE OF 
SOCIOPOLITICAL JUSTICE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed virtue ethics as a response to vulnerability. It was 
suggested that it is an advantage for dementia care to focus on the character of care 
providers. This was part of a move away from considering the moral status of the 
individual receiving care as the primary basis of a model for dementia care. The 
advantage gained by this shift was that by focussing on care providers, it avoids debates 
about the erosion of moral status of the individual with dementia that may occur due to 
the loss of autonomy, personhood or other capacities. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that changes to capacity, rather than being seen as problematic in terms of a lesser 
moral status, may actually be a potential resource for an ethical response. 
As the discussion in Chapter 5 developed, the agent-based virtue ethics of Michael Slote 
emerged as a promising candidate for dementia care. Slote’s view can be seen as part of 
a movement that seeks to form a bridge between virtue ethics and the ethics of care. 
Slote, himself, does not apply his work to dementia care. However, it seems in tune with 
the needs of people with dementia due to its focus on the caring disposition of the care 
provider and its recognition of the importance emotion and empathy play in our moral 
lives (Slote 2013; 2007).  
This chapter will initially explore the emergence of the ethics of care in an historical 
context. Here links between the ethics of care, virtue ethics and 19th century 
sentimentalism can be seen. However, there are a number of distinctions too. This 
pressure is particularly felt in the way that the traditions put different emphases on 
obligation, relationships and justice. It will be examined how the ethics of care views 
these notions and how this might affect dementia care ethics. 
From this, the beginnings of an ethical model can be outlined based on the ethics of care 
perspective. This will then lead to a critical evaluation of the ethics of care, and an 
argument that the virtue of receptivity has a role in responding to these criticisms. 
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6.2 THE ETHICS OF CARE AND VIRTUE ETHICS COMPARED 
6.2.1 THE COMMON FOUNDATION OF MORAL SENTIMENTALISM 
It may be assumed that, virtue ethics has its roots in the ancient world; the ethics of care 
in the modern. However, conceptual links between the two schools of thought can be 
found. This section will briefly outline the emergence of the ethics of care in both an 
historical and political context. From this, similarities and distinctions with virtue ethics 
will be discussed and their possible role within an ethical model for dementia care will 
be evaluated. 
In Western Philosophy, virtue ethics is seen to originate in the classical world view of 
Plato and Aristotle. However, these ideas were challenged during the Enlightenment, as 
virtues were sought to be encompassed under the increasingly dominant views of the 
era such as rights, reason and the promotion of utility (Hursthouse 2013; Slote 2013; 
Banks & Gallagher 2009). At this time, the philosopher David Hume provided a sceptical 
voice against the dominance of reason in the Enlightenment and argued for an 
empirically-driven virtue ethics guided by feelings and sentiment (Denis 2012; Hume 
1998/1751). 
In dementia care, attention to the emotional aspect of human life is promoted as part of 
the ‘new culture’ of care (Kitwood 1997: 135), particularly so in the work of David 
Sheard (2013). The sentimentalist position of Hume resonates with this. Though 
Hume’s ethical theory was not care-focussed, his placing feelings (or passions) at the 
core of ethics would later be shared as a central tenet of the ethics of care (Noddings 
1984; Held 2005). As such, Slote argues that the ethics of care is the ‘present 
incarnation’ (Slote 2007: 4) of moral sentimentalism. Though, Slote also makes a 
distinction between his care-based virtue ethics and the virtue ethics of Hume. Hume 
sees moral worthiness as something that can be judged by how much it pleases or 
displeases people (Garrett 2015; Hume 1998/1751). Slote (2013) shares Hume’s view 
to some extent but argues against the idea that morality has no more value than 
anything else that might please or displease us, arguing this move resembles the 
(amoral) tendency in utilitarian thought.  
On the other hand, Garrett (2015) makes the argument that Hume was not a 
consequentialist due to his focus on virtue and reliance on a moral sense rather than a 
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calculation of utility being the ultimate arbiter. Nonetheless, the utilitarian 
consequentialism of Jeremy Bentham does get from Hume the idea that utility can be 
the measure of virtue. Bentham used this to develop his own position that the amount of 
happiness resulting from consequences should be the measure of its ethical value 
(Garrett 2015; Driver 2009).   
Ultimately, this idea eclipsed any resurgence of a Humean virtue ethics in the eighteenth 
century. Instead, consequentialism, along with deontology, was to dominate the ethical 
landscape of Western Philosophy until some years later in the mid twentieth century 
when a rising dissatisfaction with the two theories (Anscombe 1958) led to a renewed 
interest in virtue ethics once again (Banks & Gallagher 2009; Hursthouse 2013). Slote’s 
view, which is based in care and receptivity, forms part of this modern revival for virtue 
ethics as well as being part of the movement of the ethics of care. 
6.2.2 THE CENTRAL TENETS OF THE ETHICS OF CARE 
The ethics of care is commonly traced back to the psychological work of Gilligan (1982) 
who claimed that when discussing ethical matters women tend to speak in a different 
voice (Beauchamp 2005). Gilligan argued that these voices, which stress care, emotions 
and relationships, are eclipsed by the voices expounding justice and rights that tend to 
be male. 
Gilligan’s findings have been adopted and interpreted by the feminist movement. 
However, Tronto (1993) is sceptical of how helpful this distinction is for feminism and 
the promotion of an ethics of care. For Tronto, boundaries between women’s and men’s 
ethics are drawn as a way that contains women and care rather than promoting it. 
Tronto concurs with the historical perspective outlined above that sentimentalism 
effectively ended up on the ‘losing’ side of the debate in the eighteen century (Tronto 
1993: 36). Tronto contextualises this as part of a changing world at this time where 
work was developed more outside of the home. Women started also to develop more 
public roles but men wishing to maintain control, sought to confine women to the 
domestic sphere. Tronto (1993) goes on to argue that in order to justify this 
confinement, the idea was developed that the ethics of sentiments were best suited to 
women and their place in this private or domestic domain. This move lead to women 
being identified as sentimental in their ethical approach; whereas men, whose work was 
Page | 151  
 
associated with public life, were expected to exercise the more esteemed form of ethical 
thinking based in reason. 
So, for Tronto (1993: 56), the association of sentimentalism and later the ethics of care 
to women is part of an ‘historical process’ that is political not biological in origin. Rather 
than separating women’s and men’s voices, Tronto’s vision is to argue for care in a way 
that does not need such a boundary. For Tronto, an ethic of care should bring care to the 
forefront of ethical thinking; not as a reaction to oppression from the side-lines but as a 
central concern for all humanity. 
‘Care is not a parochial concern of women, a type of secondary moral question, or 
the work of the least well off in society. Care is a central concern of human life.’ 
(Tronto 1993: 180) 
The development from Gilligan’s initial findings to Tronto’s more overtly political 
perspective reflects the evolution of the ethics of care tradition. Since Tronto’s (1993) 
work, further evolution has occurred resulting in it being now even more widely 
interpreted (Klaver et al 2014). In order to begin an assessment of the usefulness of the 
ethics of care for dementia care, the features that are (on the whole) shared by the 
contemporary tradition will need to be examined. 
Firstly, distilled from Gilligan’s original (1982) work, Edwards (2009: 151-153) has 
formulated ‘five claims’ of ‘care-based’ ethics: 
 Uniqueness claim: each ethical situation must be treated as unique 
 Caring claim: our involvement in relationships with others is characterised by 
care. 
 Emotions claim: emotions form ‘central aspects of the moral life’ and are ‘guides 
to action’ 
 Privileged view claim: people who are involved are best placed to know how to 
respond. 
 Justice claim: specific to Gilligan’s (1982) view that the ethics of care works on 
an emotional basis that is not compatible with justice-based approaches. 
The ethics of care theorist, Virginia Held (2005: 10-13) argues that ethics of care has the 
following features: 
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 It is primarily about the ‘moral of claims of particular others’ 
 It values emotions such as sympathy, empathy and responsiveness rather than 
rejecting them. 
 It avoids abstract reasoning and universal rules. 
 It ‘...reconceptualizes traditional notions about the public and the private’ in tune 
with feminist thought. 
 It has a relational and interdependent conception of persons. 
Finally, Klaver et al (2014: 758-9) suggest the following four features for an ethics of 
care: 
 It is based ‘first and foremost’ on relationships and has a relational view of 
society. 
 ‘It is ‘context-bound and situation-specific’ and as such needs to avoid being 
abstract.  
 It is a political ethics that challenges the public/private distinction and has a 
scope beyond personal relationships. 
 It is empirically grounded/ informed. 
These summaries suggest some contrast in perspective. Firstly, Held (2005) and 
Edwards (2009) focus more overtly on the importance of the emotions, whereas Klaver 
et al (2014) emphasise the importance of empirical content of the ethics of care. This 
seems to suggest a different approach. Though, if a Humean view is taken then the 
notion of emotions informing good care would be part of an empirical grounding for 
ethics (Hume 1998/1751). Indeed, describing the epistemological process behind the 
ethics of care Klaver et al (2014: 759) state 
‘It is not just about rational approaches and decontextualized abstract 
knowledge; rather emotions and tacit knowing are also valued as important 
epistemological sources, which therefore have to be critically cultivated.’ 
Edwards highlights a potential tension between the role of emotion in ethics of care and 
the more rational basis for justice. However, this concern is more specific to early views 
such as Gilligan’s (1982) on which Edwards’ five claims of care ethics are based. Later 
views such as Held (2005) and Tronto (1993) aim to reconcile this tension, seeing 
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justice and care as being compatible if the assumption of their polarised origins is 
removed. 
Another contrast is that Klaver et al (2014), Held (2005) and Edwards (2009) interpret 
the issue of a public/ private distinction slightly differently. For Held, this is about the 
ethics of care as a feminist vehicle for social justice within the so-called private 
relationships that law and ethics have arguably ignored. Klaver et al (2014:759) 
emphasise developing just institutions and having a scope ‘...broader than personal 
relationships’. Yet, to move the scope beyond personal relationships is in tension with 
their first feature, seemingly making Held’s view more consistent here. Edwards (2009: 
166) argues that the ‘public-domestic dichotomy’ is actually somewhat dissolved by 
caring (and nursing in particular) as it involves acts that can be seen to straddle both 
the public and domestic domain. For Tronto (1993), as discussed, the public and private 
domain is a political construction that needs to be dissolved in order for care to develop. 
Despite these differences in some aspects, the accounts of Held (2005), Klaver et al 
(2014) and Edwards (2009) broadly concur. They each emphasise the importance of 
relationships for an ethics of care. They also agree on the importance of context, direct 
involvement and the need to avoid abstract reasoning. Held and Klaver et al, along with 
Tronto (1993) emphasis the political nature of the ethics of care as well as how it 
challenges the notion of the public / private distinction. 
These shared features appear relevant to informing an ethical approach for dementia 
care. Having caring relationships at the centre of ethics, along with the idea of 
interdependence has been demonstrated as an important theme in previous chapters. 
Also, it seems fair to state that dementia care is a practical endeavour and an ethical 
model that focuses on the tangible elements of real situations may well be more useful 
than one that focuses on generalising and abstract reasoning.  
Finally, the prominent role of emotions is also promising in light of the assertion that 
dementia care works primarily on an emotional level (Sheard 2013). For Sheard (2008) 
‘feelings matter most’ and person-centred is more about ‘being’ than doing. 
Sheard’s approach is in tune with the theme of emotion-centred care and some aspects 
of Hughes and Kitwood work discussed in previous chapters. However, his work does 
not seek philosophical grounding, nor has it been developed into an ethical model. As 
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such it does not seek to answer the key philosophical questions nor has it been applied 
to ethically challenging situations. 
The ethics of care can state a strong claim for consideration in dementia care; though it 
remains unclear where this leaves virtue ethics, as neither virtue nor virtue ethics 
feature explicitly in the descriptions of an ethics of care above. It is important at this 
point, therefore, to clarify the degree and nature of the collaboration between the two 
approaches, and its relevance for dementia care in particular. 
6.2.3 SIMILARITIES AND DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF 
CARE 
The conclusion of the previous chapter highlighted as promising the idea of a bridge 
between virtue ethics and an ethics of care. The most prominent candidate for this can 
be found in Michael Slote’s work culminating with his account of virtue ethics based on 
receptivity (Slote 2013).  Recall from Chapter 5 (5.5), that a key element of receptivity is 
that it involves valuing non-rational elements as essential in our relationships to other 
people, allowing us to be open to others’ opinions and needs. Slote expands on this 
theme below: 
‘If moral judgments and claims depend on our capacity for approval and 
disapproval, then they depend on our capacity for empathically taking in the 
warmth that we see others expressing in their actions or attitudes and the lack of 
warmth or coldness that those who are indifferent or malicious toward third 
parties exhibit in their actions or attitudes. And to be warmed or chilled by 
another’s warmth or coldness is not to do something deliberately, but to be to a 
high degree emotionally receptive to what is going on around us. So on the view 
just described, receptivity lies at the heart of moral judgment and moral belief 
and is therefore essential to a very important part of our life and thought.’ (Slote 
2013: 200) 
It is important to note the Humean idea (Hume 1998/1751) that receptive individuals 
can feel ‘warmth or coldness’ when exposed to the actions of others. These actions 
produce this warmth depending on the amount of receptivity that the agent employs. 
The notion of being receptive and developing a virtue of receptivity is in tune with the 
more widely understood features of an ethics of care. Though there is much of the ethics 
of care which is shared with virtue ethics more generally. Virtue ethics as a whole also 
seeks to avoid abstract reasoning and rules, has a central place for emotions and is 
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context and situation specific (Hursthouse 2013; Banks and Gallagher 2009). This is 
probably why some commentators, including Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 35) 
interpret care ethics as a form of virtue ethics. The similarities are also recognised by 
Held (2005: 19) 
‘Certainly there are some similarities between the ethics of care and virtue 
theory. Both examine practices and the moral values they embody. Both see 
more hope for moral development in reforming practices than in reasoning from 
abstract rules. Both understand that the practices of morality must be cultivated, 
nurtured, shaped.’ 
However, there are also some key points of departure. For Noddings (1984), virtue in 
caring is build up in the context of caring relationships and it is not the same as having 
virtues as abstract ideals. As she rather frankly puts it: 
‘We must not reify virtues and turn our caring toward them.’ (Noddings 1984: 
96) 
Sander-Staudt (2006) aims to outline some of the distinct qualities of virtue ethics and 
the ethics of care, for which she employs the alternative term, care ethics. Firstly, the 
apparently self-evident point is made that the concept of care is central to care ethics in 
a way that it is not in virtue ethics and similarly virtue does not have the same 
prominence in care ethics as in virtue ethics. Sander-Staudt (2006: 35) goes on to state 
‘This is not to say that CE [care ethics] is not interested in achieving virtuous care 
or thinking about care as a virtue. But CE scrutinizes virtue in the context of how 
best to achieve the goals of care, while VE [virtue ethics] scrutinizes care in the 
context of how best to achieve virtue and a flourishing life.’  
Sander-Straut (2006:35) then makes the following argument to highlight the role of a 
virtue of care in virtue ethics 
‘Although Aristotle claimed that virtues must be practiced and not just 
possessed, there is no guarantee that every application of caring virtue will be 
tied to a certain dimension of caring practice. According to Aristotle, individual 
virtue is in part determined by social positioning. Given this, privileged men (and 
women) are judged to exhibit the virtue of care without being responsible for the 
more thankless aspects of caring practice..... Even if care is defined as the most 
central of virtues, and one that must be practiced on all levels to be fully met, the 
competing focus on other virtues and virtue ethical concepts means that VE is 
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likely to take longer than CE to highlight the imperative and injustice of caring 
practices.’ 
The above suggests that care ethics gives a more prominent place to the role of justice in 
supporting care than virtue ethics. Justice has a central role in virtue ethics also, but 
care ethics is more equipped to highlight issues of sociopolitical justice in practical 
everyday caring for both paid and family care providers. 
A sociopolitical justice focus would have to attend to the inequalities of how care is 
organised. Families providing care for people with dementia may find that there is a 
considerable physical and psychological demand placed on them (Aggarwal et al 2003). 
Gibbons et al (2014) found that women experience significantly more burden than men 
when caring for a spouse with dementia. Ward-Griffin et al (2006) report similar 
expectations falling to daughters to care for their mothers with dementia. This 
resonates with Tronto’s (1993) argument outlined above that it is a political process 
that brought women to be seen as caring and is linked to them being confined to the 
domestic environment. 
In some cases, the demands of caring work may be transferred outside of the family, 
particularly if the family is in a privileged position. Barnes (2012) observes that paid 
care work in wealthier countries carried out in people’s own homes is predominately 
done by migrant workers who she argues are more at risk of being exploited due to 
their marginalised status. Tronto is more robust here pointing out that care is gendered, 
raced and classed. As Tronto (1993: 113) rather bluntly puts it: 
‘Care has mainly been the work of slaves, servants, and women in Western 
history.’ 
These accounts suggest that the demands of caring fall unfairly on certain members of 
society, which may affect the caring relationship and the ethical quality of the care 
provided. The underlying argument here is that in order to value care, and help enable 
good care, it is necessary to value the people who are carrying it out (Kittay 1999). This 
will be returned to in more depth below. In the meantime, it seems fair to advance that 
this underlying dialogue in the ethics of care has a central role to play in elevating the 
status of dementia care along with those who provide and receive it in a way that is more 
politically overt than is found in virtue ethics. 
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Nonetheless, Sander-Staudt’s (2006) criticism (quoted above) of virtue ethics as more 
for the privileged does rely on an interpretation of Aristotelian ethics that was rejected 
in the previous chapter. As such it would be going too far to generalise this to views of 
virtue ethics that are more care-centred. 
Sander-Staudt also raises the concern that care providers may perceive virtue as 
burdening them with a personal ideal that cannot be lived up to; whereas care ethics 
does not have this tendency, instead focusing on political and social structures. 
However, again this argument against virtue ethics was challenged in the previous 
chapter. There it was argued virtue ethics should focus on education and aspiration, 
primarily through emulation. Care providers in an array of different social positions can 
still find exemplars in everyday life on whom to model better practice that is reasonably 
attainable. 
Also, it is not apparent that care ethics is clear of the criticism of putting pressure on 
care providers. Though it commonly recognises the importance of social justice, some 
theorists in the ethics of care of tradition focus on obligations to care resulting from the 
moral claims made by particular others (Held 2005; Kittay 1999; Noddings 1984).  
Noddings (1984: 84) describes it thus: 
‘I am obliged, then, to accept the initial “I must” when it occurs and even to fetch 
it out of recalcitrant slumber when it fails to awake spontaneously. The source of 
my obligation is the value I place on the relatedness of caring.’ 
However, this is not always the case, and others such as Brannelly (2011) and Tronto 
(1993) argue that obligation has lesser place in the tradition. An ethics of obligation if 
accepted is one that may give the care provider fewer options than an approach that 
does not have recourse to this notion. 
The quote from Noddings above links to another distinction that can be found in how 
care ethics and virtue ethics perceive relationships. As Sander-Staudt (2006: 36) 
suggests: 
‘.....CE [care ethics] construes the entire self as constituted, known, and 
maintained through relationship, and construes virtue as a quality that nurtures 
relationships appropriately.’ 
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Here links can be seen with this predominately feminist idea of the social constitution of 
the self (Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000; Christman 2004).  
In contrast, virtue ethics draws attention primarily to individuals rather than the 
relationship (Banks and Gallagher 2009) and this is particularly the case with Slote’s 
agent-based view. The importance of this distinction is summed up by Held (2005: 19) 
‘In my view, although there are similarities between them and although to be 
caring is no doubt a virtue, the ethics of care is not simply a kind of virtue ethics. 
Virtue ethics focuses especially on the states of character of individuals, whereas 
the ethics of care concerns itself especially with caring relations.’ 
For this reason, Held argues that Slote’s aim to unify the two ethics is problematic.  In 
response Slote draws on the concept of receptivity that he shares with Noddings 
‘Noddings has argued that ethics of care should view caring as primarily a 
relationship and only secondarily a trait or virtue of individuals..... But, 
receptivity is a trait or characteristic of individuals, so if, as Noddings and I both 
believe, it is essential to all caring relationships and lies “at the heart of human 
existence,” care ethicists shouldn’t perhaps think of relationships as ethically 
more important or foundational than individual character traits.’ (Slote 2013: 
221) 
Slote’s view seems in line with the idea of a society of interdependent individuals where 
receptivity is located in the consciousness of individuals rather than in the more 
nebulous realm of their relationships. However, his conclusion is measured with the 
phrase ‘shouldn’t perhaps think’ and maybe this suggests some uncertainty. After all, it 
could be argued that receptivity cannot exist without a relationship and this would 
make relationships necessary and arguably foundational. However, though Slote 
appears to be more on the side of virtue ethics in his notion of relationships, in earlier 
work (Slote 2007) he takes the ethics of care perspective when discussing the role that 
empathy has in generating obligations.  
So there seems to be some tension in trying to combine care ethics and virtue ethics and 
Slote’s position gets tangled up in this.  This tension can be found in the fact that 
obligation and relationship have a lesser role in virtue ethics and that justice is 
understood differently. Attention will now turn in more detail to how these concepts are 
understood in the ethics of care, and its possible implications for dementia care. 
Page | 159  
 
6.3 RELATIONSHIPS, OBLIGATION AND SOCIOPOLITICAL JUSTICE IN THE 
ETHICS OF CARE 
6.3.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT IN CARE RELATIONS 
Relationships and relational ethics are a recurring theme in this thesis and the concept 
has been explored from various perspectives. As discussed in Chapter 2 (2.10), 
relational ethics can be associated with a social conception of the self (Christman 2004).  
Kitwood (1997) considered how the notion of forming I-Thou relationships (Buber 
1959) might create a sound basis for empathic dementia care (4.9.1). Overall the 
discussion of relationships has developed in a sceptical direction culminating in the 
tensions outlined as to whether relationships or character should be considered 
foundational. 
A distinction can now be made between the effect that taking a relational view has on 
recipients of dementia care (explored in previous chapters) and the effect it might have 
on care providers.  
The risk identified for the individual with dementia in seeking a socially constituted 
view of personhood was that these social forces may actually end up overwhelming any 
remaining self-determination. The people surrounding the individual may end up 
imposing a particular perspective due to the power of these social influences (Donchin 
2000). Even if these forces are benevolent there is a risk of paternalism and taken to its 
extreme, these forces can become malign. 
Shifting the effect of care ethics and its social view of the self to the care provider reveals 
a subtly different result. The risk also applies in that the autonomy of the individual care 
provider might be overwhelmed by giving too much consideration to social 
perspectives. However, in terms of relational autonomy there is also an opposing risk 
that people’s decisions may be respected inappropriately as the social conditions have 
not been considered enough (Donchin 2000). Put simply, the opposing risk is that care 
providers from oppressed groups are not making an autonomous choice about choosing 
to care due to this negative social context. This worry is made more forceful by the 
observation discussed above that a sizable number of people who care are from 
politically oppressed groups. Oshana expresses the concern in general terms: 
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‘In order to be autonomous, a person who is in a society must find herself within 
a set of relations with others that enable her to pursue her goals in a context of 
social and psychological security.’ (Oshana 1998: 94) 
As pointed out by Christman (2004) and Holroyd (2009), this line of thought leads to 
the seemingly paternalistic treatment of care providers. This is because people in 
perceived oppressive situations could in fact have their decisions overruled in their best 
interests as they cannot be autonomous under such social conditions. 
The crux of the matter appears to hinge on whether the social forces, to which relational 
views may have us yield, are positive or negative. If we are part of a positive supportive 
community then yielding to a relational view seems preferable, though carrying with it 
the risk of limiting individual choice to some degree. However, if the forces are malign 
or oppressive then it seems that these social forces can disable our ability to be 
autonomous in a meaningful sense and therefore need to be tackled. 
Interestingly, this argument can also be applied to the care recipient. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that the malignant social psychology described by Kitwood 
(1997) may in fact lead to a mindset in the care recipient with dementia that concurs 
with this malignant psychology. If the dementia is less severe, then decisions made 
under this mindset may meet the internal psychological criteria for autonomy, as 
outlined in Chapter 2. However, the very fact that this decision is made in the context of 
an oppressive social situation will render it not autonomous using the relational 
external social criteria. 
So, caring relationships have a complex make-up. On the one hand they can be enabling 
and positive for the two parties involved. However, caring relations can also be 
oppressive either for the recipient, provider or both. 
This background raises some important issues for the ethics of care. There is the 
question of how the ethics of care might respond to the potential for injustice, both for 
care receivers and those providing the care. 
6.3.2 OBLIGATION AND MUTUALITY IN CARING 
In the discussion of vulnerability in the previous chapter, it was raised that Kittay 
(1999:55) sees care providers as having ‘vulnerability-responsive obligations.’ It is 
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worth noting initially that Kittay has a type of care in mind here where the care 
recipient is particularly dependent on the care provider to meet their needs. In these 
situations, Kittay argues that the care recipient is vulnerable to the actions of the care 
provider in the sense that they are dependent on them for care. This dependency in 
another human being then obligates the care provider to respond. This is even the case 
if care providers find themselves in such a relation without choosing it voluntarily. 
Though some acts resulting from a caring obligation might be delegated to others, the 
care provider remains ultimately responsible for the caring obligations being carried 
out.  
Recall that Kittay is not alone in using the language of obligation as Noddings (1984) 
also uses the term frequently in her work and Slote (2007) favours this term in his book 
The Ethics of Care and Empathy. However, some care ethicists prefer to use the term 
responsibility rather than obligation. It is argued by Barnes (2012) and Tronto (1993) 
that this language reflects a less rigid structure in terms to how people should respond, 
and therefore shows more fidelity to the ethics of care approach. Yet on closer scrutiny, 
this difference of language does little real work. Though it may suggest a different 
context, it is hard to imagine what a responsibility that does not entail any obligations 
would be? Furthermore, both obligations and responsibilities can be met in varying 
ways so a flexibility of response is implied by either term. It seems that though the 
terms may suggest a different context; they are ultimately interchangeable. 
The pertinent point becoming recurrent in this chapter is that the coercive nature of the 
social structure results in women often finding themselves in the situation of being 
responsible for dependency work and therefore obligated to respond. As Kittay (1999: 
64) acknowledges 
‘Women, and others who have done dependency work because of coercive 
conditions or without adequate compensation, have too long simply accepted 
these unfair allocations as social facts, thereby colluding with an oppressive and 
exploitative situation.’ 
So it follows from this that acceptance of these conditions is arguably unjust and a 
decision to behave in such a way may be challenged as not autonomous from a 
relational point of view. In order to tackle this, Kittay shifts the focus to moral 
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obligations that society has to the care provider (as a dependency worker) enabling a 
more equitable picture to develop. 
For Kittay (2009; 1999) the answer lies in putting mutuality at the centre of caring. This 
starts with the idea that care received from a mother is reciprocated. It is this mutual 
exchange of care that preserves human society: 
‘No one can survive and become part of the human community without the 
interest of some mothering person(s) who has provided a degree of a 
preservative love, a concern in fostering the individual’s growth, and a training 
for social acceptability. When we respect an individual as some mother’s child, 
we honor the efforts of that mothering person and symbolically of all mothering 
persons.’ (Kittay 1999:69) 
So, part of this vision is to ensure that the carers themselves are also respected in order 
to be able to care for others. It is this that inspires Kittay to refer to the principle of 
doulia. Doulia is derived from the contemporary definition of a doula meaning someone 
who supports a mother to care for a new baby both during and after childbirth. Kittay 
describes doulia in these terms:  
‘Just as we have required care to survive and thrive, so we need to provide 
conditions that allow others – including those who do the work of caring – to 
receive the care they need to survive and thrive.’ [italics removed from original] 
(Kittay 1999: 107) 
For Kittay, doulia is therefore ‘a public conception’ (1999: 108) and it results in an 
obligation on society to support those who care in order to reflect the interdependent 
reality of our human existence. Kittay has not applied her ideas to dementia care in 
particular. However, Kittay’s notion of doulia seems to respond to the concerns outlined 
above regarding the potentially oppressive position of care providers in dementia care.  
People with dementia and their care providers can make claim to being a mother’s child 
and therefore need to be treated fairly as part of a society of nested dependencies: 
‘The equality concept inherent in the idea that we are all some mother’s child 
utilizes such a notion of nested dependences. This equality insists that our full 
functioning presumes our need for and ability to participate in relationships of 
dependency without sacrificing the needs of dependents or dependency 
workers.’ (Kittay 1999: 132) 
*** 
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Let’s examine how Kittay’s interpretation of the ethics of care might work in practice by 
returning once again to the dilemma from Schermer (2007).  Recall, that this involved a 
woman with dementia banging on the door of a locked ward begging to be let out to 
collect her long since grown-up children from school. It was found by people caring for 
the woman that telling her the truth makes her distress worse; whereas saying her 
children will not be out of school for an hour eased her distress. 
Putting oneself in the position of being the care provider at the door with this woman, it 
is not at all clear how such a notion might guide a care provider in the seemingly central 
question of whether they should tell the truth or not. For Kittay (2009: 624), being a 
mother’s child, grants the woman with dementia personhood and therefore an 
entitlement to ‘just treatment and protection’. However, the question is begged what 
personhood would have to be in order to ground such entitlements. In Chapter 3 (3.4.2), 
the discussion of this example centred on whether the psychological attributes of the 
woman with dementia entitled her to a prima facie right to be told the truth, based in 
the moral status of personhood from these attributes.  However, Kittay is quite clear 
that psychological attributes are not the relevant thing as far as her conception of moral 
status is concerned (Kittay 2005). 
Instead, Kittay’s notion of being a mother’s child is merely equivalent to saying human 
being (as all human beings meet this criterion). So, it raises the question why Kittay 
would use the term a mother’s child and not just say human being. Part of the answer 
can be found by reflecting on the context in which Kittay writes. Kittay, herself, is the 
mother of a child with profound disabilities and it is this that has motivated her to 
pursue this philosophical issue (Kittay 1999; 2005; Kittay 2009). Kittay champions the 
cause that people with severe cognitive and physical disability have a moral status 
based on their status as cared-for human beings rather than their psychological 
capacities. For Kittay the fundamental caring relationship of mother and child is central 
to who we are and the moral status we hold. 
Ultimately, it is the claim to this moral status that obligates people to respond, Kittay 
believes. Kittay describes this moral status as personhood (Kittay 2005; Kittay 2009). 
Yet, having the care requirements of a mother’s child is a status to which all human 
beings are entitled and it follows for Kittay therefore that all human beings have 
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personhood. If this is accepted, it remains unclear how the reference to a being a 
mother’s child adds more than merely saying that personhood is a status granted to all 
human beings. The latter claim was investigated in Chapters 3 and 4 and found to be 
philosophically wanting. 
Arguably, what marks out Kittay’s view as relying on more than humanness is that it 
puts care at the centre of the claim. It is being cared for that provides the status she 
describes.  However, it is still a status that is based on humanness. Kittay does not seem 
to be arguing that being worthy of care is separate from humanness, in fact the two are 
closely intertwined. 
Returning to the example, it is reasonable to suggest that Kittay’s view (along with many 
others) would obligate a caring response in this situation. This might be similar to the 
discussion of this example in Chapter 5 (5.4.2) which looked to the care provider to 
respond in a way that reflected a virtue of compassion. It could be advanced, therefore 
that the compassionate caring response to this human being would be to tell a white lie. 
However, recall that this response could be challenged by the opposing argument that 
the care provider should exhibit the virtues of honesty and trustworthiness, or that the 
truth should be told in a compassionate way. Also, the care provider may believe that a 
caring response actually involves a responsibility or obligation to be honest in their 
caring interactions. 
There is also the complicating factor that Kittay’s principle of doulia requires that the 
care provider is also respected. This has not been a factor in earlier discussion of moral 
status. It may be that the care provider finds the reaction of the woman with dementia, 
when she is told the truth, particularly distressing. In this case, there is possibly now an 
additional reason not to tell the truth. On the other hand, it may be that she finds telling 
white lies distressing, and if this response is obligated then it may mean the care 
provider is not being supported in a way that might be expected by doulia. Seemingly, 
there is a balance to had in being supported to provide care and caring for the care 
recipient. 
Kittay’s (1999) view of nested dependencies entails a political obligation to support the 
care provider in meeting their care obligations to the care recipient. Yet, it appears that 
this generates some complications. Is it reasonable for the care provider to experience 
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at least some distress in order to meet their care obligations? What guidance does it 
offer for meeting these obligations? How might differences of opinion be resolved? At 
first blush, this appears to put some pressure on the idea that the ethics of care is better 
equipped than other views to attend to such ethically challenging situations. 
Nonetheless, it is too quick an assessment to conclude that the ethics of care is therefore 
inadequate. The ethics of care, though practical in its outlook, does not aim to provide a 
framework to guide action. So to judge it as such is to measure the ethics of care against 
a standard to which it is opposed. 
6.3.3 JUSTICE AND DECISION-MAKING FROM THE ETHICS OF CARE PERSPECTIVE 
When faced with a scenario such as the one described above, people from an ethics of 
care perspective, rather than trying to simplify the story, will often be more interested 
in the details that enable an understanding of context. Instead of trying to sharpen the 
horns of the dilemma, an alternative solution is sought; a way out of the problem such 
as through a compromise. As pointed out by Noddings (1984: 96): 
‘Faced with a hypothetical moral dilemma, women often ask for more 
information. It is not the case, certainly, that women cannot arrange principles 
hierarchically and derive conclusions logically. It is more likely that they see this 
process as peripheral to or even irrelevant to moral conduct. They want more 
information, I think, in order to form a picture…. Moral decisions are, after all, 
made in situations; they are qualitatively different from the solution of geometry 
problems.’ 
Putting aside the gendered description, already criticised above, the process of ‘forming 
a picture’ is nevertheless a central part of how the ethics of care approaches ethical 
problems. Edwards (2009) sees the benefit of this when he argues that having a care-
infused approach to ethical thinking can help the care provider to be more emotionally 
receptive rather than just following ethical principles in a disinterested way. 
Yet, for Edwards, principlism still dominates and ultimately he argues that this is 
required to make sound ethical decisions. This view is compatible with what Edwards 
(2009:174) describes as the ‘third wave’ of the ethics of care. Here, care is seen as more 
of an orientation or matrix within which ethical decision-making can take place rather 
than being sufficient as a basis for an ethical theory itself. Vanlaere and Gastmans 
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(2011) take a similar view employing personalism to bolster the normativity of the 
ethics of care. 
It is worth noting that these combination approaches differ from the one proposed by 
Slote for ethics of care and virtue ethics. For Slote, these two concepts are connected 
through the virtue of receptivity; whereas Edwards argues that care ethics requires the 
additional theory of principlism in order for it to be normatively viable. 
In contrast, Tronto (1995; 1993) emphasises care not so much as a matrix or 
orientation that needs to rely on further theories, but as something that has the 
potential to be central in a reconstruction of our moral and political life. In a similar vein 
to Kittay, she argues that our shared need for care points to justice and a political theory 
of care in order that care can reach its full potential. 
‘To address and to correct the problems with care... requires a concept of justice, 
a democratic and open opportunity for discussion, and more equal access to 
power. An ethic of care remains incomplete without a political theory of care.’ 
(Tronto 1993: 155) 
As discussed above, the injustice for many care providers has a political dimension. Held 
(2005: 68) also develops the idea of ‘meshing’ care and justice. Held states that in the 
past she tried to assign care and justice to different roles in ethical thinking however: 
‘I now think that caring relations should form the wider moral framework into 
which justice should be fitted.’ (Held 2005: 71) 
To explain why Held (2005: 71-72) takes a line that is similar to Kittay’s: 
‘Though justice is surely among the most important moral values, much life has 
gone on without it.... Without care, however, there would be no persons to 
respect and no families to improve.’ 
Slote (2013: 106) also see justice as being integrated into an ethics of care approach.  
‘I have long argued that a care ethics that seeks to be a general approach to 
moral questions needs to take on issues of justice but deal with them in its own 
distinctive care-ethical/sentimentalist terms.’ [Original emphasis] 
Held (2005) suggests that the overall moral design of feminist moral theory is based on 
caring relations and cannot be reduced to elements such as utility, justice or virtue. Here 
there is a distinction with Slote as Held is critical of the fact that he does not place 
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relationships at the centre, instead favouring an agent-based sentimentalist virtue 
ethics.  
The ethics of care analysis rather than taking a virtue or morality first (Tronto 1993: 7) 
approach, requires instead that the whole picture is seen. An essential part of that 
picture is the social and political situation of the care provider in relation to the care 
recipient. The ethics of care approach is opposed to the idea of trying to get a solution to 
an ethical problem by factoring out this background. Also it is opposed to seeing such 
dilemmas as single events isolated in time. Instead, solutions are sought in a broad sense 
both in terms of context and time. Decisions need to be made, not just by the individual 
participants in this one dilemma but by society as whole and these will then support 
and inform others who face similar dilemmas in the future. 
6.4 APPLYING THE ETHICS OF CARE TO DEMENTIA CARE 
So rather than focusing in a reductionist way on a particular question such as “should 
the care provider tell the truth”, the relevant concerns for an ethics of care analysis are 
much broader in scope. Drawing on the work of this chapter, here are some possible 
questions that might arise: 
- What is the context of the relationship between the care provider and recipient?  
- What do both people feel about the situation? 
- Which courses of action might allow for both care providers and recipients to 
feel fairly treated and cared for? 
- How might the political or social situation be changed to alleviate difficult 
situations like this in the future? 
So let’s now reapply to the example above. Firstly, it is not clear what the relationship is 
between the care provider and the woman, Jane, with dementia. Is it someone that Jane 
might recognise or trust? It may be assumed that the care provider is an employee, 
though this may not be the case. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to try and find 
someone who has a positive relationship with Jane. Memory loss may hinder this 
process, but it is still valid for the care provider to ask if he or she is the best person 
available to engage with the woman at this time. 
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The second question considers the emotions being felt by both people concerned. The 
example is clear that Jane is distressed, however, the nature of that distress is not made 
clear. Is it anger, sadness, frustration? It seems reasonable to state that these emotions 
may inform differing care responses. Anger might require calming; sadness, comfort; 
frustration, action. The question here is whether this also informs a differing ethical 
response. 
The ethics of care would suggest that the care provider needs to feel their way through 
in order to the respond to the complex reality of the situation. Here receptivity can be 
employed to respond empathically and with flexibility (Slote 2015; Slote 2013; 
Noddings 1984). Recall, Slote’s key point above that receptive people are able to judge 
ethical situations based on the amount of warmth that is expressed by the interaction. 
There is also a great deal of similarity with the perspective of Julian Hughes (2013) as 
outlined in his article 'Y' feel me?' How do we understand the person with dementia? 
which employs the work of Wittgenstein:  
‘...the foundations for good care emphasise the importance of knowing the 
people we care for in as holistic a fashion as possible. We are back to ‘being with’ 
as a priority before ‘doing to’. And we are back to the importance of the intuitive, 
the expert clinical judgement based on feelings akin to an aesthetic sense of what 
is right.’ (Hughes 2013: 356) 
This quote was used in Chapter 4 (4.9.1). Here it was pointed out that this approach is 
more suited to an ethical model that is less rigid and therefore does not seek to produce 
answers based merely on the outcome of a reasoning process. Such a strategy is more 
plausible in the context of an ethics of care. As part of this broader picture, feelings have 
a place and they may form part of this ‘aesthetic sense of what is right’.  
So, the ethics of care suggests that the care provider must also work within what feels 
acceptable for him or her in order for the care to be ethical in this wider context. This 
links to the third question that asks which course of action might allow both care 
providers and recipients to feel justly treated and cared for. Here the idea of mutuality 
expressed as doulia is brought into focus. Whether the decision is made to tell the truth 
or not, this needs to be done in a way that supports the care provider and the care 
recipient.  
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The discussion that has run through previous chapters has highlighted there are 
competing answers in this situation, and it should be accepted that there will be a 
certain amount of blameless diversity (Garrett 2015) in the judgements reached. This 
may be due to there being insufficient information available and with this an answer 
might become clear. However, more information would not satisfy someone who holds 
the view that the truth should always be told.  If someone with this view is best placed 
to care for the woman, then doulia would suggest that everyone should be supported to 
deal with the distress that the scenario suggests this would cause. Furthermore, being 
receptive to this distress may ultimately enable the care provider to reconsider her 
fixed position. 
This leads to the final question which asks if there are any political or social changes 
that can help alleviate the problem. It may be that Jane’s care providers would be able to 
provide better care in a different environment or with improved resources in the 
current environment. It is important in terms of justice that every effort is made for 
Jane’s preference to be heard in terms of what would improve her current living 
situation. Based on Tronto’s (1993) work, Brannelly (2011; 2006) argues that 
incorporating the ethics of care into dementia care can enable care providers to take an 
approach of negotiation with care receivers to solve problems, which in turn promotes 
the notion of citizenship. 
In summary, those who hope to find an ethical framework in the form of prescriptive 
guidance or a decision-making flowchart will be disappointed by the ethics of care 
approach. Instead we are expected to dig deeply to respond intuitively to these human 
dilemmas. 
6.5 EVALUATING THE ETHICS OF CARE FOR DEMENTIA AND THE POSSIBLE 
ROLE OF VIRTUE ETHICS WITHIN IT 
6.5.1 THE ROLE OF EMOTION 
John Paley (2011; 2002) argues that the notion that the ethics of care can rely on 
emotion alone is flawed: 
‘Either you feel sympathy, or you don’t; and if you don’t, how can the “ethics of 
care” make any moral demand on you? What, indeed, is the point of an ethic that 
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appeals only to people of a certain cast of mind and which, in any case, 
recommends what they are naturally inclined to do without prompting?’ (Paley 
2002: 140) 
As has been shown, some ethics of care theorists have argued that we have an 
obligation to care for particular others and that society must support us to meet our 
obligations. It is the source of this obligation that is at issue here, as Paley argues that 
the ethics of care can make no demand on a person if they feel no sympathy. Paley’s 
(2002) concern leads him to propose the idea of a Kantian ethics of care. Through this 
he argues that it is possible to reconcile the reason-based morality of Kant with the 
emotion-based ethics of care. Paley also states clearly that if Kantian duty (based in 
autonomy) and sympathy conflict then it is the former that must take precedence.  
‘In cases of conflict, when the sympathetic impulse clashes with what morality 
requires, duty takes precedence; but, generally speaking, there is no reason to 
think – and Kant does not suggest – that ‘inclination’ and duty are, 
motivationally, in competition’ (Paley 2002: 140) 
However, Paley’s argument for the compatibility of ethics of care and the Kantian moral 
law relies on the seemly optimistic idea that it is a rare event for inclination and Kantian 
duty to conflict. This claim is somewhat extraordinary as contemporary ethical debate 
often focuses on dilemmas where duty and inclinations conflict, not least with the 
example where telling the truth (a Kantian duty) conflicts with an inclination to avoid 
distress. 
Returning to the work of Slote, he takes a different approach to this problem arguing 
that empathic concern for others leads most people to wish to do something to alleviate 
suffering. Not doing so is wrong if  
 ‘...an act one performs reflects or exhibits a lack of fully developed empathic 
caringness.’ (Slote 2007: 32) 
What makes the act wrong is not that one has failed to meet an obligation based in 
autonomy. Instead it appeals to the idea of how a fully developed empathically caring 
person would respond to someone suffering. The obligation is therefore to avoid 
conduct that a fully empathic person would also avoid; which in this case means not 
being indifferent towards someone’s suffering. As this obligation is a minimum, there is 
Page | 171  
 
also room for actions above and beyond these obligations for those who wish to act 
from an even higher degree of empathic concern. 
As discussed, the idea of being an empathic caring person is developed in later work by 
Slote (2015; 2013) to be seen part of a virtue of receptivity. Unlike Paley, Slote does not 
hope for a correlation between emotion and rationality. As this quote suggests, for Slote 
and other sentimentalists, it is our emotional responses that we find morally pleasing in 
human beings, not their rational capabilities 
‘The wife-saving husband who acts and/or needs to act from moral duty is less 
morally attractive than one who acts from love of and concern for his wife, and 
such love and concern, far from rendering us or morality less dignified, actually 
make it more humanly appealing and heart warming. Or so at least the care 
ethicist thinks.’ (Slote 2013: 130) 
So in answer to Paley’s original question of how the ethics of care can make a demand 
on the unsympathetic; the beginnings of an answer can be found. Being receptive in the 
way described above is something that is seen as admirable (or morally attractive) by 
other receptive people. So rather than suggesting that the unsympathetic person acts 
from reason to make up for their deficit, the ‘demand’ would be to cultivate receptive 
empathy; or, if this is not possible, emulate someone who has and then act accordingly. 
This is not to say that reason doesn’t have a role in ethical decision-making. The 
argument here is that reason needs to serve someone in their quest for good character; 
not dictate what that good character ought to be. 
The overall strategy of the ethics of care of bringing emotions, relationships, practical 
decision-making and political justice to the fore appears to be both defensible and a 
sound fit for dementia care ethics. However, there are two main issues with the ethics of 
care that remain to be tackled: an apparent tendency for paternalism and whether it can 
generate normativity. 
6.5.2 PATERNALISM REVISITED 
As Tronto (1993) recognises, there is a danger in care that those who provide it believe 
that they have a better idea of how to meet someone’s needs than the care recipient. If 
these acts are then carried out against someone’s wishes, it is paternalism. (Dworkin 
1988)  
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Currently, a culture of paternalism is considered to be a problem in dementia care. As a 
recent review by the House of Lords into the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 
states: 
A fundamental change of attitudes among professionals is needed in order to 
move from protection and paternalism to enablement and empowerment. 
(House of Lords 2014: 8) 
Previous discussion of paternalism in Chapter 2 (2.5) focussed on respecting autonomy 
as a way of preventing hard paternalism, where the individual’s wishes are considered 
voluntary and adequately informed. However, there were barriers to establishing 
autonomy for those with more severe dementia. Paternalism, on the other hand, can call 
on beneficence, the idea that it is necessary to act in a way that provides benefits and 
lessens harm when the care recipient lacks mental capacity (Beauchamp and Childress 
2013). 
Though, calling on the ideas of autonomy and beneficence as balancing principles is not 
considered to be a standard part of the ethics of care, both autonomy and beneficence 
can claim a place in the tradition. 
The ethics of care understands autonomy relationally rather than individualistically. 
However, as outlined above, this can lead to paternalism as these relational forces may 
themselves become paternalistic by overwhelming the individual, or (conversely) there 
may be paternalism due to the need to override a choice made under oppressive social 
forces. 
Benevolence as the ground for beneficent actions also has a more controversial position 
in the ethics of care. Slote in his earlier work (Slote 2001) focussed on benevolence as 
the basis for an agent-based virtue ethics for caring, drawing on the philosophical 
background of Hutcheson and Hume. Slote’s early focus draws criticism from Held 
(2005) who stated that benevolence is not enough and that sensitivity is also required. 
This deficit is arguably corrected in later work by Slote’s move to receptivity as the 
main value via the notion of empathy (Slote 2007; 2013). 
The point at issue here is whether a shift to promoting receptivity in care providers 
helps answer the concern about paternalism. For Slote, being receptive means being 
sensitive to others’ views (Slote 2013). As mentioned, receptivity is also part of the 
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work of Noddings (1984), and appears similar to the notion of attentiveness which 
forms an element of an ethics of care for Tronto (1993). It is fair to the say that 
paternalism by definition involves a lack of sensitivity to others’ feelings and 
preferences, or at least a lack of will to respond to them. Receptivity would involve 
having a greater sensitivity for others’ feelings and preferences. So a reasonable claim 
can be made that receptivity is an antidote to any paternalistic tendencies in the ethics 
of care. 
 As a result, it is possible that someone with receptivity may avoid a beneficent action, if 
they are sensitive to the feelings of the individual who is opposed to this action. It raises 
the question of whether this is merely therefore respecting autonomy through another 
route. However, as outlined, the arguments that would support autonomy in this sense 
are based in the ability of the individual with dementia to reason. Here it is not 
(necessarily) reason that is driving the decision. Instead, what makes the decision a 
good one is based on trust in the judgement of the care provider. It is the trust in the 
care provider’s ability to be sensitive to the care receiver feeling wronged by what 
others consider to be the beneficent action. Ultimately we are back to the idea that this 
relies on a virtue in the care provider that they can make these intuitive or aesthetic 
moral judgments. 
6.5.3 THE NORMATIVITY PROBLEM 
For some scholars, the ethics of care approach raises a normativity problem. The 
discussion so far in this chapter suggests some solutions. It could be argued that the 
ethics of care simply does not recognise that normativity is necessary. As discussed, the 
ethics of care expects each situation to be different and therefore does not seek rules to 
guide conduct. Tronto (1993) though, clear in her wish to distance herself from moral 
relativism, nonetheless argues that different judgements are required for people in 
differing situations. 
Kittay, on the other hand, does wish to appeal to the normative force of vulnerability-
responsive obligations based in personhood. However, this is grounded in the notion of 
moral status based on being a mother’s child. Being a mother’s child makes every 
human being worthy of care. This seems to open to the same objections as those raised 
by idea of moral status being based in humanness alone. Instead, it is argued here that 
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there is a place for a combination approach in order that challenges to normativity can 
be met. 
Paley’s (2002) suggestion of a Kantian ethics of care requires the seemingly optimistic 
assumption that inclination and Kantian duty are usually aligned. Also, as a Kantian 
view, it would exclude some people with dementia from full moral consideration. A care 
provider following such a view would be unable to respect a non-autonomous 
individual with dementia as a person and would therefore prioritise others over that 
individual. Edwards (2009) model of principles infused with care is a promising 
candidate as it balances out an uncompromising reliance on autonomy. The role of 
principles is yet to be fully assessed, so this will be returned to in the next chapter. 
The arguments in this chapter and the previous ones have so far suggested that Slote’s 
approach of seeking a connection between virtue ethics and the ethics of care is a sound 
fit. Virtue ethics can help to answer the normativity problem in the ethics of care. The 
virtue of receptivity along with other virtues can be aspired to, and doing this is 
approved of by other receptive individuals. So there is no need to assume that 
inclination and duty based in reason are usually aligned. This virtue ethics approach 
seeks to ground our response in the emotions felt by the receptive individual. The 
normativity comes from the approval or warmth felt by other receptive individuals. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that the ethics of care has a number of benefits as a 
philosophical approach to ground an ethical model for dementia care. One of these is its 
emphasis on the broader context of ethical decision-making. Rather than taking a 
reductionist analysis of ethical challenging situations by merely simplifying the 
situation and factoring out the variables; the ethics of care engages with the wider 
picture drawing on sociopolitical context and wider information about the people 
involved.  
This analysis means that every ethically challenging situation is treated differently. 
Similar situations, which might be simplified in order to appear the same for some 
philosophical approaches, will actually have different outcomes under an ethics of care 
depending on these variables. So, in the example of a truth-telling dilemma, it is not the 
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question of whether it is always right to tell the truth in similar circumstances but a 
subtler judgement based on feelings, relationship and social context in this particular 
situation, at this time. 
The ethics of care perspective also looks to the sociopolitical background in an effort to 
ascertain what can be done to prevent or alleviate such dilemmas in the future. Overall, 
it is proposed that engaging with ethical problems in this way produces solutions to 
dilemmas which remain invisible from a more myopic moral perspective. 
Yet, there are some pitfalls with the ethics of care. Firstly, some versions seek to place 
an obligation on people to provide care if they find themselves in the situation of having 
responsibility for a particularly vulnerable individual. As a result, care providers may 
find themselves overly burdened, and this responsibility appears to fall more heavily on 
certain groups in society. In response, it is argued that any felt obligation to care must 
be balanced with the idea of mutuality and recognition of political justice in caring. Both 
care providers and care receivers need to be supported by society in order for ethical 
care to result. Care work needs to valued and seen as a concern for society as whole. It is 
not merely a private arrangement between individuals. 
Secondly, the tendency in the ethics of care to base ethical decisions on relationships 
and social context is two edged. It is agreed here that relationships are necessary for 
care. However, the social forces in which relationships are formed can be overpowering. 
This may result in a culture of paternalism/maternalism or more malevolent outcomes 
that care providers or receivers are not empowered to challenge. It is argued here that 
promoting receptivity in care providers helps answer this concern, as being receptive 
means being sensitive to the feelings and views of others rather than merely pursuing a 
belief that one can empirically know how best to promote someone’s welfare. As such, 
paternalism and malignant social conditions can be challenged by people being 
receptive in this way. For this to work, the emphasis needs to be on the character of care 
providers being receptive within a supportive sociopolitical environment. 
Finally, the role of emotion in the ethics of care has been evaluated. The chapter has 
argued that emotions form a central place in dementia care. However, the ability of 
emotions to provide a normative foundation for ethical behaviour has been challenged. 
The objection was raised that some people may be indifferent or have feelings that are 
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not conducive to ethical conduct and in this situation an ethics of care can make no 
claim on them to go against such feelings.  
Instead, it is concluded here that individual emotions are an important guide for 
conduct. However, this must be backed by the evaluation that some emotions are more 
praiseworthy than others depending on the situation. For Slote, this judgement is better 
made by people who have developed a virtue of receptivity. The background to this is 
that emotions are considered praiseworthy only if they generate actions that then 
produce a sense of ‘warmth’ in others who are receptive. (Slote 2013:200). As such, the 
ethics of care should be interpreted in a manner that connects it to virtue ethics. 
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7 BALANCING PRINCIPLES AND INTERESTS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter concluded that the ethics of care is a promising philosophical 
approach to ground an ethical model for dementia care. In this context, it was suggested 
that the ethics of care is best understood as a sociopolitical theory that places a 
responsibility on society to support good care. It also introduced a different way of 
approaching ethically challenging situations. Instead of taking a reductionist approach, 
a broader account of these situations is sought. The rationale being that a wider picture 
can help to find solutions that may not otherwise be visible. 
It was also advanced that the ethics of care should be interpreted in a manner that 
connects it to a virtue of receptivity in the care provider as outlined by Slote (2013). It 
was argued that this connection can be made by promoting receptivity as a foundation 
for the character of care providers. This, in turn, promotes ethical care by those caring 
being both sensitive to and identifying with the feelings and views of the individual 
being cared for. This virtue ethics foundation helps answer a number of objections that 
can be raised against the ethics of care, such as that it places too heavy a burden on care 
providers, its lack of normativity and its tendency to be paternalistic. 
Recent chapters have moved away from primarily focussing on the moral status of the 
care receiver. An attempt to reintroduce the notion of a care-based moral status 
grounded on being a mother’s child (Kittay 2009; 1999) was also found philosophically 
unconvincing. Overall, this move away from moral status removes the difficulties 
highlighted in finding an adequate ground for personhood when dementia is severe. 
Nonetheless, this shift in emphasis has not been intended to remove the care receiver 
from the picture. After all, it is not possible that someone could care in a receptive way 
without having consideration for the receiver of care. 
The ethics of care suggests that care providers need to feel their way through complex 
situations in order to respond appropriately. As such, the emotions felt by receptive 
individuals by putting themselves in the position of others are an important guide to 
conduct. The care receiver is linked in the ethical picture with the care provider in a 
shared sociopolitical environment. Furthermore, understanding if a care provider has 
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responded in a good way is reliant on the approval of other receptive individuals and is 
therefore not a notion that is merely internal to the care provider. 
Yet, taking an approach that relies solely on the feelings of the care provider, even when 
these are grounded by approval of a receptive character may not be sufficient. 
Arguments can still be put that in order to respond to the competing ethical demands 
brought by multifaceted situations, a rational thinking procedure is required. There are 
times when factors such as respecting autonomy and ensuring that things go best 
overall might well be relevant. It is not being proposed that these determine the 
outcome absolutely, just that such considerations might be part of the thinking of a 
receptive care provider when ascertaining which options are acceptable or better. 
So, this chapter will consider the use of frameworks which balance relevant principles 
and interests, and to assess whether such frameworks might be compatible with the 
ethical approach argued for above. The factors involved in balancing are ones that have 
already been discussed.  However, they are being returned to now in a somewhat 
different context as they are being employed together in the context of a pluralistic 
model.  
In this context, it will initially explore the influential biomedical ethical framework, the 
principlist approach of Beauchamp and Childress (2013). It will investigate their claim 
that this framework reflects a common morality, before moving to apply it to an 
example. The care infused principles approach of Edwards (2009) will also be 
evaluated. 
The investigation will then move on to examine whether it is possible to structure 
decision-making around a consideration of interests of the individuals involved. This 
section will assess whether responding to interests can allay any concerns brought by 
the move away from basing the decision-making framework on the moral status of 
personhood. In order to do this, the discussion will begin with Singer’s (2011) principle 
of equal consideration of interests and this will be contrasted with the ethics of care 
approach already discussed. The chapter will then move on to discuss the central role 
played by interests in the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report before exploring the 
concept of best interests. 
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The notion that the best outcome might be known moves the discussion onto the role 
that consequentialism might play. Consequentialism requires the maximising of good 
outcomes without consideration of the moral content of the actions that produce the 
outcome. Forms which appeal to the maximising of a single good offer an appealingly 
simple alternative to pluralism by measuring the amount of this good that results from 
following the competing outcomes. 
A critique of this then leads to a consideration of rule consequentialism and the 
intriguing proposal of Parfit (2011) that this can be combined with a Kantian form of 
contractualism to produce a Triple Theory. Based on the work of earlier chapters, this 
brings the possibility of a combined model drawing together the contemporary work of 
Slote (2013) and Parfit (2011) along with the Beauchamp and Childress (2013). The 
viability of this will be assessed before moving to a conclusion. 
7.2 PRINCIPLISM 
7.2.1 THE COMMON MORALITY AND MORAL PLURALISM 
The four principles approach of Beauchamp and Childress (2013) is a well-established 
ethical framework in the bioethical field. It was first conceived in the late 1970s and was 
a clinical development of the Belmont Report (1979) into research ethics that had 
similar principles and was also authored by Tom Beauchamp. 
The four principles are reproduced here along with Beauchamp and Childress’s 
(2013:13) explanations of each principle:  
‘(1) respect for autonomy (a norm respecting and supporting autonomous 
decisions), (2) nonmaleficence (a norm of avoiding the causation of harm), (3) 
beneficence (a group of norms pertaining to relieving, lessening, or preventing 
harm and providing benefits and balances benefits against risks and costs), (4) 
justice (a group of norms for fairly distributing benefits, risks and costs).’ 
The idea follows that these four principles can be applied to ethically challenging 
situations in order to inform judgements and formulate rules. For Beauchamp and 
Childress (2013, p13) these principles function as: 
‘...an analytical framework of general norms derived from the common morality 
that form a suitable starting point for biomedical ethics.’ [my emphasis] 
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As can be seen, the idea of a common morality forms a starting point for philosophical 
grounding of the principles. This assumes that there is a ‘set of universal norms shared 
by all persons committed to morality’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 3). To illustrate 
this, Beauchamp and Childress give a number of examples of the sort of norms they 
have in mind such as those that forbid killing, stealing and causing pain; along with 
those that instruct persons to tell the truth, keep promises, rescue people in danger.  
They draw on three possible justifications for the claim that the common morality 
exists. Firstly, there is the possibility of an empirical justification, which aims to gather 
evidence that this is indeed what the people committed to morality universally believe. 
However, the empirical investigation required to justify such a claim has not been 
carried out leaving Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 416) merely to propose it as a 
hypothesis.  
‘If an empirical investigation were to show that a universal content is found in 
moral belief, the claim a common morality exists would be empirically justified.’ 
However, if such an empirical investigation was possible and it found the hypothesis to 
be true, it could still be challenged. Possible challenges might include whether the 
results might change over time, whether the study can satisfactorily eliminate bias and 
error and whether the sample could ever be diverse enough to justify the claim of 
universal content. Moreover, Beauchamp and Childress themselves recognise that an 
empirical justification would not be sufficient to justify their claims; instead they look 
also to normative and conceptual justifications.  
For Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 383), the four principles approach is consistent 
with a wide range of normative ethical theories: 
‘Many and perhaps most moral theories lead to the acceptance of the action 
guides we present... These theories defend roughly the same principles, 
obligations, rights, responsibilities, virtues, and the like.’ 
So, Beauchamp and Childress see principlism as consistent with a convergence of ethical 
theories. However, they point out that this convergence, on its own, does not justify the 
principles or the common morality from which they are drawn; it is necessary for the 
ethical theories themselves to have their own justification. 
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‘Our conclusion... is merely that such theories have been and can be constructed 
and, if they are successful, they would justify the norms of the common morality’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 420) 
For Beauchamp and Childress, a more promising avenue is the conceptual justification 
of the common morality sought in the (seemingly Kantian) idea that in order for 
morality to exist there needs to be a set of norms that everyone shares. This means that 
to claim something is moral when it lies outside the common morality is therefore 
‘conceptually mistaken’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 420). Beauchamp and 
Childress appear to be arguing that the very idea of morality infers the existence of 
common morality norms. 
Having argued for the existence of the common morality on these terms, Beauchamp 
and Childress then use it as a basis from which to draw their four principles. They argue 
that the common morality, by definition, cannot be pluralistic as it cannot have norms 
that are relative to individuals or cultures; however, the four principles approach is 
pluralistic in the sense that it draws on four non-absolute principles while remaining 
objectivist in the sense that the result of applying these principles must reflect the 
objective common morality. 
As was highlighted in Chapter 3 (3.3), the four principles approach draws extensively 
from the work of WD Ross (1930) who argued for prima facie (not absolute) duties. As 
part of this, Ross (1930: 21-23) proposes prime facie duties of beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice. Interestingly, considering its contemporary importance, the 
principle of respect for autonomy has no direct equivalent in Ross; though elements can 
be found in his proposal of prima facie duties of fidelity, to which he also adds duties of 
reparation and gratitude. 
Ross (1930) argues that underlying the approach of prima-facie duties there is a duty 
proper which is objective but hard to determine. The aim of the prima facie duties of 
Ross and the principles of Beauchamp and Childress is to lead us to the morally right 
solution which is only indirectly knowable. 
Beauchamp and Childress appear to take this pluralist approach a step further by 
claiming also that the domain of character ethics is equal and consistent with the 
principalist approach. 
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‘Virtues, ideals, and aspirations of moral excellence support and enrich the 
rights, principles and rules discussed in Chapter 1. There is no reason to consider 
one domain inferior to or derivative from the other, and there is reason to 
believe that these categories all have a significant place in the common morality’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 56) 
As Beauchamp and Childress place the ethics of care under the category of virtue ethics, 
it follows from this that they argue for compatibility between the ethics of care and the 
principlist approach. 
‘We need not reject principles of obligation in favour of virtues of caring, and we 
can conceive moral judgements as involving moral skills beyond those of 
specifying and balancing general principles.’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 
37) 
Beauchamp and Childress’s seminal work devotes one chapter to moral character and 
there is a brief discussion on caring and the ethics of care. Yet, they offer little argument 
as to how the virtues and principles might work together outside of providing a table 
that gives equivalent virtues to each of the principles (e.g. benevolence and 
beneficence). 
From the other side of the divide, the ethics of care, as highlighted, is hostile to the idea 
of analysing matters in the reductionist terms of principles seeing them as, at best, 
peripheral to moral conduct (Noddings 1984). Nonetheless, Edwards (2009:176) aims 
to draw on interpretations of the ethics of care which are more compatible with 
principlism in order recommend a ‘principles infused with care’ approach.  
7.2.2 EDWARD’S PRINCIPLES INFUSED WITH CARE APPROACH 
A good way to begin to illustrate this approach is to draw on an example from Edward’s 
own work.  
...‘a patient who, in a nurse’s considered view, is in urgent need of pressure-area 
care, competently refuses such care. Suppose two nurses – call them nurse A and 
Nurse B – have been introduced to the rudiments of the principle-based 
approach....’  (Edwards 2009:177) 
Nurse A applies the approach and decides that due to respect for autonomy (a moral 
norm that respects and supports autonomous decisions) this refusal needs to be 
respected.  
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Nurse B, on the other hand, does not take the refusal at face value. Instead Nurse B 
‘would try to enter into a dialogue with the patient’ the aim being to elicit if there was 
‘anything that was of concern to him.’ (p177) If the patient has fears that can be allayed 
then they may agree after all to the intervention. On the other hand, the patient may not 
have any fears, or they might continue to refuse treatment despite having any fears 
allayed. In this case, Nurse B would also respect the autonomous decision of the patient. 
Edwards favours the approach of Nurse B and sees this as a way of avoiding the 
accusation that the principle-based approach ‘fosters a callous and uncaring attitude.’ 
(Edwards 2009: 178). 
Both nurses appear to be respecting autonomy in the sense understood by Beauchamp 
and Childress. However, their responses can be differentiated by proposing that Nurse B 
is actually taking a more relational view of autonomy. Employing relational autonomy 
would also mean not taking the initial refusal at face value; instead, the importance of 
relationships and context would be taken on board in this more care-focussed approach. 
Yet Nurse B’s approach is not immune from criticism. Let’s say that Nurse B feels under 
pressure to persuade the patient as she is concerned that to do otherwise would make it 
appear that she is not able to perform her duties as a nurse. So Nurse B listens to the 
fears but is able to dismiss each one in order that she can do what is felt to be best for 
the patient. Now, what might have appeared to be a caring act of allaying fears, can 
instead be seen as an intervention to elicit agreement from the patient. The relationship, 
rather than fostering true autonomy, actually becomes a vehicle for paternalism/ 
maternalism. It was this paternalistic tendency in care ethics that lead the previous 
chapter to call on virtues in the care provider in order to diminish this possible effect. 
The hope was that a carer who takes time to cultivate caring virtues in their character 
would be one who was receptive to the both the fears and opinions of the care receiver, 
rather than merely pursuing the intervention that the carer believes is in the best 
interests of the patient. 
On the other hand, this could be overly critical. As pointed out, both nurses wish to 
follow the four principles as a way of carrying out the common morality. It also appears 
that both nurses are committed to the first principle; the difference is one of strategy in 
application. It seems reasonable to imagine that Nurse A and Nurse B could replay the 
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argument above and a course of action that reflects the common morality could result 
from this. 
It has already been stated above that Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 37) are 
sympathetic to the idea of having ‘moral skills beyond those of specifying and balancing 
general principles’ even though these are not reflected fully in their framework. The 
ability to engage the patient in a caring conversation in order to better to understand 
their views could be seen as part of the moral skills to which Beauchamp and Childress 
refer. 
So, ultimately, having care infused principles is a useful application of the four 
principles approach. It also shows how principlism can be compatible with perspectives 
such as the ethics of care, pointing the way to a more pluralistic approach. 
7.2.3 APPLICATION OF THE FOUR PRINCIPLES TO DEMENTIA CARE 
In the introduction, it was suggested that there are times when a more structured 
approach may be required in order to assist with making a decision. Attention will now 
turn to why this might be, initially by illustration with an example: 
Mrs X lived with her daughter and her family and used to take a lot of pleasure in 
cooking family meals whilst everyone was at work or school. When her dementia 
progressed she started leaving the gas stove on for long periods of time and 
there were a few near misses when care providers visiting Mrs X found the house 
full of smoke. The daughter in consultation with the other care providers decided 
to switch the gas off before leaving for work in the morning. However, Mrs X 
became deeply distressed as she still tried to cook dinners but could not 
understand why it would not work. She started to lose her appetite and did not 
eat the ready meals that were brought by the care providers.3 
A care provider faced with such a situation may struggle to work out the best course of 
action. Both the professional care provider and the daughter are rightfully concerned 
about a catastrophic outcome. It seems that fire or explosion is likely due to the fact 
there have been several near misses. However, Mrs X is deeply distressed and it seems a 
                                                        
3 Thank you to Egle Vatkeviciute for this example from her practice. 
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rather uncaring (and unreceptive) act to deny her the pleasure of cooking for her family 
as she has always done. 
However, it may not be immediately obvious how an expectation to act as a receptive 
care provider can, on its own, provide the overt guidance necessary to tackle such a 
dilemma. The four principles approach may well provide some acceptable options to 
work from: 
Firstly, autonomy. Mrs X has a long standing wish to cook for her family that has 
continued as her dementia has developed. It appears that this is an autonomous wish 
that has endured. Furthermore, she will have the prima-facie right to be told the truth 
about why the gas has been switched off if it is established that Mrs X. has autonomous 
personhood. 
Secondly, non-maleficence. It could be argued that the act of turning off the gas causes 
harm to Mrs X. This is based on the definition of harm outlined by Beauchamp and 
Childress (2013: 153) 
‘A harm is a thwarting, defeating, or setting back of some party’s interest’ 
However, Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 153) go on to point out that this along with 
the others is a prima-facie principle 
‘Harmful actions that involve justifiable setbacks to another’s interests are not 
wrong.’ 
So it is possible for a greater consideration for health and safety to overrule this second 
principle and still be consistent with the overall duty or common morality. 
The third principle, beneficence, is also engaged as in one formation it states that 
‘One ought to prevent evil or harm’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013: 152) 
This addresses what for the care providers may well be their central concern. The 
paternalistic act of preventing the great harm of a fire or a gas explosion can be justified 
under the principle of beneficence. So their course of action is justifiable. However, this 
leaves the autonomy of Mrs X (if this can be established) unmet. However, as the story 
continues it can be seen that a solution could be found. 
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Mrs X experienced a serious deterioration of her emotional and physical well-
being after the gas was switched off during the day. This in turn caused the 
daughter and the professional care providers to feel sad for her in this situation. 
As a result of this the daughter upgraded the care package and Mrs X had 
professional care providers three times a week to help her cook lunch and enjoy 
family meals again. 
By spending extra money on supplementary care, the receptive attitude of the daughter 
and the care providers meant that they performed an action that might be considered 
supererogatory by some views as the daughter did more than fulfilling her duty to keep 
her mother safe. However, this is arguable as it may well be considered a duty to pay for 
this extra care under a principle of beneficence in order to relieve her distress at having 
the gas switched off. It also meets the principle of respecting an autonomous wish to 
cook, if this can be established to be present.  In this sense, the decision reflects the four 
principles approach. Nonetheless, it also reflects an ethics of care approach in that it 
looks at a compromise in order to try and remove the dilemma through finding a 
practical alternative. 
Yet, there is a possible fly in the ointment as this proposed solution also engages the 
fourth principle of justice. The principle of justice as outlined by Beauchamp and 
Childress (2013) would argue that Mrs X should not get more than her fair allocation of 
resources. Dementia care requires increasing amounts of resources as the numbers 
with the condition increase. As such the amount of care available is subject to rationing. 
It is possible that the daughter’s decision to pay for extra care could result in other 
people receiving less of this resource due to there being less available overall. Even if 
there are enough carers to provide the extra care, it might still be argued that it is unfair 
that Mrs X gets a higher level of provision merely due to her daughter’s ability to pay. 
Yet this view can be mitigated (at least in the long term) by the ethics of care 
perspective. Recall, that an essential part of the ethics of care, as argued above, was a 
sociopolitical argument to value care by providing support for those who provide and 
receive it. This would mean a reorientation of society’s values to ensure there is enough 
caring resource and that it is available to everyone who requires it. 
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So it seems that the four principles have a viable place in dementia care ethics, at least 
as a decision-making tool. As such, it can be seen as forming a viable element of a 
broader ethical model. 
7.2.4 WEIGHING AND BALANCING OF THE FOUR PRINCIPLES 
As raised above, Beauchamp and Childress (2013) philosophically ground their work 
with the proposal that seemingly diverse philosophical perspectives are in fact 
compatible and actually aiming at the same common morality. At face value this idea is 
an appealing one and such an idea has been suggested by Derek Parfit to be the case for 
consequentialists and Kantians who he describes as ‘climbing the same mountain on 
different sides’ (Parfit 2011: 419) 
Yet, if this idea is to be accepted, then it is important that a common morality is one that 
is inclusive of people with dementia. Beauchamp and Childress’s approach certainly 
owes a significant debt to deontological views and these views have a tendency to 
degrade the moral status of people with dementia.  The principle of respect for 
autonomy relies heavily on how autonomy is understood. Beauchamp and Childress 
themselves take a view of the concept that is likely to exclude at least some people with 
dementia. 
The nature of the four principles framework allows other aspects to be engaged in an 
effort to be more inclusive. Nonetheless a lot, if not everything, rides on how the 
individual with the decision-making power actually weighs and balances these principles. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 20) give the following explanation of weighing and 
balancing in terms of their four principles framework: 
‘Balancing is the process of finding reasons to support beliefs about which moral 
norms should prevail. Balancing is concerned with the relative weights and 
strengths of different moral norms... Accordingly, balancing consists of 
deliberation and judgement about these weights and strengths.’ [my emphasis] 
The process of deliberation and judgement needs to be supported by good reasons, 
though they also suggest that ‘intuitive balancing is one form of balancing.’ (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2013: 20).  In order to ‘allay concerns’ (p22) about the model being too 
intuitive they offer a number of conditions that need to met in order to justify infringing 
one prima facie norm in order to adhere to another. These conditions suggest that good 
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reasons need to be given for overriding a norm in order that the moral objective can be 
achieved; that it can be justified and done with the lowest level of infringement of the 
norm overridden. 
It is worth noting that this strategy of constrained balancing can be used to justify hard 
paternalism, where a fully voluntary and informed choice is overruled. However, this is 
only allowable in Beauchamp and Childress’s (2013: 222) view if the patient is at risk of 
‘significant’ harm, which the paternalistic action will ‘probably prevent’; there is no 
‘morally better’ alternative and the ‘least autonomy-restrictive alternative’ is adopted.  
In the process of deliberation about the right course of action, Beauchamp and Childress 
(2013:22) concede that disagreements between ‘morally committed persons’ may 
persist. This seems to put some pressure on the idea of a common morality. 
Furthermore, it seems to be analogous, if not the same, as debates that occur between 
people who have different theoretical positions in ethical discourse more generally. The 
four principles may act as a good way of describing or categorising these debates but it 
cannot be expected to resolve them. 
The four principles can be weighed and balanced, but they will be weighed and balanced 
by different people differently. The key factor in weighing may well be the character of 
the people who perform the weighing. The example above has shown that an approach 
that is both receptive and based in the ethics of care can work with the four principles 
approach to find a solution. 
Nonetheless, there remains a further possibility. Rather than working to principles it is 
possible to structure decision-making around a consideration of interests of the 
individuals involved. This next section will investigate whether this provides an 
addition avenue for a care provider to employ in dementia care. 
7.3 BALANCING INTERESTS 
The consideration of interests has already been encountered. In earlier chapters, the 
focus was primarily with the interests associated with the moral status of personhood 
or full moral standing. It was the concern about the implications of the potential loss of 
this moral status in severe dementia that has led to a move in recent chapters to find an 
alternative approach. However, this generates the worry that by moving the care 
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recipient’s moral status away from the centre of the ethical picture, it will leave open 
courses of action that arguably should be forbidden. This is perhaps most keenly felt in 
the debate over euthanasia where the interests of society are pitched against the 
protection of the individual with dementia from being killed (Johnstone 2013; Sharp 
2012). However, it can also be seen in less extreme circumstances when people need 
protection from treatment that is deemed not in their (best) interests. 
So this section will see if responding to people’s interests is sufficient to allay concerns 
that might be brought by the loss of the moral status of personhood. An important 
contribution to this discussion can be found in Peter Singer’s principle of equal 
consideration of interests:  
The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interest is that we give 
equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interest of all those affected 
by our actions (Singer 2011: 20) 
Firstly, it is worth noting that Singer (2011) doesn’t abandon the idea of personhood 
altogether. For Singer, being a person adheres to a Lockean definition of the term. As 
outlined in Chapter 3 (3.1) this means being a rational being who is aware of 
his/her/itself as a distinct entity with a past, present and future. Having this capability 
brings different interests and arguably a different moral status. So, initially it appears 
that the original problem has returned. What happens to those who are not able to meet 
these requirements? 
A key difference is that Singer (2011:66) does not wish to ‘place a gulf’ between those 
with and without these capabilities in the same way as with some of the personhood 
theories discussed in earlier chapters. The point for Singer (2011) is that all entities 
have different interests which must be considered equally, regardless of species or any 
other attribute. Personhood merely produces a particular set of interests which can 
then be balanced against the interests of other entities. Personhood is not a special or 
exalted status; it merely generates a set of interests that could still be out-balanced by a 
sufficiently larger number of less weighty interests. 
Another key aspect of this approach is its lack of partiality, and in this way it stands 
somewhat in opposition to the ethics of care approach argued for above. The ethics of 
care approach tends to focus on attention to those near and/or dear to us. It therefore 
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rejects Singer’s argument that we should equally consider the interests of a child who is 
about to starve in a faraway land in the same way we would if a child was about to 
drown in a pond in front of our eyes (Slote 2007; Singer 2011). 
However, this tension between Singer’s approach and that of the ethics of care is not as 
stark as first appears. Slote argues that it is possible to feel empathy for those who are 
not near and dear and furthermore it is desirable for this to be cultivated by moral 
education (Slote 2007). Coming from the other direction Singer points out: 
‘...it would be absurd to propose that from now on we all regard ourselves as 
equally responsible for the welfare of everyone in the world.’ (Singer 2011: 204) 
So there may, after all, be some points of contact between an interest-based approach 
and the care ethics approach, despite the methodology being clearly very different. 
Ultimately, Singer’s approach requires that weighing and balancing occurs in order to 
achieve the best outcome for all interested parties. This brings with it the same problem 
as principlism in that different people will assign different weights to interests and 
therefore balance them differently. An example of balancing interests can be found as a 
component of the ethical framework for dementia from the Nuffield’s Council on 
Bioethics (2009a) 
7.4 THE NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS REPORT 
7.4.1 AUTONOMY AND WELL-BEING INTERESTS 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a) have produced a six component ethical 
framework on ethical issues in dementia care (Appendix B).  
This framework is described as having “...a methodology for approaching ethical 
decisions; beliefs about the nature and impact of dementia; and a set of interlinked 
ethical values.” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009a: 20). 
It was previously discussed in the context of autonomous personhood. Here, it was 
highlighted how the Nuffield Council split the interests of the individual with dementia 
into two aspects: autonomy interests and well-being interests. Autonomy interests, as 
the name suggests, are the interests that people with dementia have in their autonomy 
being respected. However, Nuffield recognise that autonomy is a contested concept and 
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they argue that it needs to be understood in way that is not rationalistic and allows for 
interdependence in relationships. 
Chapter 2 (2.10) found that the Nuffield Council’s approach was in line with a relational 
understanding of autonomy, as they argued that a person’s sense of self should be 
grounded in social and family networks. As such, the Nuffield Council argues that carers’ 
and families’ interests also form part of autonomy interests of individuals with 
dementia.  However, these autonomy interests, as outlined by the Nuffield Council, have 
a wide scope. As well as including the interests of those near and dear, weight is also 
given to autonomy interests by emotional responses. Yet this seems close to the 
definition of the other aspect of interests identified by the Nuffield Council i.e. well-being 
interests, as described here: 
‘A person with dementia clearly has an interest in being helped to maximise their 
well-being, an important aspect of which involves the satisfaction of their desires 
and preferences’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009a: 28) 
As a result it was suggested that if autonomy interests are to include emotional 
responses then they are likely to conflate with at least some well-being interests. 
A reason given by the Nuffield Council for making the distinction is that those who 
believe that autonomy interests no longer apply due to cognitive decline will recognise 
that promoting well-being is still an important aspect. However, it is debatable whether 
those who believe that autonomy is based in rationality will also believe that well-being 
interests alone give sufficient reasons to respect what they might consider irrational 
preferences and desires. On the other hand, those who believe that autonomy can be 
based on non-rational elements such as desire do not need to consider the aspect of 
well-being interests that relates to this at all. 
In the context of the current chapter, taking the focus away from autonomy might help 
to simplify the situation. As a result, the Nuffield Council’s approach might be better 
seen as merely balancing interests without adding the distinction of well-being or 
autonomy. Each interest is then assessed on its merits. For example, people with the 
most severe forms of dementia can feel pain and would have an interest not to feel this, 
even though other interests related to a higher level of cognitive function might have 
fallen away. 
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Though, there is more to Nuffield’s framework than merely balancing interests. The 
framework also brings in the concept of personhood. 
7.4.2 RECOGNISING PERSONHOOD 
Component 6 of the Nuffield Council’s framework entitled ‘recognising personhood, 
identity and value’ states: 
‘The person with dementia remains the same, equally valued, person throughout 
the course of their illness, regardless of the extent of the changes in their 
cognitive and other functions.’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009a: 21) 
The Nuffield Council hopes to hold onto a personhood account in order to protect rights 
and entitlements, but it raises the question of what factors would lead the person with 
dementia to be equally valued. Unlike Singer (2011) above, it is not linked to their 
interest account, which would have meant that personhood itself would have brought a 
particular set of interests to be weighed. Instead it appears that this component needs 
to be seen as a separate issue to component 2 which relates to interests. It is possible 
therefore that a decision based on interests might conflict with any prohibitions based 
on the individual with dementia being a person. 
The Nuffield Council offer two reasons why people with dementia are considered 
persons. The first draws on Jaworska’s (1999) work by stating that the capacity of 
people with dementia to value experiences is indicative of personhood. The second 
states that personhood derives from people’s emotional, spiritual experiences as fellow 
human beings, not merely their cognitive abilities. This second reason is distinct from 
the first and does not necessarily complement it. To have the capacity to value (the first 
reason) requires a cognitive ability. Yet, the second reason argues that personhood 
should not be seen exclusively in terms of cognitive abilities. Nuffield seem to be 
hedging their bets by drawing on as many sources as possible to maintain personhood. 
Earlier chapters of this thesis found significant philosophical difficulties with these 
avenues, a point that appears to be recognised by the Nuffield Council (2009a: 31) when 
they state: 
‘We do not aim to settle these controversies, but simply to offer practical and 
policy guidance regarding ethical issues arising in the care of people with 
dementia. From this perspective we believe that the position that a person 
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retains their identity throughout the course of dementia (even though they may 
behave in profoundly different ways) provides a better guide to policy and 
practice.’ 
So, the belief on which continued identity is founded remains controversial. This may 
well cast some doubt on the authority of the framework to guide practice and policy.  
Furthermore, it does not amend the conclusions made about personhood in earlier 
chapters. 
7.4.3 CASE-BASED REASONING – CASUISTRY AND MORAL PARTICULARLISM 
Another dimension in the Nuffield’s Council’s framework states that decisions need also 
to be made in the context of ‘case based’ reasoning. 
 ‘This methodology has three main stages: identifying and clarifying the relevant 
factual considerations; interpreting and applying appropriate ethical values; and 
comparing with other similar situations.’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009a: 
21) 
The first two stages in component one can easily be made consistent with an approach 
that balances interests. However, the third stage in the approach introduces an element 
of casuistry: 
‘A third feature of sound moral judgments is they often involve comparison with 
other similar cases where it has been clear what is the right thing to do.... In 
other words, one difficult decision can be compared with another decision where 
the issue has already been decided.’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009a: 22) 
Hence another factor to bring in is what has been decided before. However, as the 
Nuffield Council point out, these past decisions may well have to be revised in the 
context of each situation being individual and as such they are not suggesting casuistry 
in the sense that there is no need for ethical reasoning to be applied to the current 
situation. 
This form of strong casuistry is also rejected here. To take a strong casuist view is to 
rely only on past decisions and to eschew the idea of reasoning which is distinctly 
ethical. As Arras (2013) points out, this approach converges with moral particularism 
(Dancy 2006) which argues that reasoning about moral matters is not distinct from 
ordinary reasoning in any way. In other words there is no requirement for notions such 
principles or virtue as a form of moral argument. This approach is rejected due to the 
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seemingly implausible idea that an ethical decision (e.g., I should tell the truth?) can be 
based merely on knowing a collection of facts. There is a need to argue why a particular 
action is right or wrong by employing ethical ideas (e.g., lying is disrespectful or not 
worthy of praise) in order to make a decision. 
Nonetheless, a weaker form of moral particularism does offers a convincing argument 
that such a moral judgement by a virtuous agent cannot be based solely on following 
broad principles or rules (Ridge & McKeever 2007). This idea is in also tune with some 
of the elements described in the ethics of care in the previous chapter. The elements 
here being that a decision needs to be sensitive to context and current ‘facts of the 
matter’ rather than merely relying on moral principles in a rigid and abstract way. 
A weaker form of casuistry has been used throughout this thesis. This is where previous 
cases can be used to inform current judgements rather than determine them. There is 
an argument for a compatibility between the more flexible use of principles and a 
weaker form of casuistry in the sense that principles are highly unlikely to be 
formulated without some reference to past situations and paradigm cases are likely to 
have principles embedded into them (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). 
Drawing on such an approach, The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a: 96-111) apply 
their framework to a number of examples in Chapter 6 ‘Dilemmas in care’, namely the 
use of assistive technologies, freedom of action and risk, sexual relationships, truth-
telling, restraint and abuse. In each of these it is fair to say that the balancing of interests 
is the key factor in the analysis. 
Taking the example of the use of assistive technologies, The Nuffield Council point out 
how they can contribute to a person’s autonomy and well-being interests but also can 
work against them, depending on how they are used. A device that monitors someone’s 
movement is generally justified by an appeal to manage the risk to the individual being 
monitored. The device may be a less restrictive solution to risk management such as a 
locked door or more direct observation. However, the device itself may become a way of 
controlling the movement of the individual in a way that does not promote their 
interests. 
There are also the interests of the care provider to consider. It could be that it is simply 
too much of a strain on the care provider not to seek some technological help. In a care 
Page | 195  
 
home situation this may be due to low staffing levels. In a someone’s own home, it may 
be that, for example, a daughter looking after her mother with dementia who lives in a 
separate part of the house needs the peace of mind of being able to see that she has not 
come to harm. Nonetheless the use of a camera when consent is not possible arguably is 
still an invasion of privacy, even when someone is unable to understand that their 
privacy is being invaded. 
Ultimately, it is not clear how to weigh and balance the various interests of the care 
recipient and the care provider. Making a decision which attempts to maintain 
personhood, along with the need to consider previous decisions adds further 
complexity. As a result, the Nuffield Council’s framework may prove too complex to 
offer options for the care provider. 
7.5 BEST INTERESTS REVISTED 
The Nuffield Council make frequent reference to the concept of best interests which also 
has an important role in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. They point out that best interests 
as understood in the Act takes account of both autonomy and well-being interests.  
Recall that Section 4(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires the person making the 
best-interest decision to consider... 
‘...so far as is reasonably ascertainable— 
(a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any 
relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity),  
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had 
capacity, and  
(c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so. ‘ 
Statements (a) and (b) are related to autonomy, either precedent or present. The other 
factors suggested by statement (c) might be considered to be based in well-being 
interests.  
However, it is worth reiterating that best interests as understood here is not necessarily 
what is best for the individual in a general sense. It may be that to follow a decision that 
respects the person’s wishes, beliefs, values, and other factors he would consider, may 
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not necessarily produce the best outcome in the opinion of others. An example might be 
where somebody has a long standing belief about staying in their own home, even 
though this is now causing significant health and safety concerns. To respect the long-
standing belief would arguably not adhere to Buchanan and Brock’s (1990: 88) 
definition that acting in someone’s best interests means ‘...acting so as to promote 
maximally the good of the individual’ as the good of the individual’s health and safety, or 
quality of life, may be deemed to outweigh the good of respecting his/her choice. 
Best interests in the sense outlined by Buchanan and Brock is much closer to (if not 
synonymous with) the concept of hard paternalism.  Beauchamp and Childress (2013: 
218) suggest that ‘...in hard paternalism the intended beneficiary does not accept the 
values used to define his or her own best interests.’ Though they point out that in soft 
paternalism ‘...the intended beneficiary’s conception of his or her best interests...’ 
(p218) is reflected in the decision. 
Both these understandings of best interests meet difficulties in how they might be 
ascertained by the care provider or decision-maker. This is particularly the case if the 
decision-maker is a member of a professional group who may have certain beliefs about 
what constitutes someone’s best interests or have their own interests invested in 
particular outcomes (Tuckett 2006). Despite the Mental Capacity Act being a piece of 
legislation that seeks to promote autonomy, Williams (2014 et al: 84) found that the 
outcome of best interests decisions tended to focus on managing risk and ‘[i]t was only 
on rare occasions that the outcome of a best interests decision resulted in an individual 
achieving greater independence.’ 
It is difficult to resolve the tension between a legal and ethical approach. The law seeks 
a clear decision to be made in someone’s best interest that can then be applied. 
Ethicists, on the other hand, may take a more flexible view of what might be meant by 
such a term. 
Nonetheless, the idea that the ‘best’ outcome can be objectively determined is not alien 
to ethical schools of thought. Namely, consequentialism takes such an approach though 
it is does so in a way that looks beyond the interests of individuals. 
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7.6 CONSEQUENTIALISM 
7.6.1 OUTLINE OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 
Darwall (2003:1) sums up what makes consequentialism distinctive as an ethical 
approach: 
‘Consequentialism begins with the idea that there are values that are prior to 
morality. Even if there were no moral right and wrong, some things would still 
be good and others bad. 
... 
What makes the values nonmoral … is that they involve evaluations of outcomes 
or states rather than distinctively moral evaluations of agency or character.’ 
So, for consequentialism, the best outcome is the one that maximises desired 
values and minimizes undesired ones, regardless of the nature of the actions 
involved. As Singer points (2011: 2) actions are only assessed in terms of how 
they further particular goals. 
‘Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals. They assess actions 
by the extent to which they further these goals.’ 
For example, it could be advanced that it would be better to have less coercion in the 
world regardless of the actions that bring this about (Parfit 1984). The goal of less 
coercion is a desirable one. However, in achieving that outcome, consequentialism 
would allow individuals to be coerced and it would be acceptable to coerce them, just as 
long as the end result sees a reduction in coercion in the world overall. An example 
might be the state using coercion to prevent a particularly coercive individual from 
behaving in coercive ways towards others. 
As such, standard consequentialism promotes values in an agent-neutral way rather 
than honouring values relative to the agent (Pettit 1997; Nagel 1988; Parfit 1984).  This 
means that outcomes are assessed as a state of affairs which people wish to promote 
rather than honouring a value relative to the agent in a particular situation. 
This can also be illustrated in the example of being loyal to friends (eg. Darwall 2003). It 
is reasonable to state the premise that the world is a better place when friends are loyal 
to each other and they are not betrayed. However, the agent-neutral approach states 
there may be times when it is better to betray a friend. This is because it is possible that 
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the act of betraying one’s friend would make it less likely that others would do the same 
(perhaps due to witnessing the horror of the betrayal) and as a result there would be 
less friend-betraying in the world overall. Here, the value of loyalty is neither promoted 
relative to this agent nor honoured overall but it is promoted agent-neutrally. The fact 
that an individual believes it is wrong to betray his/her own friend is not relevant if the 
sole aim is to reduce the number of friends being betrayed overall. 
The permission to betray a friend in order to increase loyalty appears a more counter-
intuitive result than the coercion example as having an eye to the greater good does not 
seem to defend such an action. It highlights a problem in classical consequentialism that 
individuals can be unjustly disadvantaged in this way. Other forms of consequentialism 
seek to avoid this problem. Though, all consequentialist theories share the commitment 
to promoting one or more agent-neutral values, they can be differentiated based on 
whether it is the consequences of the individual act that is relevant or the consequences 
of certain rules being followed. 
7.6.2 RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM AND CONTRACTUALISM 
In rule consequentialism, the aim is to promote desirable states of affairs by the use of 
rules. Unlike act-consequentialism described above, these rules can be based on agent-
relative concerns. Such a concern would be the one raised above that it is wrong to 
betray friends but also wrong to betray my friend. Rules relative to the agent are 
allowed just as long as these rules are able to promote states that are more valuable in 
an agent-neutral sense (Darwall 2003).  
So, a rule consequentialist would say that having a rule that forbids betrayal of friends 
produces a more positive state of affairs than not having this rule. As such, it would be 
forbidden to betray a friend, even if, for some reason, betraying a friend would in this 
particular case mean that there is more loyalty produced overall. 
Even though following a rule-consequentialist decision procedure will not guarantee 
the best consequences for each act in the way an act-consequentialist one aims to do; it 
is argued that better consequences will be produced in the long term by following rules 
rather than trying to calculate the best outcomes on a ‘case-by-case basis’. This is 
because people can make mistakes predicting outcomes of their acts or have skewed 
beliefs about the benefits being brought by their decisions (Hooker 2011; Parfit 2011). 
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Having a decision procedure based on rule consequentialism has the advantage of 
removing some of the possible errors or excessive behaviour that might be produced by 
attempting to act in every situation to maximise a particular value. It also seems 
intuitively right to prohibit people from acts such as betrayal, even if a betrayal in 
certain circumstances might produce a better outcome for loyalty overall. It is more 
acceptable to act within rules that others would generally agree promotes the greater 
good in such situations, even if for some reason it would actually not produce the best 
consequences in a particular case. The argument follows that society appears better off 
overall when people follow rules or principles, rather than merely focussing on 
outcomes. 
Following this approach, Hooker proposes the following formulation for rule 
consequentialism: 
‘…what makes an act morally permissible is that the act is permitted by the code 
of rules whose more or less universal acceptance would produce the best 
consequences, impartially considered.’ (Hooker 2014: 40) 
Rule consequentialism requires that rules once accepted are followed, rather than the 
agent acting with an aim to promote a particular value in each instance. This 
formulation may also be aligned with public acceptance rule consequentialism (Sinnot-
Armstrong 2014) and a similar formulation can be found in Brandt (1965). 
This emphasis on public acceptance has some similarity with Scanlon’s (1998) version 
of contractualism which says that an act is wrong if it is allowed by a principle that a 
person could reasonably reject. Developing this thought, a possible convergence 
between a Kantian form of contractualism, rule consequentialism and a principle-based 
ethics has been suggested by Parfit (2011: 412-413) in his Triple Theory as outlined 
below. 
‘An act is wrong if and only if, or just when, such acts are disallowed by some 
principle that is 
one of the principles whose being universal laws would make things go best, 
one of the only principles whose being universal laws everyone could rationally 
will, 
and 
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a principle that no one could reasonably reject.’ 
So, for Parfit what is fundamental is the claim that an act is wrong only when it is 
disallowed by a principle that will make things go best overall and can be both willed by 
all and cannot be reasonably objected to. This result is significant here as it creates a 
conceptual link between rule consequentialism and a principlist approach discussed 
earlier in the chapter. 
7.6.3 APPLYING RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM TO DEMENTIA CARE 
Consider the following situation.  
A woman with moderately advanced dementia on a dementia care unit is 
disturbing other people by shouting out loudly. The care providers have 
employed a number of strategies to try and establish what is causing the woman 
to shout. Some of these are successful for a short time but currently this is not 
effective. After a number of hours, the other people with dementia are starting to 
get increasingly upset by the noise. The woman making the noise is able to walk 
and does not wish to stay in her room. However, a number staff would prefer to 
keep her in her room as this contains the noise sufficiently to prevent it from 
disturbing other people. 
The staff who, against the wishes of the woman, would rather keep her in her room may 
look to justify their decision by appealing to the good that results overall. The value they 
hope to maximise would be the reduction in distress for the other people on the unit. 
This would need to be balanced with the distress caused to the woman by restricting 
her liberty but they may believe that this is outweighed by the reduction in distress to 
others affected. 
Yet, this justification draws on act consequentialist reasoning that has already been 
criticised above. So in order to frame this decision within a rule consequentialist 
framework a rule such as the following could be employed: 
It is only permitted to restrict somebody’s liberty to reduce the distress of others 
if there is a likelihood that this distress will be severe and there is no reasonable 
alternative. 
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As discussed, both Parfit (2011) and Hooker (2014) draw on the idea that rules need to 
aim for universal acceptance, not just within discrete societies or particular situations. 
Is this plausible for this rule? There may be disagreement. Restricting someone’s liberty 
is a serious matter and the proposed principle recognises that liberty can be restricted if 
the likelihood of distress is severe and there is no reasonable alternative. Yet this begs 
the question of what makes an alternative unreasonable and how severe the potential 
distress has to be in order to warrant a restriction of liberty. Can this be measured? 
People may disagree about how much distress is needed before a restriction of liberty 
can be justified. The idea that people can have their liberty restricted too lightly may in 
itself cause distress across society, due to a fear of liberty being restricted without 
sufficient justification. 
Assuming the principle is valid and meets the triple theory criteria outlined by Parfit, 
the problem remains that a value such as liberty may be incommensurable with a value 
such as reduction of others’ distress (Sinnot-Armstrong 2014; Egglestone 2007). In 
short the rule may be valid but how it is applied is still open to interpretation and it is 
difficult (arguably impossible) to find rules clear enough not to be. 
7.7 FROM RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM TOWARDS A COMBINED MODEL 
The process of formulating rules for a society to follow is neither straightforward nor 
uncontroversial. Despite the best efforts of consequentialist reasoning, what the content 
of these rules should be and how they might be internalised remains unclear. 
Furthermore, the intractable problem remains of what should be done when two 
seemingly compelling rules conflict (Egglestone 2007). 
One answer is to draw on the suggestion of Brandt (1965: 228) that when there is no 
clear priority between two applicable but competing rules then it is necessary ‘…to take 
whatever course of action would leave morally well-trained people least dissatisfied.’ 
This is significant here as this ‘remainder-rule’ implies the idea that it is sometimes 
necessary to following exemplars, as well as suggesting that a feeling of satisfaction is 
relevant in the decision.  This echoes the arguments that can be found in the discussion 
of virtue ethics and the ethics of care in the final chapters of this thesis. 
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So, drawing together the contemporary work of Slote (2013) and Parfit (2011) a 
formulation can be produced. The consequentialist discussion has ultimately returned 
back to the idea of a virtuous (or morally well-trained) individual. A good care provider 
will respond based on their good character and, in particular, a well-developed virtue of 
receptivity that seeks to identify with how the individual might be feeling and what they 
might prefer. 
There are times when a more structured approach will be required in order to assist the 
care provider with their aspiration to act ethically. It is concluded here that such an 
approach can indeed be based on an assessment of relevant moral principles as well as 
the preferences and feelings of those involved.  
It is further concluded that the best approach for this is the Triple Theory as described 
above. This is mainly due to it having a firm conceptual basis in rule consequentialism 
and contractualism. Beauchamp and Childress’s (2013) four principles might be 
expected to produce similar results. As discussed, the four principles are based on 
prima-facie duties, which are expected to lead indirectly to the morally right solution. 
Overall, it is important to emphasise that the principles are merely there to provide a 
range of acceptable options for the care provider. How the options are then prioritised, 
and which courses of action are chosen, will depend on how values are balanced. Good 
character is the ultimate arbiter. Furthermore, how the chosen option is carried out, is 
based on receptivity in character of the care provider who will empathise with the 
thoughts and feelings of those affected as well as the broader context of sociopolitical 
context of the decision. 
So, returning to the example above, it is necessary to be receptive both to the 
preferences and feelings brought by situation for all the parties involved. The woman 
concerned has a desire to move around the ward but the distress of others from her 
noise is also evident. The people involved feel a pressure to ‘do something’ to improve 
the situation and as care providers in a clinical situation they have the power to do so. 
The care providers need to make a receptive decision. In order to guide this, they may 
well have in mind a rule consequentialist principle such as the one above that it is only 
permitted to restrict somebody’s liberty to reduce the distress of others if there is a 
likelihood that this distress will be severe and there is no reasonable alternative. So, 
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with this principle in mind, the care providers should explore all reasonable alternatives 
in order to prevent the woman’s liberty being restricted. Negotiation with the woman 
may be possible to some extent depending on the level of cognitive impairment and the 
strength of the relationship between the woman and the individual care providers. 
Nonetheless, whether the alternatives are reasonable is a matter of judgement. Perhaps 
finding an alternative larger space for the woman to make the noise is reasonable as it 
requires less of a restriction of liberty than being confined to a small room. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that the problem behaviour does not cause distress severe 
enough for even a more limited restriction of liberty such as this. 
The care providers need to be guided by their virtue in carrying out an action that is 
both acceptable and will bring positive feelings to others. This would probably mean 
being as gentle as possible within the limits of still preventing what is perceived as 
unacceptable distress to others. Furthermore, there is also the broader context to 
consider such as finding a way that the situation can be avoided in future, perhaps by a 
change of environment where the woman would be able to make noise without 
disturbing others, or by seeking a situation where the woman is happier and no longer 
feels the need to shout out. 
The good character of each of the care providers will be reflected in the actions they 
carry out and these actions will bring positive feelings to other receptive individuals 
observing his/her actions. In this example, it is proposed that a compassionate 
approach which seeks to engage on an emotional level with all concerned while 
following a principle of least restrictive care is most likely to elicit such a response. 
7.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter marks the end of the philosophical investigation. An answer can now be 
proposed as to which philosophical approach provides the best foundation for the 
ethics of dementia care. This will be outlined in the form of an ethical model that is 
informed primarily by the ethics of care which is both sensitive to sociopolitical context 
and is connected to a virtue ethics approach grounded in the virtue of receptivity. 
Within this, the current chapter has found a compatible role for a decision-making 
framework, which is based on the contemplation of principles that adhere to Parfit’s 
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Triple Theory. The next chapter will outline the structure of this model and begin the 
work of how this model might be used as a tool for ethical leadership to improve the 
situation for those receiving and providing dementia care. 
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8 A NEW ETHICAL MODEL FOR DEMENTIA CARE AND ITS 
APPLICATION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
How to respond to increasing numbers of people with dementia is an urgent concern for 
society. Though there has been some progress in reducing dementia incidence in recent 
years, estimates still suggest that the numbers of people with dementia will double 
worldwide in a generation (Prince et al 2015; Banerjee 2013). 
As discussed in this thesis, dementia presents a particular challenge in terms of 
formulating an ethical response for care. This is because the progress of the condition 
affects many of the attributes on which ethical thinking might usually be founded. 
Dementia also raises questions about personal identity and what it is that we value in 
fellow human beings. 
It has been recognised elsewhere that philosophy has a central role to play in bioethics 
(Savulescu 2015). In line with others in the field such as Hughes (2011a), the case has 
been further advanced that philosophy can help people make better ethical decisions in 
dementia care. This thesis has examined a wide range of philosophical ideas in an effort 
to establish which approach provides the best foundation for the ethics of dementia 
care. It has also examined critically the philosophical underpinnings of pre-existing 
frameworks, the most prominent of which are person-centred care (Kitwood 1997), the 
four principles approach (Beauchamp and Childress 2013) and the ethical framework 
from the Nuffield Council of Bioethics (2009a). The research question has been 
investigated away from the constraints of professional categories, instead applying to 
everyone who provides care to someone with dementia. 
The result of this investigation has been to establish a novel and rigorous way of 
understanding the ethics of dementia care drawing on these philosophical influences. In 
this chapter the proposed ethical model for dementia care will be outlined, along with a 
discussion of how it can be applied. 
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8.2 SUMMARY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES EXAMINED 
8.2.1 AUTONOMOUS PERSONHOOD 
Personhood is a term closely associated with the new culture of dementia care (Kitwood 
1997); however, it is variously understood.  For this thesis, personhood has been 
understood as an evaluative term meaning that the holder has the full moral status 
associated with persons, which brings with it particular protections and entitlements 
(Jaworska 1999; Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2013).  
The aim of the first section of this thesis was to establish how this moral status might be 
grounded for people with dementia in order assess the viability of an ethical model 
developed with personhood as its central element. It was initially investigated whether 
autonomy in the care receiver is sufficient to ground the moral status of personhood. If 
successful then an ethics based on the autonomous personhood (Christman 2015) of the 
receiver of dementia care would have been possible. 
Autonomy is considered by some scholars to have been a dominant force in recent legal 
and ethical thinking in the Western World (Foster 2009). This is also reflected in the 
area of dementia care. It can be seen in legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
and in the emphasis in policy on the promotion of independence and individualism in 
the area (Nolan et al 2004).  
Analysis of the concept revealed that in order for autonomy, understood in a standard 
way, to ground personhood, it must include the ability to reflect on immediate 
preferences in terms of one’s values for life as whole. This is because choices made 
without such reflection are too open to challenge to carry the necessary moral weigh. It 
was argued that the necessary level of reflection is unlikely to be possible for people 
with more advanced forms of dementia, and, as such, autonomy understood in a 
standard way would not suffice to ground personhood for individuals in this situation. 
So other avenues were explored to investigate how autonomy could be modified in 
order that it might ground personhood for people with more advanced dementia. A 
commonly proposed solution is to use precedent autonomy (Dworkin 1986), where an 
autonomous choice of an individual from the past remains applicable when the 
individual is no longer considered capable of exercising autonomy. This is the 
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philosophical concept which underpins various types of advance directives, such as 
advance decisions used in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
It was argued that precedent autonomy requires a social view of autonomy linked to a 
narrative personal identity in order for it to do the work of maintaining autonomous 
personhood. This is because there is not a sufficient psychological connection between a 
past and present self in order to maintain personal identity in the usual way.  
However, this social view brings philosophical problems due to the risk that the beliefs 
and interests of the social group around the individual will overwhelm the individual 
self and the person’s narrative rather than maintaining autonomy in a genuine way. In 
addition, there remain practical problems of accurately applying someone’s past wishes 
to a present situation. All this leads to the risk that the current individual will be subject 
to treatment that is not from the surviving autonomous will of the current individual to 
whom it being applied. It is concluded that the controversy over the moral authority of 
advance directives remains unresolved. 
Though, it is not concluded that autonomy is therefore irrelevant. For many with 
dementia, it is valid concern and respecting preferences, whether fully autonomous or 
not can form a prima facie principle in ethical decision making. The argument here is 
that autonomy needs to be put in context as an important but not a central all-
encompassing value for dementia care. 
8.2.2 PERSONHOOD MORE BROADLY UNDERSTOOD 
The discussion moves on to consider how personhood might be understood in a way 
that is not reliant on autonomy. It was hoped that this might provide a more inclusive 
route to the moral status of personhood. 
Following an exploration of various academic views on personhood it is suggested that 
it is possible to have a form of personhood based on self-conscious valuing (Harris 
1985) for all except those with the most severe dementia; the criteria being less 
stringent than the requirements for autonomous personhood. However, the presence of 
self-consciousness is more doubtful for people with severe dementia, due to a further 
reduction in psychological capacities. There is some evidence that a basic sense of 
identity based on a simpler form of consciousness continues into severe dementia 
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(Eustache et al 2013). Yet, if personhood is founded on simpler forms of consciousness 
then this approach produces a demanding moral vision. This is because, in order to be 
consistent with a purely psychological view, it must extend prima-facie protections and 
entitlements to non-human animals with similar psychological abilities. 
A reasonable response is to imagine personhood as something that can be a matter of 
degree rather than all or nothing (DeGrazia 2008). Linking this to the notion of prima 
facie duties, it can then be proposed that people with different levels of personhood will 
incur different prima facie duties from a care provider. Yet there are practical 
difficulties with trying to assign entitlements/ protections/ duties to those with ‘lesser’ 
forms of personhood. It becomes a line drawing exercise that is liable to disagreement 
and controversy. 
Therefore, as with autonomy, there’s an apparent need to explore views modified to be 
inclusive of dementia. Kitwood’s (1997) view of personhood is undoubtedly the most 
influential, and has had a profound effect on dementia care. Hughes’s Situated 
Embodied Agency view (2001; 2011) also presents a view of personhood for dementia 
that is both plausible and positive for people with more severe dementia. However, each 
view has philosophical difficulties in terms of how they define personhood.  
Kitwood’s view of personhood relies on others bestowing the status on the individual 
with dementia. This may work within the context of a positive environment where 
people are willing to bestow personhood in this way. However, this may not be case in 
all situations. If those caring for people with dementia do not wish to bestow 
personhood on them, there is no argument in Kitwood that obligates them to do so in 
terms of moral status. Hughes’ view aims to overcome the flaws in this and other social 
constructivist positions of personhood. However, the position generated is not an 
argument for moral status. It is, instead, a phenomenological position, which ultimately 
reflects a more promising approach for an ethical model to take. 
8.2.3 DIGNITY, EXISTENTIAL AND SPIRITUAL VIEWS 
Due to the practical and philosophical difficulty basing an ethical model on autonomous 
personhood and personhood more broadly understood, the idea that it might be 
grounded on a dignity of humanity (not necessarily tied to these concepts) was 
explored. 
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It was suggested that in common use the term ‘person’ might mean something different 
to the standard philosophical use of the term, and that dignity may be the key to this. 
Yet, when analysed as a theoretical concept, dignity was hard to delineate. It was not 
possible to fully differentiate subjective forms of dignity from autonomy. Objective 
forms of dignity which aim to delineate the concept independently of someone’s 
subjective experience (Gallagher 2004) were found to be more promising. However, 
they remained culturally relative, in that an objective view of what dignity is for a 
human being is sensitive to cultural values. 
Nonetheless, dignity is a powerful notion in care, which for many who use the term is 
based on an intuitive understanding of how fellow human beings ought to be treated. 
This line of argument on the substance of such intuitions led to an exploration of 
existential views and the importance of the body. This is again in tune with the views 
expressed by J.C. Hughes (2013: 356) who states that judgement in dementia care is 
‘…based on feelings akin to an aesthetic sense of what is right.’ 
This begins a shift in philosophical approach. Care providers need to use their ability to 
feel, making aesthetic judgements rather than merely drawing on their ability to make 
reasoned judgements from facts presented. Decisions are not made solely in terms of 
obligations generated by the situation and attributes of the human being who is cared 
for. Emotions brought by factors such as empathy for the vulnerability of the other can 
generate a positive ethical response in the care provider, rather than that vulnerability 
being perceived in the context of a loss of capabilities. As such, the end of the chapter 
marks the beginning of the move away from a focus on moral status of the care recipient 
towards the experience and inner life of care providers, both emotionally and 
psychologically in the caring relationship. 
8.2.4 VULNERABILITY AND VIRTUE 
Virtue ethics looks to the development of character as the central concern in the moral 
life. This chapter further developed the argument that there is an opportunity to 
cultivate good moral character in care providers through an understanding of the 
vulnerabilities that we all share in some degree as human beings. This is also guided by 
moral education and by emulating other virtuous characters in life and literature. In line 
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with Sellman (2011) it was argued that our teachers are all around us and that we can 
cultivate virtue in various ways. 
A number of virtues were considered relevant for dementia care providers such as 
trustworthiness, compassion and courage. It became clear that these and other virtues 
may conflict. In order to try and solve this problem, classical Aristotelian virtue ethics 
relies heavily on the more intellectual notion of practical wisdom and aims for human 
perfection though the doctrine of the mean and the unity of the virtues. Yet, ultimately, 
Aristotelian virtue ethics was not found compelling due to this emphasis on intellectual 
prowess. 
Instead, it was argued that the virtue of receptivity proposed by Slote (2015; 2013) 
should be the central virtue for dementia care. This virtue aims to develop empathy in 
order to identify with the experience of others and respond in a way that reflects this. 
This is part of a move by Slote to rethink both rationalistic Enlightenment values and 
the perfectionist tendencies found in Aristotelian virtue ethics. As such, an essential part 
of developing receptivity is to recognise and accept the limitations of ourselves and 
those around us. Slote argues that receptivity moves us beyond a reliance on rationality 
to value also the non-rationality in human life 
It follows that exemplars of receptivity will not be aiming for perfection, even in 
receptivity itself, as they know that is an unobtainable aim and will in fact distance 
themselves from those they hope to inspire. Moral education from the perspective of 
receptivity is more of an empathic and emotional process than an intellectual one. 
Overall, the argument of this chapter concurs with Slote (2015; 2013) when he states 
that a combination of rationality and empathy are necessary for us to have a full 
appreciation of the good life in virtue ethical terms. 
8.2.5 THE ETHICS OF CARE, EMOTION AND THE ROLE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL JUSTICE 
The ethics of care brings a number of elements to the ethical model that is now 
beginning to take shape. It values emotions and it is therefore in line with the strategy of 
aspiring to a virtue of receptivity. 
Through the work of theorists such as Tronto (1993) and Kittay (1999), the ethics of 
care also brings a sociopolitical context to the ethical decisions being made. This raises 
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the idea that care providers need to be supported to care and caring as a whole is 
something that needs to be valued by society at large. This is also reflected in the way 
that contextual factors, which might be considered irrelevant by more reductionist ways 
of ethical thinking, are seen as an essential part of finding the best way forward in the 
ethics of care. As such, it is also more likely to seek compromise rather than sticking to 
polarised positions. Examples in the main body of the thesis have shown how this 
strategy fits well with ethical decision making in dementia care. 
8.2.6 BALANCING PRINCIPLES AND INTERESTS 
A case has been made for both an ethics of care and virtue ethics playing a key role in 
the ethics of dementia care. Nonetheless, taking an approach that relies solely on the 
character of the care provider to produce ethical care is open to criticism. 
The ethics of care suggests that care providers need to feel their way through complex 
situations in order to respond appropriately. However, in order to respond to the 
competing ethical demands brought by multifaceted situations, a decision-making 
framework may be needed to offer guidance to the care provider who is trying to act in 
a caring and receptive manner. As such, a more structured and rationalistic approach 
offers broadly acceptable options to inform the judgement of the care provider. 
The aim of this chapter was therefore to consider the merits of a framework which 
seeks to establish and balance principles and interests, and whether this can be 
compatible with the approach argued for above. On examination it was found that 
principlist approaches such as the framework of Beauchamp and Childress (2013) can 
indeed be made compatible with both a virtue ethics and ethics of care approach. The 
role of virtue comes to the fore in terms of how the principles are balanced. 
Ultimately it was argued that that it is best to base the principles on the Triple Theory of 
Parfit (2011), which incorporates elements of consequentialism and contractualism. 
This somewhat surprising result means that principles should be formulated both in 
terms a consequentialist measure of what would make things go best, but also they 
must be universally willable and be principles that nobody can reasonably reject. 
Actions are wrong if they are disallowed by such principles. 
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The purpose of the principles is therefore to present broadly acceptable option/s to the 
care provider. How the options are prioritised and which courses of action are chosen 
will depend on how the values within the principles are balanced. This judgement is 
based on character of the care provider and it is argued that receptivity will assist with 
this judgement as it will enable the care provider to empathise with the thoughts and 
feelings of those affected, as well as the broader sociopolitical context in making the 
decision. 
8.3 THE ETHICAL MODEL 
So the final model is pluralistic in terms of drawing together a number of philosophical 
influences: 
Figure 4 – A new ethical model for dementia care 
 
There are three main elements: sociopolitical justice and mutuality; principles and the 
emulation of exemplars of receptivity. 
Based in the ethics of care perspective, sociopolitical justice and mutuality provides 
support for other aspects of the ethical model. For the ethical situation being 
considered, it asks questions such as:  What is the context of the relationship between 
the care provider and recipient? How might the political or social situation be changed 
to alleviate difficult ethical situations? Which courses of action might allow for both care 
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providers and recipients to feel fairly treated and cared for? Is negotiation possible? Can 
a compromise be reached? 
The mutuality and sociopolitical context base of the model reflects the position that care 
is not merely a private concern between individuals or within families. Caring is an 
essential part of society and needs to be valued as such, with those carrying it out being 
supported in order that everyone can survive and thrive (Kittay 1999; Tronto 1993).  
This context is relevant at a macro level in terms of overall political and policy decision 
making, but also at the level of organisations or individuals. The latter is more likely to 
be within the sphere of influence of the individual care provider. 
As discussed above, each ethical decision needs to be made based on a broader 
understanding of this sociopolitical context. The ethics of care approach also seeks 
wider information about those concerned rather than merely taking a reductionist 
approach.  This is shown on the model by the context feeding into the judgement made 
by the care provider/s. 
Decisions (ideally) should be made in a way that leaves both the care provider and 
recipient feeling fairly treated and cared for. This should involve negotiation (Brannelly 
2006) and if an impasse is reached, a compromise may be needed.  This element is also 
represented graphically in the model. 
 The model shows how acceptable options are presented to the care provider/s by 
utilising principles in order for their judgement to be employed and a caring response 
made. As discussed, it is proposed here that Parfit’s (2011) Triple Theory produces a 
stronger conceptual foundation for principles than other approaches. 
Based in the virtue ethics perspective of Slote (2013), the model puts the virtue of 
receptivity as the central virtue for the care provider to cultivate. This perspective seeks 
to understand the world of the individual who is receiving care, both in terms of what 
they are feeling and also their thoughts and preferences.  
As the model also shows, the option/s presented by the Triple Theory principles 
combine with the approval from exemplars of receptivity in order for a sound 
judgement based in receptivity to be made. In virtue ethics, some emotions are more 
praiseworthy than others depending on the situation. It is the most praiseworthy 
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intentions and their associated actions which will gain the approval of virtuous 
exemplars. 
In practice it is envisioned that this component will often be as a result of the care 
provider imagining what a particular exemplar might do in a particular situation. This 
may be produced by the care provider asking questions such as:  
What would my chosen exemplar think and do in such a situation?  
Or perhaps by asking more generic questions, such as: 
What would a good care provider think and do in such a situation?  
 If I am to be the good provider that I aspire to be then what do I need to think 
and do? 
Another factor to consider is the agency of the individual with dementia themselves and 
this is represented on the model by an arrow directly linking the care recipient with the 
response. The model already reflects that negotiation and compromise may well be 
necessary. As has been discussed in earlier chapters, the amount that the individual 
with dementia can contribute to the response will vary depending on the level of 
cognitive impairment brought by the condition. 
It is useful at this point to refer back figure 3 outlined in Chapter 2 (2.7). Here a flow 
chart was devised to show what needs to be in place either for an individual to exercise 
autonomy themselves or to be helped to do so. If the individual is free, willing and able 
to act with autonomy then the care provider has little or no role at all. Arguably this is 
no longer an act of care if the action has been carried out completely independently, and 
as such may well fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is also possible that although the autonomous choice has been made by the 
care receiver, at least some assistance is required by a care provider in order to 
facilitate the act. If the individual with dementia retains autonomous personhood, then 
principles, such as those generated by the Triple Theory, are likely to protect him/her 
from a response that is paternalistic from the care provider. The model is extended to 
show how someone with dementia who has autonomous personhood can make better 
ethical decisions. As represented by the dotted lines this would also involve virtuous 
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exemplars and working within principles. This recognises that a person with dementia 
may well retain moral agency while requiring some care, and it follows that the care 
receiver (and other affected parties) can benefit in the active application of the ethical 
model. 
8.4 APPLICATION USING A SIMPLER VERSION OF THE ETHICAL MODEL 
The ethical model needs to be useable for a wide range of care providers, not just 
professionals or those with an academic interest in moral philosophy. For this reason a 
second version of the ethical model has been formulated, which uses more ordinary 
language and is set out in a more user-friendly way. 
Figure 5 How ethical decisions can be made in dementia care 
 
The key elements remain the same and can be mapped onto the academic model 
outlined in Figure 4 above: 
Attempt to find a solution through negotiation. This reflects the ethical idea argued 
for in the feminist ethics of care tradition that negotiation, and perhaps compromise, is 
something that may be sought if it offers a practical way of solving an ethical challenging 
situation (Brannelly 2006). 
Build a society that supports care providers to care. It may not be directly within the 
sphere of influence of the care provider to change the political situation. However, 
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awareness of this idea is important as it allows the care provider to put care into 
context as a concern for society not merely a private arrangement between individuals. 
Consider the effect of the setting, power and relationships on the decision. As 
Tronto (1993:155) suggests, resolving problems with care requires a ‘more equal access 
to power’. The setting for care also affects the care produced. For example, in an 
institution such as a hospital or care home there will be certain policy or legal 
considerations that need to be taken into account. At the micro level, relationships may 
or may not be positive for the care receiver, in terms of generating a sensitive (and 
receptive) care response. 
What is acceptable based on a principle such as the Golden Rule? The adaption of 
this part of the model reflects the fact that not everyone who makes decisions as a care 
provider will be able to (or wish to) draw on Parfit’s Triple Theory for guidance. 
Beauchamp and Childress’s (2013) four principles approach may act a useful 
framework for producing acceptable options. However, in order to be as inclusive as 
possible this simpler model assumes only that people consider the most basic principle 
of morality, the Golden Rule. 
In its most basic form, The Golden Rule can be formulated as  
Treat others as we would want others to treat us. 
Philosophically a number of objections might be levelled at this basic form, mainly due 
to its ambiguity which could lead might lead to partial judgements. Some of these can be 
resolved by the following formulation: 
‘We ought to treat everyone [including how we treat ourselves] as we would 
rationally be willing to be treated if we were going to be in all of these people’s 
positions, and would be relevantly like them.’ (Parfit 2011: 327) 
Nonetheless, it may not be necessary to add this complication. As Parfit (2011: 330) 
points out, despite objections that might be levelled: 
‘.. this [Golden] rule may provide what is psychologically the most effective way 
of making us more impartial, and morally motivating us.’ 
 The key point here is that such a principle signposts acceptable options. It is unlikely to 
offer definitive answers. For example, we could ask ourselves whether we would want 
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to be lied to and many of us would say no; however, some of us might also say that we 
would want to be protected from the truth if it causes us severe distress. As a result, we 
need to decide, and an empathic response can be enhanced by emulating other 
empathic persons we admire as good care providers. 
What would an empathic person I admire do? This question aims to elicit the 
emulation of exemplars using more ordinary language. Ideally, the person admired will 
demonstrate receptivity as a virtue, as well as having high levels of empathy. 
What do I think and feel is best? This reflects the central role of both feelings and 
preferences as used in the academic model above. 
What do the care receiver/s think and feel is best? As with the academic model the 
thoughts and preferences of care receivers are central to producing a receptive (or in 
less academic language) a sensitive care response. As has been discussed in depth in 
this thesis, the cognitive element may become less prominent as dementia becomes 
more severe. Nonetheless, it is still possible to be receptive to preferences and feelings. 
All of this culminates in the aim to care in a way that is both principled and sensitive to 
the care receiver’s perspective. 
As with the academic model, some lines are dotted signifying how someone with 
dementia, who is still able to exercise moral agency, would fit into the model. As before, 
the person with dementia would need to draw on the same factors as their care 
providers in order for their actions to be an ethical response to the problem relating to 
their own care. 
8.5 CONCRETE EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION OF THE ETHICAL MODEL 
Chapter 1 outlined a range of everyday ethical issues that have been highlighted in the 
literature. A number of these have been discussed in the thesis. In order to aid further 
understanding, the ethical model can now be applied to some further examples. 
8.5.1 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
Care providers may use electronic surveillance measures such as tagging, tracking 
devices and cameras in order to manage risk while promoting benefits for both the care 
receiver and those providing care. Niemeijer et al (2010) carried out a systematic 
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literature of surveillance technologies in residential care. They found that the use of 
such technologies to manage risk and reduce care provider burden needs to be balanced 
with concerns that the care receiver might have about being monitored or watched. 
Privacy, stigma and the risk of losing human contact have also been raised as issues of 
serious concern to care receivers (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009a; 2009b; 
Niemeijer et al 2015; Welsh et al 2003) 
Justifications can be applied on both sides of the argument. For example, a device that 
enables someone to safely go out could be viewed as something which promotes liberty 
in the sense that it allows that individual a greater freedom to move safely. On the other 
hand, the fact that a device such as a tag has to be worn can be seen as stigmatising and 
restrictive of freedom, even when the non-technological alternative involves care 
providers using more physically restrictive interventions to maintain safety (Niemeijer 
et al 2015). 
Consider the example of Joe. He has moderately advanced dementia which leads 
to him putting himself at risk in the home environment. Joe lives in a small flat 
attached to the main house where his daughter and main care provider, Nerys, 
resides. Nerys is worried about Joe’s safety in his flat. She is concerned he might 
fall or otherwise injure himself. She is also worried that he is throwing food away 
as he seems to losing weight despite apparently eating the meals that she 
provides him.  
As Nerys does not wish to spend all of her time in her father’s flat she decides the 
best thing is to set up a small camera that observes Joe in his main living area. 
Nerys can then get on with things in her own part of the house while observing 
that he is OK. Though Nerys explained to her father about the camera he seems 
unable to understand its purpose. Since installing the camera, Nerys has had 
peace of mind and has been able to get to the bottom of the food mystery, 
noticing that Joe has been feeding his dinner to his pet dog. However, Nerys is 
unsure whether she should carry on using the camera. 
Firstly, Nerys would be wise to reflect on the context in which she is making the 
decision. As the main care provider, the relationship that Nerys has with her father is 
relevant. Has it been a close and trusting one? How has it changed by the progress of his 
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dementia? Nerys may wish to consider the feelings and beliefs she has about looking 
after her father and reciprocally how her father might experience being cared for by 
her. For example, does Nerys feel obligated to care for her father, perhaps believing it to 
be part of a daughter’s role? She may also wish to consider if she is adequately 
supported and if there is anyone else she can discuss the situation with. 
Nerys is unsure whether to carry on using the camera. She considers a principle of 
whether it is acceptable to be watched without one’s knowledge. Nerys concludes that if 
her father had the mental capacity to understand then that would definitely not be an 
acceptable option due to a lack of privacy, and privacy being something that persons 
need to make life go best. However, due to her father’s lack of understanding, Nerys is 
uncertain whether such a principle would apply. Nerys also believes that a principle of 
doing the best for her father and protecting him from harm needs to be considered. For 
Nerys, to not keep a close eye on her father goes against such a principle and means that 
she would neglecting what she perceives as her duty as a daughter. 
Nonetheless, Nerys reflects on what it might feel like for her father to be watched in this 
way. Putting herself in his position, Nerys feels uneasy about this.  She decides to talk 
with him again about the situation. He continues to not understand what the camera is, 
referring to it only as ‘”…that black shiny button on the wall”. However, he also states 
that he likes to keep himself to himself, a value that his daughter knows he has held for 
many years. 
Nerys decides to respond to her uneasy feelings and remove the camera. However, she 
still feels a responsibility to consider how her father might be kept safe. Reflecting on 
her belief about being a dutiful daughter, Nerys considers whether this belief may have 
its origins in society placing an unreasonable expectation on her as a daughter. Nerys 
decides to seek support. She asks her brother if he can spend more time at the house to 
help her have a break and both he and Joe agree to this. Furthermore, she finds some 
other adaptations that would alert her if her father were to fall, without directly 
watching him or monitoring his movements. Finally, Nerys also decides to eat dinner 
with her father more regularly. Though this is not possible every day, Joe appears to 
enjoy this time and he starts to put on some weight. 
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8.5.2 COVERT MEDICATION 
Giving medication covertly to older adults who are unable to consent to medical 
treatment is not an unusual event in nursing and care homes (Haw and Stubbs 2010). In 
England this can only be done after a best interests meeting has been held (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence 2015). In order to establish best interests, English law 
requires the person’s present and past wishes be taken into account as well as any 
beliefs and values held and any other factors the person themselves would be likely to 
consider if they were making the decision (Department for Constitutional Affairs 2007) 
As discussed in Chapter 7 (7.5), this best interests standard does not merely look at 
what is going to produce the best outcome for the individual objectively but also 
introduces an element of substituted judgement by considering what the person 
themselves might have decided. However, some pressure can be put on the idea that the 
past preferences of the individual remain valid, if there is a lack of psychological 
continuity for the individual concerned between this past time and the current 
situation. 
Consider the example of Laura, who lives in a care home and has advanced 
dementia and diabetes. Laura requires a number of medications for her physical 
and mental health. These include medication to manage her diabetes and a small 
dose of an anti-psychotic medication which appears to reduce her mental 
distress. When offered medication in tablet form Laura spits these out. When 
asked about this, Laura does not communicate any reasons for refusal and it 
appears that she is unable to understand what the tablets are for. As such, she is 
assessed to currently lack the mental capacity to make this decision. 
A best interests meeting is held. This includes members of Laura’s immediate 
family as well as senior health and care staff who are managing Laura’s care. 
Laura’s family state that she would want to be treated as she always had strong 
views about the sanctity of life which they now to wish to honour for her. As such 
the consensus from the meeting is that is acceptable to give Laura her 
medications covertly as without these her diabetes would deteriorate, putting 
her life at risk. It is also decided that it is not in Laura’s best interests to be living 
with severe mental distress so to carry on giving anti-psychotic medication. This 
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is despite the knowledge that anti-psychotic medications can have serious 
adverse side effects for people with dementia (Banerjee 2009). 
As a result of the meeting, the care providers have been instructed to hide the 
medication in a small piece of cake and not to say that there is any medication 
there in order that Laura will take it. However, Jane who is on duty today, feels 
uncomfortable about this. Firstly, because it involves deception. Secondly, she is 
concerned about giving anti-psychotic medication, which may make have other 
adverse effects, when it cannot be ascertained that this is what Laura wishes. 
How might the ethical model help Jane in this situation? 
Firstly, Jane needs to be aware of the sociopolitical context in which the decision to give 
covert medication has been made. There is nothing that immediately can be done about 
the legal and policy situation. Though Jane may wish to lobby for a change in this, if she 
is uncomfortable with how the decision has been made. Furthermore, it is not 
immediately practical to have the prescription for the anti-psychotic drug reviewed and 
there is a reality that Jane may not be powerful enough to effectively challenge this 
decision. Though, it is hoped that adoption of this model would result in a more 
flattened hierarchy and a greater opportunity for all those involved in Laura’s care to 
negotiate a response to their situation. 
Jane finds herself in a situation where she has to decide what to do about giving the 
covert medication. She needs to be mindful of how she feels about the situation. Laura 
appears happy to have a piece of cake to eat, not knowing that it contains the 
medication but Jane feels uneasy about the deception. She is receptive to the fact that 
Laura has recently been reluctant to take medication and perhaps this suggests a 
current preference that cannot be fully expressed. 
Needing some further guidance the care provider looks to the Triple Theory principles. 
A principle can be formulated that it is a prima-facie wrong to lie to people as deception 
is not universally willable, nor is it an action that makes things go best in society. Yet, it 
is also the case that a principle of absolute honesty would not make things go best in 
society (though it is universally willable) and as such this would also fail the test set by 
the Triple Theory. As such, an exception needs to be built into the principle and Jane 
decides that it would probably be acceptable for someone to be deceived if they are 
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unaware of the threat to their health and there was no other reasonable option for 
removing this threat to their health. Jane also reasons that uncertainty over Laura’s 
current wishes requires that people err on the side of caution and treat her for this life 
threatening condition. As such giving the medication presents itself as an acceptable 
option. 
Jane also reflects on whether it is acceptable to be giving medication that may have 
serious adverse effects. This involves considering whether it provides the greatest 
benefit for Laura in line with a principle of beneficence (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2013). However, there is also a concern that a serious harm may result, even early 
death. The care provider considers a principle that allows a treatment which benefits 
but also seriously harms. She forms the view that in certain circumstances this action 
might be what makes things go best but could also be reasonably objected to by 
someone who does not wish to be harmed. Again, it is difficult to know if Laura would 
want to take this risk. 
Bearing this in mind, Jane then considers what someone who exemplifies receptivity 
might do in this situation. Jane imagines that such an individual would also be uneasy 
about using deception as well as having serious concerns about any aspects of the 
medication that risk harm to the individual long term. Nonetheless, when faced with the 
immediate risk of deterioration of someone’s mental health Jane imagines that they 
would go ahead and give the medication covertly. To do otherwise could be considered 
irresponsible and might jeopardise trust that others hold in care providers to give 
medication as prescribed. However, Jane imagines that her exemplar would also have 
the courage to challenge any aspects of the prescription that they believed were not 
right. In this case, Jane’s primary concern being the possible side effects of taking the 
anti-psychotic medication. So Jane plans to raise her concerns with the prescriber. 
Finally, the way that the response is carried out is important. The care provider is aware 
that openness may prevent Laura from accepting the cake. So she cannot be open about 
this. However, Laura ensures that the cake chosen to conceal the medication is one of 
Laura’s favourites and she makes her drink which shows a preference for also. The care 
provider also uses the opportunity to sit with Laura and the care provider is receptive 
to the fact that Laura appreciates this. 
Page | 223  
 
8.5.3 SEXUALITY 
As Mahieu and Gastmans (2012) point out, the sexual activity of people with dementia 
can present challenges to the care provider. The principle concern is that people with 
dementia may be at risk of being sexually exploited or abused due to their reduced 
ability to make decisions. On the other hand, people with dementia have the human 
need for love and intimacy the same as other human beings and any tendency to 
infantilise people with dementia needs to be avoided. Makimoto et al (2015) reviewing 
international studies on the topic and found that sexual experiences are common but 
vary a great deal in their nature and degree.  Furthermore, the responses to these 
experiences are often inconsistent and are highly sensitive to the attitudes of the care 
providers to the expression of sexuality in general. 
In trying to make a decision in ethical dilemmas involving a sexual element, the 
concepts of informed consent, selfhood and personal identity are commonly drawn on 
within the context of a principle of autonomy and other principles such as beneficence 
having less emphasis (Mahieu & Gastmans 2012). This might include a form of advance 
directives to assist with decision-making about sexual matters. However, as discussed 
above, ways of maintaining autonomy and personhood through advancing dementia are 
open to philosophical dispute and this limits the scope of their usefulness. 
Consider the following example. Ian and Angela live in a care home. Both Ian and 
Angela have dementia but Angela’s is considered to be more advanced. For a 
number of months Ian and Angela have been seen holding hands and appeared 
to be enjoying each other’s company. Recently, though, Ian has started spending 
time in Angela’s room, occasionally staying in it overnight.  
Some concern has been expressed by Angela’s relatives that she may be being 
exploited by Ian. Furthermore, Ian is still married, though his wife is not able to 
live with Ian in the care home. Ian states that he misses the intimacy he used to 
be able to experience with his wife. Ian’s wife is sympathetic to this but is not 
comfortable with Ian spending the night with Angela, saying that this ‘probably 
crosses a line’ for her. Angela when asked how she feels about spending time 
with Ian states that he is a nice man. Angela appears relaxed in Ian’s company 
when in public areas. 
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The care providers have a meeting to discuss what to do. How might the ethical 
model help in this situation? 
The context of the care home means that there are a number of people involved in 
making a decision about how to proceed. Ian and Angela both have dementia and this 
may affect their ability to make a decision in this situation. Legal aspects and local 
policies such as safeguarding procedures will be relevant. There is also the broader 
sociopolitical context of woman being more at risk of abuse from men and women’s 
oppression in society. 
The care providers recognise an ethical principle that consent must be given for 
significant physical contact. This is a basic principle which is necessary for a good 
society and it is one to which nobody can reasonable reject. In line with (Mathieu and 
Gastmans 2012) they also decide that both Ian and Angela need to be aware of the 
benefits and risks of having a sexual relationship. However, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether Angela (in particular) is giving consent to this. She states that Ian is a nice man 
and does not appear to be uncomfortable when he is with her. However, it is difficult to 
know how things are behind closed doors and Angela is unable to express her views on 
having an intimate sexual relationship with Ian. 
The care providers want Ian and Angela to be happy. In the past when Ian has been 
away from the home, Angela has appeared sad and states that she misses Ian. Ian has 
expressed similar feelings when Angela has been away. The care providers are receptive 
to this and want to act in a compassionate way. However, they are also worried about 
Angela, sensing that she is being dominated in this relationship. The care providers 
must also be mindful of their own views about sexuality and consider whether these 
views may be unreasonably prejudicing their judgement in regards to Ian and Angela’s 
situation. 
The thoughts and feelings of Angela’s relatives also need to be taken into account. 
Though the care providers need to put Ian and Angela first, the view of relatives may 
offer some insight. Angela’s relatives express a concern that this she is being dominated 
by Ian. Ian’s wife, on the other hand, appears to have a sympathetic attitude merely 
wishing him to be happy; though, she does express some apprehension about Ian 
spending the night with Angela. She states that this “crosses a line”. 
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The principle that someone should be able to consent to physical intimacy guides the 
care providers to agree that Ian and Angela should not be allowed to see each other in 
private in their rooms. This is a difficult decision and is against the principle that Ian 
and Angela should have the liberty to pursue an intimate relationship in private. 
Nonetheless, the general sense that Angela may be being exploited leads the care 
providers to take a more cautious approach. Ian is particularly upset with this decision. 
However, the care providers make every effort possible for Ian and Angela to spend 
time together during the day in public areas of the home. 
8.5.4 REFLECTION ON THE EXAMPLES 
The examples each draw on the three elements of the model, sociopolitical justice, use 
of the principles and emulation of exemplars. They seek to demonstrate how the ethical 
model is flexible enough to apply in complex and diverse situations by drawing more or 
less on the each of the elements necessary to make a decision. 
The first example draws more heavily on the sociopolitical element of the model to 
assist the care provider, Nerys, to reflect on how she might be best supported to care for 
father Joe. However, a reflection on principles is central in Nerys’s decision to take the 
camera down.  
The second example of Laura being given covert medication also relies on an 
assessment of principles to try and guide Jane in her decision. However, in this example, 
virtue is needed to act in a way that is both compassionate and measured but also 
courageous in order to challenge the decision that has been made. The power structure 
is important here, drawing again on the political aspect of the ethics of care. 
Finally, the difficult decision faces the care providers who are seeking to do the right 
thing for Ian and Angela. Once again principles are required to help guide the decision. 
However, the care providers need a mindful approach here to act in a way that reflects 
their intuitive discomfort with the situation but is also receptive to the feelings of both 
Ian and Angela. 
In order for care providers to develop the necessary skills and attributes to be able to 
best apply the ethical model in either version, the following ethical education 
programme is proposed. 
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8.6 OUTLINE OF AN ETHICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME 
The following outlines how an ethical education programme might be used to 
implement the ethical model. This could be carried out as a standalone course or as part 
of a broader programme in dementia care. It is envisaged that the courses could be run 
in venues such as higher education establishments, care homes or carer support groups. 
Overall, the objective is to make the programme as widely available and as inclusive as 
possible to reach the largest number of care providers. 
Overall, the programme has four proposed components: 
Component one  –  Receptivity 
Component two  –  Care in a supportive sociopolitical context 
Component three  –  Using ethical principles  
Component four  – Making ethical decisions 
8.6.1 RECEPTIVITY 
This is a central notion for providing ethical dementia care using the ethical model. As 
discussed in Chapter 5 (5.5), the first stage in cultivating receptivity as a virtue is to 
engage with emotions.  
In order to assist people with engaging with emotions the following questions may be 
helpful: 
 Consider your beliefs about emotion in dementia care? 
 Are you fully connected with your emotions when caring for someone with 
dementia? 
 Are there certain rules around the expression of emotions at work / in your 
home? 
This focus on emotions can be aligned to the Feelings Matter Most approach to dementia 
care pioneered by Sheard (2009). Sheard’s work does not aim to be an ethical model 
nor does it name the cultivation of receptivity as a goal. Nonetheless his work is highly 
relevant for this first stage which aims to engage care providers’ emotions in the ethical 
decision-making. 
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In his aim to develop person-centred care (broadly understood), Sheard argues that 
there are a number of ‘old rules’ relating to care providers’ emotions in dementia care 
that need to be replaced with new beliefs. 
Figure 6: Old rules and new beliefs for dementia care from Sheard (2009:69-89) 
Old rules New belief 
Express emotions at work is 
unprofessional 
Expressing emotions at work is needed to 
be an attached professional 
Leaving our personal lives at home is 
healthy 
Being a whole person at work is healthy 
Wearing a professional mask is protective Removing your mask at work and being 
authentic is essential in being person 
centred. 
Carrying out the role of a manager means 
not being real at work 
Being person centred leader requires the 
joining up of the personal and 
professional 
Promoting restrictive rules on emotions 
at work is effective 
Replacing rules at work with positive 
beliefs is the way forward 
Being professional with families  requires 
a ‘façade’ 
Being person centred with families 
involves facing jointly real emotional 
dilemma and placing the person living 
with a dementia centre stage 
Turning emotions into logic is more valid Turning care work back to focus on the 
central importance of emotions in 
everyone is the beginning of being person 
centred 
Disguising emotions is a strength in staff Disguising emotions at work belongs with 
institutionalised care. Expressing 
emotions at work is about your right to 
be a whole person at work. 
Focussing only on positive emotions at 
work is productive 
A new culture of opening up emotions at 
work has to be inclusive and also provide 
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an avenue for the release of less positive 
but equally natural feelings. 
Displaying emotions at work is a burden 
to others 
Displaying and sharing emotions at work 
with colleagues is essential. Sharing 
emotions within person centred staff 
team can unburden the weight of these 
feelings. 
 
The essence of this list is about connecting and valuing our emotions and putting these 
on at least an equal footing with reasoning when it comes to making decisions in a 
caring context. It highlights the way that emotions have tended to be seen as unhelpful 
and unprofessional in dementia care. These new ‘rules’ aim to radically change the 
situation by creating a new culture which opens up emotions. 
Sheard’s approach is primarily aimed at those providing dementia care within a care 
home environment. As such it is not an exact fit for the aim of this thesis to apply to 
anyone who is proving dementia care, professionally or not. Furthermore, it is possible 
to be critical of the statements made here. For example, it is unclear what might ground 
a ‘right’ to be a whole person or what being a ‘whole person’ actually means. In a similar 
vein, this thesis would take issue with describing such an approach as person-centred if 
this means that personhood as a moral status is the most important consideration. 
Yet, to make such criticisms may well be missing the broader point that is being made 
by these statements about the central role that emotion needs to play in dementia care. 
Further support for this approach, can be found in research from McPherson et al 
(2015) which has found that work pressure is made worse by a perceived need to 
repress emotions in order to remain ’professional’. McPherson et al (2015) support 
mindfulness as a practice which improves the ability of those providing dementia care to 
be aware of their own feelings and accept them. This is supported by reports from 
elsewhere that this results in the care provider being able to care for others in a way 
which more connected emotionally and less mechanical (Hurley et al 2014; Mackenzie 
& Poulin 2006). It is therefore suggested here that mindfulness practice forms an 
important part of developing a virtue of receptivity. 
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Being connected to the emotions is the first stage in order to develop a virtue of 
receptivity but empathy is required which is able to appreciate someone else’s 
experience and respond in a way which reflects that appreciation. As Slote (Slote 2015: 
5) argues: 
‘There are known to be two types of empathy: the projective kind, which 
involves being able to get inside the heads of others; and the associative or 
receptive kind, which involves actually identifying with the other person, 
actually seeing things, however briefly, from their point of view. The con artist 
who knows how to get into other people’s heads and who is good at reading 
what they are thinking or feeling doesn’t actually identify with the other person 
and their feelings/beliefs.’  
When applied to dementia care this suggests that every effort has to be made to imagine 
what it is like to be in that particular individual’s situation. In ethically challenging 
situations it is therefore essential to engage with the perspective of those receiving care. 
This means that in an ethically challenging situation, the aim is to first put yourself in 
the position of those being affected. This involves imagining what it might be like from 
their perspective. Some exercises may be helpful. 
 Role play where people put themselves in the position of someone with 
dementia. 
 Use case studies and ask people to imagine both a receptive and 
unreceptive response. 
For professionals, clinical supervision may also help people to reflect on their level of 
receptivity. Care providers in a non-work context might seek assistance from other care 
providers or support groups. 
8.6.2 CARE IN A SUPPORTIVE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 
Support is a central part of providing good care. This is why sociopolitical justice and 
mutuality forms the basis of the ethical model. This part of the programme will focus on 
how ethical care can best be promoted. A number of factors are relevant. 
Firstly, there are the broad political and organisational factors. As both Paley (2014) 
and McPherson et al (2015) point out, compassion deficit is not the source of unethical 
care when it is caused by issues such as poor staffing, management mechanisms or 
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other problems of a sociopolitical nature. As such, it is essential that care providers are 
supported by society and organisations to care ethically. 
Secondly, there are relationship factors at the micro-level. This involves factors such as 
how care providers support each other within in a team. It also involves the nature of 
the care relationship itself as well as the appropriate involvement of nearest and 
dearest in decision-making. 
The overall aim is to support ethical care for the care receiver. This needs to be an aim 
shared at all levels. Those involved in care may wish to ask the following questions. 
 What are the sources of support that care providers (or you as care 
provider) can draw on? 
 How can people be best supported to provide care? If part of a team, what 
can we do to support each other? 
 Reflect on vulnerability in the caring relationship and whether power is 
used appropriately. 
 How can the environment be improved to better support care? 
 What political changes might result in better resources for providing 
care? 
It needs to be recognised that some organisational or broader sociopolitical problems 
may be outside of the influence of individual care providers. However, being aware of 
such limitations is nonetheless an important consideration both in making ethical 
decisions, and feeling comfortable with the decision made. Decisions have to be made in 
the context that care providers find themselves, not an ideal world. Though it is 
important to keep ideals in mind and part of a wider ethical approach might involve 
campaigning for changes to improve the situation. 
The issue of power is also central here. Individual care providers may lack power to 
change the sociopolitical situation they find themselves in. However, care receivers 
often find themselves in a vulnerable and powerless position also. The response to 
vulnerability has been discussed in the thesis. For those who wish to promote 
independence as an ideal, empowerment may be seen as the logical solution to 
disempowerment. However, independence has been criticised in this thesis as an 
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unrealistic notion for human existence, particularly for those with dementia. Instead we 
find ourselves in a world of risky interdependence where we each have to trust each 
other and accept that we all are, to some extent, vulnerable. The response to 
vulnerability must therefore be a positive one that cultivates compassionate and 
appreciates mutual support rather than shunning it as weakness. 
When making a decision using the model, negotiation may well be necessary along with 
compromise with other affected parties the process. Negotiation and compromise may 
suggest to some that the best or right answer has not been followed. However, this 
thought would not be in tune with overall approach of the model. Both a Humean view 
of virtue ethics and the ethics of care suggest it is an acceptable situation for more than 
one answer to present itself. This can be referred to as a ‘blameless diversity’ of moral 
options (Garrett 2015). 
8.6.3 USING ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
Potentially this is the most theory dense aspect of the model. As such it is envisaged that 
the theory involved can be engaged with at different levels depending on people’s levels 
of knowledge. 
At the basic level, it is assumed that everyone with normal cognition has the ability to be 
a moral agent. Following the discussion in Chapter 7 (7.2.1), it might also be supposed 
that there is a form of common morality that majority of people hold (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2013). As such people tend to make ethical choices on a daily basis, such as 
whether to own up to wrongdoing, share an ice cream, jump a red light etc. People will 
have found a way of balancing these decisions, which may be simply using the Golden 
Rule, treating everyone as they would wish themselves be treated. Though, 
participation in this ethical education programme would introduce some further 
options that may be of assistance. 
At an intermediate level, the four principles framework of Beauchamp and Childress can 
be looked to for guidance. As discussed in depth, this involves balancing four principles: 
respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice. People would be made 
aware of the idea that these principles are non-absolute and need to be balanced. 
Examples real or imagined could be used to see how the principles might be employed. 
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At a more advanced level, the preferred approach is to use principles based on the 
Triple Theory of Parfit (2011). It is accepted that the concepts involved here are more 
complex. Fundamental to this approach is the claim that an act is wrong only when it is 
disallowed by a principle that will make things go best overall and can be both willed by 
all and not be reasonably objected to. The use of academic language may make this 
approach unattractive to some. Nonetheless, it does not seem wholly unrealistic to 
imagine a care provider considering whether an action conforms to a principle that is 
rational, justifiable to others and makes things go best. 
8.6.4 MAKING ETHICAL DECISIONS 
This leads to the core of the ethical model – the care response. The role of character 
comes to the fore in exercising judgement, both in terms of which course of action to 
choose and also how the decision is applied. Central to this process is asking the 
question 
What would a good care provider do? 
Professional groups may wish to the substitute the term care provider with a 
professional title. The model is flexible enough to allow for this as it is still consistent 
with the overarching aim which is to support people to be the best care providers they 
can be. It has already been argued that this requires a virtue of receptivity. Along with 
this the idea needs to be instilled that being a receptive care provider is a valuable 
occupation worthy of development. 
An important part of this process is looking to exemplars. As discussed in Chapter 5 
(5.4.4), these exemplars can be found in a variety of places and roles; they may be 
people from our everyday lives or those we know through literature. To help people 
with identifying exemplars the following question might be asked: 
Think of one or more people who are an inspiration to you in terms of how they 
care for others? They may real or from literature. 
This may then be followed up with a question such as 
Return to one of the difficult ethical situations we have discussed. Imagine how 
your exemplar might respond in such a situation. 
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All of the elements can now be pulled together and a response made based on either the 
academic or simplified version of the ethical model as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
An education programme, based on the outline here, is proposed as the main way that 
the findings of this thesis could be implemented. There are a number of 
recommendations which also follow from the arguments made in the thesis.  
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9 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations in the following areas can be made: 
Philosophy of the ethics of dementia care  
1) Personhood as a moral status should not be the primary focus for ethical dementia 
care. The emphasis needs to be on emotions and interdependent relationships not 
the promotion of independence or individual choice (3.6.1)(3.7)(4.9.1)(5.5)(6.2.1) 
(8.4). 
2) The term dignity expresses intuitive ideas that matter deeply to people and should 
not be dismissed. However, what people understand by the term varies greatly 
and is relative to culture. Care responses which look to dignity for inspiration need 
to be mindful of this (4.8). 
Providing ethical dementia care  
3) Emotions should form a central place in the ethics as well the general practice of 
dementia care. (6.5.1) 
4) The virtue of receptivity should be the central virtue for dementia care. Care 
providers need to look for exemplars of receptivity in life and literature for 
inspiration and guidance. It is suggested that mindfulness practice forms an 
important part of developing a virtue of receptivity (5.5)(6.4)(6.5)(8.3.3)(8.6.1) 
5) Principles should be seen as part of a pluralistic ethical approach which supports 
care providers to be the best care providers they can be. (7.7) 
Social policy 
6) It is necessary to improve sociopolitical conditions by raising the status of care in 
society as well as by promoting mutuality and negotiation in caring encounters 
(6.3) (6.4). 
7) Advance decisions are an unreliable way of maintaining autonomy. Advance 
decisions to refuse treatment should be treated with caution and not given the 
same authority as contemporaneous refusals of treatment. (2.9) 
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Implementation and future research 
8) The ethical model will be implemented by the development of an ethics education 
programme that could be made available in a range of settings and formats in 
order for it to reach the widest possible audience of dementia care providers (8.6) 
9) Future research will test empirically whether the ethical model and the associated 
education programme are understandable across a range of care providers and if 
it is found to be useful in promoting ethical dementia care. 
9.2 OVERALL CONCLUSION AND ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION 
The research question asked which philosophical approach provides the best 
foundation for the ethics of dementia care. In order to answer this question, a number of 
philosophical approaches have been evaluated. 
Overall, it has been argued that personhood as a moral status should not be the primary 
focus for the ethics of dementia care. How best to construct, regain or maintain 
personhood in a broader sense might be useful questions to consider in terms of a 
therapeutic response to dementia. However, in terms of an ethical model, a more 
promising and inclusive route is to provide care for people in a way that does not 
require an answer to the question of whether personhood is present.  
Instead, it is argued that emotions should form a central place in the ethics of dementia 
care. As a result, the term emotion-centred care might more accurately describe this 
new approach. It aims to nurture the good character of care providers so they can care 
for people in a way which is both receptive and principled. 
The ethical model represents graphically the conclusion of this thesis. The ethical model 
demonstrates an original contribution to knowledge in the area. The central role of a 
virtue of receptivity, based on the work of Slote has not previously been applied as 
philosophical approach for the ethics of dementia care. Furthermore, it is a novel move 
to then combine this with both principle-based ethics and an ethics of care approach. 
Personhood not being at the centre of the ethical approach also marks a somewhat 
radical departure due to the central place that the concept has held discussions about 
dementia care for many years. 
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It is appreciated that harmonising such a broad range of philosophical ideas into the 
model may challenge those who believe that these ethical theories cannot be compatible 
with one another. This thesis has presented a number of arguments as to why this 
pluralistic approach is justified conceptually. These stand as its defence. 
Whether such a model can be understood and used effectively by care providers is a 
separate but equally important consideration. The model and the proposed ethics 
education programme have been designed to be sensitive to this. However, whether 
either will be practicable is an empirical question that would be the subject of further 
research. 
The recommendations outlined above flow from the arguments that have produced the 
ethical model.  It is asserted that following the recommendations above will produce an 
ethics for dementia care which meets the challenges raised by the condition better than 
previous frameworks. More broadly, the model also promotes caring as an essential 
part of society which needs to be valued and supported as a mutual endeavour. 
Dementia may or may not touch our lives directly. Nonetheless, we all need care at 
times, and we should hold in high esteem those who choose, often selflessly, to provide 
care to people at the time of their greatest need. 
[83200] 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A – CARE PROVIDER BEHVAIOURS RESULTING FROM A 
MALIGNANT SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY  
1. Treachery 
2. Disempowerment 
3. Infantilization 
4. Intimidation 
5. Labelling 
6. Stigmatization 
7. Outpacing 
8. Invalidation 
9. Banishment 
10. Objectification 
11. Ignoring 
12. Imposition 
13. Withholding 
14. Accusation 
15. Disruption 
16. Mockery 
17. Disparagement 
(Kitwood 1997:46-47) 
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APPENDIX B –  SIX COMPONENT ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEMENTIA 
PRODUCED BY THE NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 
 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2009a: xvii) 
 
